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ABSTRACT 
 
John Quinn 
The Corporate Objective: Reinterpreting Directors’ Duties 
This thesis aims to find the model of the corporate objective which is most likely to provide maximum 
wealth for all participants in the company. The corporate objective deals with the question: in whose 
interests should a company be run? This question is answered by providing a legal and theoretical 
argument that it is best for all participants if directors focus on maximising the wealth of the company 
as a separate legal entity. The entity focused approach requires directors to prioritise the interests of 
the company as an entity ahead of the interests of any shareholder or stakeholder groups. The thesis 
also argues that it is possible to practically implement such a model in Ireland. Currently Ireland 
implements a shareholder value approach with the duty to act in the interests of the company being 
equated with a duty to act in the interests of the shareholders. However, with a reinterpretation from 
the Irish courts as to what it means to act in the best interests of the company, an entity focused 
approach can be implemented. It is submitted that there is a sufficient legal basis for the Irish courts to 
make this reinterpretation. It is also submitted that enforcement of the entity focused approach can be 
ensured through the directors’ duty to act in good faith. Compliance with this good faith duty is a 
question of honesty and it is submitted that the test being applied for honesty is an objective one. This 
objective test means that it will be possible to hold directors to account when they fail to act in the 
best interests of the company. This thesis argues that in comparison to other models such as 
shareholder value, stakeholder theory and Enlightened Shareholder Value, the entity based approach 
provides the greatest potential for a company to maximise benefits for all its constituents.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.01 Introduction 
Since the company has been given the status of a separate legal entity1 there has been a remarkable 
change in the role of companies. Companies have gone from small organisations to enormous 
multinational enterprises. Companies, particularly large public companies, wield significant political, 
social and economic power in modern society.2 The actions of such companies affect not only direct 
stakeholders of the company such as employees, creditors and customers but also governments, 
communities and the environment.3 They employ millions of people and exercise significant control 
over public service sectors such as telecommunications4 and food production.5 Despite the significant 
impact companies have on society, there is no agreement between academics or law makers as to what 
their objective or purpose should be. This is despite the view that all purposeful behaviour requires the 
existence of a clear objective.6 Is the function of companies simply to increase shareholder wealth or 
do companies have a wider responsibility to benefit stakeholders and society as a whole?  
An answer to this question firstly requires a normative determination on the role of companies and 
secondly a determination as to which legal framework offers the greatest chance of achieving this 
normative goal. Hansmann et al provide the suitable solution to the normative question when stating 
that, ‘[t]he appropriate goal of corporate law is to advance the aggregate welfare of all who are 
affected by a firm’s activities including the firm’s shareholders, employees, suppliers and customers, 
as well as third parties such as local communities and beneficiaries of the natural environment’.7 A 
similar goal was outlined by the Company Law Review Steering Group (CLRSG), who led the reform 
of UK company law leading to enactment of the Companies Act 2006. The Group stated its aim in the 
reforming the corporate objective was to achieve ‘efficient creation of wealth and other benefits for all 
participants in the enterprise’.8 It is submitted that a similar aim of maximising wealth for all 
constituents in a company should be the aim of the law when setting the corporate objective. The 
difficultly is finding a legal framework which attains this goal in practice. Any legal model which 
deals with the corporate objective will be required to deal with the duties of directors. Directors, as 
                                                          
1
 Companies Act 1862; Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22. 
2
 Kent Greenfield, ‘There’s a Forest in Those Tress: Teaching about the Role of Corporations in Society’ (2000) 
34 Georgia Law Review 1011, 1013.  
3
 Daniel Attenborough, ‘Giving Purpose to the Corporate Purpose Debate: An Equitable Maximisation and 
Viability Principle’ (2012) 32(1) Legal Studies 4, 4.  
4
 Andrew Keay, The Corporate Objective: Corporations, Globalisation and the Law (Elgar 2011), 5.  
5
 John Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility (Oxford University Press 1993), 15.  
6
 Michael Jensen, ‘Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objective Function’ (2001) 7(3) 
European Financial Management 297, 302. Andrew Keay, The Corporate Objective: Corporations, 
Globalisation and the Law (Elgar 2011), 8. 
7
 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, Paul Davies, Gerard Hertig, Hideki Kanda, Edward Rock, Klaus Hopt 
Luca Enriques, John Armour, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (2nd 
edn, Oxford University Press 2009), 28.  
8
 CLRSG, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework (DTI, 1999) para 
5.1.8. 
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managers of the company, are charged with the day to day decision making in a company. The duties 
placed on directors, the enforcement methods used to enforce these duties and how directors respond 
to these legal requirements are the primary factors which will determine what a company’s objective 
will be.  
Traditionally there are two models which deal with the question of the corporate objective: 
stakeholder theory and shareholder value. Stakeholder theory holds the company should be run for the 
benefit of all stakeholders and no one interest group is to be prioritised over any other.9 While 
normatively desirable, there are significant difficulties in practically implementing the theory.10 
Directors aiming to benefit all stakeholders will end up trying to maximise in several different 
directions, something which is likely to be detrimental to the company’s attempts to be economically 
successful.11 Because stakeholder theory provides no guidance on how to choose between 
stakeholders when their interests are in conflict,12 it becomes impossible for directors to balance all 
divergent agendas, meaning that the company is likely to become inefficient.13 Ultimately if the 
company is economically inefficient and unprofitable it will not serve to benefit any constituent. 
A model which can be practically implemented and allows one particular stakeholder, employees, a 
significant role in the management of companies is the German model of codetermination. Through a 
two-tiered board model, certain German companies are required to give employees up to fifty per cent 
representation on the supervisory board. However, applying such models in a common law country 
would require major institutional reform and represent a significant change to corporate culture. The 
difficulties in implementing major reform have led the UK CLRSG14 and the Irish Company Law 
Review Group15 both declining to adopt a two-tiered board model of governance or make any changes 
to board composition. At EU level the draft Fifth Directive16 attempted to implement an EU wide two-
tiered board model in line with that of Germany’s. However due to strong opposition from Member 
                                                          
9
 See Max Clarkson, ‘A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social Performance’ 
(1995) 20 Academey Management Review 92; Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder 
Approach (Pitman 1984); Thomas Donaldson and Lee Preston, ‘The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: 
Concepts, Evidence, Implications’ (1995) 20 Academy Management Review 65; Thomas Donaldson, ‘The 
Stakeholder Revolution and the Clarkson Principles’ (2002) 12 Business Ethics Quarterly 107. 
10
 See Elaine Sternberg, ‘The Defects of Stakeholder Theory’ (1997) 5(1) Corporate Governance 3; Anant 
Sandaram and Andrew Inkpen, ‘The Corporate Objective Revisited’ (2004) 15(3) Organisation Science 350; 
Amir Licht, ‘The Maximands of Corporate Governance: The Theory of Values and Cognitive Style’ (2004) 29 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 649. 
11
 Michael Jensen, ‘Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objective Function’ (2001) 7(3) 
European Financial Management 297, 300. 
12
 Ibid, 13. 
13
 The Committee on Corporate Law, ‘Other Constituency Statutes: Potential for Confusion’ (1990) 45 Business 
Lawyer 2253, 2269. 
14
 CLRSG, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework (DTI, 1999) para 
5.1.32. 
15
 Company Law Review Group, First Report, (Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, December 2011)  
available at http://www.clrg.org/1streport/first.asp p247 para 11.8.14. 
16
 Concerning the structure of the Public Limited Companies and the Powers and Obligations of their Organs 15 
OJ EUR. COMM. (No. C131) 49 (1972). 
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States, the Fifth Directive failed in its attempts to harmonise the law in this area. A Directive and a 
European Council Regulation introduced in 2001 now protects the rights of Member States to choose 
their own structure of company boards.17 What these examples highlight is that any significant 
changes to legal frameworks in line with either stakeholder theory or the German two-tiered model 
are unlikely to be implemented in common law countries. The point is that when discussing legal 
models to practically implement in common law jurisdictions there are limits to the reform that can be 
proposed as countries are unwilling to make major changes to existing legal frameworks.  
The other traditional framework that addresses the corporate objective is shareholder value18 which 
requires the company to be run for the ultimate objective of maximising shareholder wealth.19 While 
shareholder value is criticised on normative grounds,20 it is possible to practically implement the 
model. Due to this ability to work in practice and the deficiencies of stakeholder theory, shareholder 
value is seen as the best way to achieve increased benefits for all constituents. After the enactment of 
the Companies Act 2006 the UK now implements a model called Enlightened Shareholder Value 
(ESV) but is a model which is much more shareholder orientated than the common law. ESV requires 
directors to promote the success of the company for the ‘benefit of its members as a whole’ and as a 
result ESV legislatively defines company success in terms of benefit to the shareholders. This 
removes any possibility for the courts to interpret the duty as anything other than a requirement to 
prioritise the shareholders’ interests, even ahead of the interests of the company as a separate entity. 
After the enactment of ESV there is no room for a distinction between the interests of the shareholders 
and the interests of the company, a distinction which was possible under the common law.21 ESV 
currently possesses what the common law never did: a clear corporate objective of running the 
company for the benefit of the shareholders which represents a strident affirmation of shareholder 
                                                          
17
 Council Regulation 2157/2001 of October 8 2001 on the statute for a European Company (SE) [2001] OJ 
L294/1 and the SE employees’ Directive [2001] OJ L294/22-23. 
18
 See Stephen Bainbridge, ‘In Defence of the Shareholder Wealth Maximisation Norm: A Reply to Professor 
Green’ (1993) 50 Washington and Lee Law Review 1423; Anant Sunderam and Andrew Inkpen, ‘The Corporate 
Objective Revisited’ (2004) 15(3) Organization Science 350; Alistair Alcock, ‘Corporate Governance: A 
Defence of Status Quo’ (1995) 58(6) Modern Law Review 898; Jonathon Macey, ‘An Economic Analysis of the 
Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Governance Fiduciary 
Duties’ (1991) 21 Stenson Law Review 23; Bernard Black and Reiner Kraakamn, ‘A Self Enforcing Model of 
Corporate Law’ (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 1911; Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman, ‘The End of 
History for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Review 440.  
19
 Stephen Banbridge, ‘Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance’ (2003) 97 
Northwestern University Law Review 547, 573. 
20
 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, Paul Davies, Gerard Hertig, Hideki Kanda, Edward Rock, Klaus Hopt 
Luca Enriques, John Armour, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (2nd 
edn, Oxford University Press 2009), 28; David Millon, ‘New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the 
Team Production Model of the Corporate Board’ (2000) 86 Virginia Law Review 1001, 1002-1004; Lynn Stout, 
‘Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy’ (2002) 75 Southern California Law Review 1189, 
1191.  
21
 See Dawson International plc v Coats Platon plc [1989] BCLC 233; Re BSB Holdings Ltd [1996] 1 BCLC 
155; Re Welfab Engineers [1990] BCLC 833. 
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value.22 ESV provides that directors are to have regard to a list of non-shareholder interests including 
employees, customers, suppliers, the local community. However due to the clear prioritisation of the 
shareholders, this requirement is extremely difficult to enforce and is largely ineffective in ensuring 
directors will actually consider the stakeholder interests. Despite its endorsement in the UK, 
shareholder value has its difficulties and is often not the best way to maximise wealth for all 
participants. Shareholder value primarily benefits shareholders, often at the expense of stakeholders 
and potentially the company itself, particularly in scenarios when the shareholders’ interests and the 
company’s interests do not align. In addition shareholder value is linked with short-termism23 where 
directors sacrifice worthwhile investments with long term benefits in order to increase reported 
earnings in the short term.24 This short term approach can be damaging for stakeholders and harmful 
to the company as an entity.25 
Due to the impracticalities of stakeholder theory and the harms to stakeholders and the company 
likely to result from application of shareholder value, it is submitted that the best legal model to 
achieve the maximum benefit for all constituents is to maximise the wealth of the company as a 
distinct legal entity. Directors’ focusing on the maximisation of the entity’s wealth provides the 
greatest chance for the company to be successful and provide knock-on benefits to its constituents. 
The approach is dependent on applying real entity theory.26 The proposition from entity theory is that 
the company is a separate legal entity which is distinct from its shareholders27 meaning the company 
is a distinct autonomous being which has attributes not found among its human components.28 This 
view of the company provides the basis for not following shareholder value and allows directors to act 
in favour of stakeholder interests when it benefits the company as a distinct entity to do so. This view 
of the company reflects two very well established legal doctrines: First that a company has a separate 
                                                          
22
 Alistair Alcock, ‘An Accidental Change to Directors’ Duties’ (2009) 30 Company Lawyer 362, 367.  
23
 Andrew Keay, Directors’ Duties (2nd edn, Jordan 2014), 148. 
24
 John Grinyer, Alex Russell and David Collision, ‘Evidence of Managerial Short-Termism in the UK’ (1998) 9 
British Journal of Management 13, 15. 
25
 Larry Mitchell, Corporate Irresponsibility: America’s Newest Export (Yale University Press 2001), 11. 
26
 See Arthur Machen, ‘Corporate Personality’ (1911) 24 Harvard Law Review 253; Sanford Schane, ‘The 
Corporation is a Person: the Language of Legal Fiction’ (1986) Tulane Law Review 563; Waino Suojanen, 
‘Accounting Theory and the Large Corporation’ (1954) 29 The Accounting Review 391; Morten Horwitz, ‘Santa 
Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory’ (1985) 88 West Virginia Law Review 173; Susan 
Watson, ‘How the Company Became an Entity: A New Understanding of Corporate Law’ (2015) Journal of 
Business Law 120; John Farrar, ‘Frankenstein Incorporated or Fools Parliament? Revisiting the Concept of the 
Corporation in Corporate Governance’ (1998) 10 Bond Law Review 142.  
27
 Paddy Ireland, Ian Grigg-Spall and Dave Kelly, ‘The Conceptual Foundations of Modern Company Law’ 
(1987) 14(1) Journal of Law & Society 149, 150; Gregory Mark, ‘The Personification of the Business 
Corporation in American Law’ (1987) 54 University of Chicago Law Review 1441, 1468. 
28
 Martin Petrin, ‘Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm: From Nature to Function’ (2013) 118 Penn State 
Law Review 1, 7. 
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legal personality29 and second that directors owe their duties to the company as an entity and not 
directly to any interest group.30  
Applying an entity focused approach to the corporate objective originates from Andrew Keay31 and 
Daniel Attenborough.32 These normative works call for a new model of the corporate objective, one 
which focuses on maximising the wealth and ensuring the sustainability of the company as an entity. 
Unlike shareholder value, the interest which has priority over all others is that of the company as an 
entity.33 Rather than focusing on the individual interest groups as under stakeholder theory, the entity 
focused model prioritises the interests of the company and what will enhance its position.34 
Attenborough believes that entity maximisation will promote fairness between competing interests 
and will be more likely to increase the efficiency of the company than completing models.35 Keay 
submits that following the model will benefit the public good as enhancement of the entity will result 
in benefits to all the company’s constituents.36 Jensen would seem to agree when he states that ‘200 
years’ worth of work in economics and finance indicate that social welfare is maximised when all 
firms in an economy maximise total firm value’.37 
While the works of Keay and Attenborough are normative in nature, this thesis submits that there is 
legal basis and legal scope to implement this model in Ireland. The Companies Act 2014 requires a 
director to ‘act in good faith in what the director considers to be in the interests of the company’.38 It 
is submitted that this broad fiduciary duty allows for an entity focused approach. However the 
existing interpretation from the Irish courts implements a shareholder value approach. The Irish courts 
have equated the common law duty to act in the interests of the company with a duty to act in the 
                                                          
29
 See for example, Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22; A L Underwood Ltd v Bank of Liverpool 
[1924] 1 KB 775; Macura v Northern Insurance Co Ltd [1925] AC 619; Roberts v Coventry Corporation [1947] 
1 All ER 308; Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] QB 373; Lee v Lee’s Farming Ltd [1961] AC 12; Re 
Frederick Inns [1991] ILRM 582; Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (A Firm) [2002] 2 AC 1; Attorney General v 
Jameson [1904] 2 IR 644. Allied Irish Coal Supplies Ltd. v Powell Duffryn International Fuels Ltd [1998] 2 IR 
519. 
30
 See for example Percivil v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421. Dawson International plc v Coats Platon plc [1989] 
BCLC 233; Crindle Investments et al v Wymes et al [1998] 2 ILRM 275; Re A Company (No. 004415) [1997] 
BCLC 479 Ch D; Peskin v Anderson [2001] 1 BCLC 372; Smith v Cork and Bandon Railway Co (1870) 5 IR 
EQ 63; Bloxham (in Liquidation) v The Irish Stock Exchange Ltd [2014] IEHC 93. 
31
 Andrew Keay, ‘Ascertaining the Corporate Objective: An Entity Maximisation and Sustainability Model’ 
(2008) 71(5) The Modern Law Review 663; Andrew Keay, The Corporate Objective: Corporations, 
Globalisation and the Law (Elgar 2011).  
32
 Daniel Attenborough, ‘Giving Purpose to the Corporate Purpose Debate: An Equitable Maximisation and 
Viability Principle’ (2012) 32(1) Legal Studies 4. 
33
 Andrew Keay, The Corporate Objective: Corporations, Globalisation and the Law (Elgar 2011), 198.  
34
 Ibid, 199.  
35
 Daniel Attenborough, ‘Giving Purpose to the Corporate Purpose Debate: An Equitable Maximisation and 
Viability Principle’ (2012) 32(1) Legal Studies 4, 27.  
36
 Andrew Keay, The Corporate Objective: Corporations, Globalisation and the Law (Elgar 2011), 175.  
37
 Michael Jensen, ‘Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objective Function’ (2001) 7(3) 
European Financial Management 297, 302.  
38
 Companies Act 2014 s 228(1)(a). 
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interests of the shareholders.39 This thesis argues for a reinterpretation of what it means to act in the 
interests of the company in the Irish context. To legally implement an entity focused approach a 
directors’ duty to ‘act in the interests of the company’ needs to be interpreted as exactly that, a duty to 
act for the company, as a separate legal entity. It is argued that this interpretation is more likely to 
meet the goal of maximising wealth for all company constituents. In addition this would reflect the 
legal reality that the company is a separate person distinct from its shareholders. There are also a 
number of cases which provide persuasive authority for not following a shareholder value based 
interpretation of the duty to act in the interests of the company. Prior to the enactment of the UK 
Companies Act 2006 several cases from England and Wales required directors to consider stakeholder 
interests when deciding what was in the interests of the company.40 Other cases have recognised that 
the interests of the company and the shareholders may well diverge and that in such cases it is the 
entity’s interests which should take priority.41 There are also a number of cases from Canada, a 
jurisdiction which has very similar legislation to Ireland on this topic, which have advocated an entity 
focused approach to the duty to act in the interests of the company.42 
It is also argued that, in Ireland, there is a changing context in the way in which directors’ duties are 
viewed. Ahern argues that company law in Ireland is changing from serving the interests of 
shareholders to instead serving a public interest function.43 This outlook is evidenced by the public 
enforcement of directors’ duties and the inclusion of a new fiduciary duty to act honestly and 
responsibly44 taken from the law on restriction.45 The purpose of the restriction regime in Ireland is to 
protect the public46 and several cases have found a director to not have acted honestly and responsibly 
when they have acted contrary to stakeholder interests.47 Including a new fiduciary duty taken from 
this area of law does signal an implicit intention from the legislature to protect interests broader than 
just shareholders.  
 
                                                          
39
 See G & S Doherty Ltd v Doherty (19 June 1969, unreported) HC, 22; Irish Press Plc v Ingersoll Irish 
Publications Ltd (15 December 1993, unreported), 77; Re Frederick Inns Ltd.  [1994] 1 ILRM 387, 396. 
40
 See Evans v Brunner Mond & Co Ltd [1921] 1 Ch. 359; Lonhro v Shell Petroleum  [1980] 1 WLR 627; 
Fulham Football Club v Cabra Estates [1994] 1 BCLC 363. 
41
 Dawson International plc v Coats Platon plc [1989] BCLC 233; Re BSB Holdings Ltd [1996] 1 BCLC 155; 
Re Welfab Engineers [1990] BCLC 833. 
42
 Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v Wise [2004] 3 SCR 461; BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders 
[2008] SCR 560. 
43
 Deirdre Ahern, ‘Directors’ Duties: Broadening the Focus Beyond Current Context to Examine the 
Accountability Spectrum’ (2011) 33 Dublin University Law Journal 116, 140.  
44
 Companies Act 2014 s 228(1)(b). 
45
 Companies Act 2014 s 819. 
46
 See La Moselle Clothing Ltd and Rosegem Ltd [1998] 2 ILRM 345; Duignan v Carway [2002] IEHC 1; Re 
Colm O’ Neil Engineering Services Ltd [2004] IEHC 83. 
47
 Duignan v Carway [2002] IEHC 1; Re Outdoor Advertising Services Ltd (28 January 1997, unreported) HC; 
Re Usit World [2005] IEHC 285. 
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Finally, it is submitted, that enforcement of the entity focused approach can be ensured through the 
duty of good faith which is assessed primarily on an objective basis. This objective test means that it 
is possible to hold director to account when they fail to act in the interests of the company. However 
the duty is often referred to as subjective48 and is perceived to be a duty which is almost impossible to 
breach.49 However an examination of the case law highlights that the duty is assessed primarily on 
objective grounds and that directors will be found in breach of the duty when they have not acted in 
line with reasonable standards.50 This thesis argues for a clear pronouncement of an objective test for 
honesty under the duty of good faith in line with the judgment in Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan51 which 
clarified a similar area of trusts law. Such a pronouncement of an objective test could have a 
declaratory effect on director behaviour by establishing a clear standard of conduct for directors. Such 
a clarification would also make it clearer as to when there has been a breach of duty from director 
making it more likely that a derivative action or an action by a liquidator will be taken. The aim is that 
any successful action on these grounds and the declaratory effect could function as a deterrent for 
directors’ non-compliance and so ensure directors do to act in the interests of the company. For the 
duty of good faith to act in such a way it would require a reinterpretation and a clear pronouncement 
that the duty is to act in good faith is assessed by an objective standard. It is submitted that this 
objective standard of good faith coupled with the public enforcement regime currently in operation 
through the Office of the Director for Corporate Enforcement (ODCE) and the restriction regime 
offers the best method to enforce this duty to act in good faith in the interests of the company.  
1.02 Research Question 
The aim of the thesis is to determine the legal framework of directors’ duties which is most likely to 
achieve maximum benefit for all company constituents. The research question is answered by 
requiring directors to focus on promoting the success of the company as a separate entity. In making 
this determination the thesis examines the models of shareholder value, stakeholder theory, German 
codetermination, Enlightened Shareholder Value, and the common law approach from the UK and 
Ireland.  
1.03 Original Contribution to Existing Research 
                                                          
48
 Extrasure Travel Insurances ltd v Scattergood [2003] 1 BCLC 598; Regentcrest plc v Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 
80; Brenda Hannigan, Company Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2009), 206; Richard Williams, 
‘Enlightened Shareholder Value in UK Company Law’ (2012) 35(1) University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 360, 365; Davy Wu, ‘Managerial Behaviour, Company Law and the Problem of the Enlightened 
Shareholder Value’ (2010) 31(2) Company Lawyer 53, 54.  
49
 Paul Davies, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law (8Th Edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2008), 
510. 
50
 Item Software Ltd (UK) Ltd v Fassihi [2004] EWCA Civ 1244; Re Coroin Ltd [2012] EWHC 2343 (Ch); 
Breitenfeld UK Ltd v Harrison [2015] EWHC 399 (Ch); Re Genosyis Technology [2006] EWHC 989 Ch; 
Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum Limited [1974] AC 821; Bloxham (in Liquidation) v The Irish Stock 
Exchange Ltd [2014] IEHC 93.  
51
 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan Kok Ming [1995] 2 AC 378. 
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The research provides an original contribution in two ways.  Firstly the research proposes a practical 
way to legally implement an entity focused approach to the issue of the corporate objective. While 
normative models have been already proposed, this research submits that an entity focused approach 
can be legally implemented in Ireland. After the enactment of ESV it is not possible to adopt an entity 
focused approach in the UK, however, such a model remains possible to legally implement in Ireland 
with a reinterpretation from the Irish courts for what it means to act in the interests of the company.  
Secondly the research makes an original argument that the duty to act in good faith can be used as an 
effective means to enforce the fiduciary duty to act in the interests of the company.  
1.04 Methodology 
The methodology involves traditional legal doctrinal analysis of statutory material, case law, 
academic commentary and company law reform documents. The thesis focuses primarily on the law 
of Ireland and England and Wales and there is a significant comparative analysis between the two 
jurisdictions. Brief references are also made to Canadian, Australian, US and Scottish law. 
The German model of codetermination is also examined, primarily from secondary sources due to 
language and resource based restrictions. The aim of the German discussion is to outline the historical 
and cultural complexities involved in the development of Germany’s two-tiered board model and to 
demonstrate that transplanting the model to a common law jurisdiction is very difficult.   
1.05 Language & Terms Used 
The term members and shareholders are used interchangeably throughout the thesis. The term 
member is used in the Irish Companies Act 2014 and the UK Companies Act 2006 as it applies to 
companies who are limited by guarantee as well as companies limited by shares. Companies limited 
by guarantee have no shareholders, only members, but for the purposes of this thesis there is no 
distinction between the two terms. 
The discussion in this thesis regarding the corporate objective is most relevant to public companies 
where there is a separation of ownership and control. In small closely held companies there is less 
likely to be a divergence between the company’s interests and the shareholders’ interests.  
This thesis deals primarily with the jurisdiction of Ireland. However given the reliance on English 
authority in Irish law and the general similarities between the UK Companies Act 2006 and the 
Companies Act 2014, the UK is the main comparator. As a result, the common law of England and 
Wales and the provisions of the UK Companies Act 2006 will be examined in detail.  
10 
 
The term stakeholder is used frequently in this thesis and the word has been subject to many different 
definitions.52 The most well-known definition was provided by Freeman who defined a stakeholder as 
‘any group or individual who is affected by or can affect the achievement of the organisations 
objectives’.53 It is difficult to precisely define what is meant by the term stakeholder as there are 
potentially many groups that can be affected by a company or can affect the achievement of a 
company’s objectives. Generally speaking however, for the purposes of this thesis, the term refers to 
interest groups such as employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, the environment and society as a 
whole.  
1.06 Thesis Outline & Structure 
Chapter two contains an analysis of the shareholder value model. It outlines the theoretical arguments 
in favour the model and the legal basis for its application. The chapter will compare and contrast 
shareholder value to an entity focused model and demonstrate that the latter is the more accurate legal 
approach. The chapter argues that the entity approach is more likely to achieve maximum benefits for 
all constituents.  
Chapter three outlines stakeholder theory and discusses its difficulties with practical application. The 
chapter also describes German model of codetermination and the two-tiered board model of corporate 
governance. The aim of the examination is to highlight why the German model is unlikely to be 
applied in common law countries.  
Chapter four has three sections. The first is a description and an analysis of the reform process leading 
to the enactment of ESV. The purpose of which is to establish underlying rationales as to why ESV 
was selected from the different options being considered. The second is a discussion on reporting 
requirements in corporate law and the role envisaged of corporate reporting under ESV. The third part 
is an analysis of the final result of ESV, the conclusion of which is that ESV represents an 
endorsement of shareholder value to a much greater degree than was ever required by the common 
law.   
Chapter five describes the Irish law on the issue of the corporate objective. It outlines the common 
law approach to the topic and how the Companies Act 2014 has legislated on the issue. It argues for a 
reinterpretation of what it means to act in the interests of the company as a duty to act in the interests 
of the entity as a separate legal person.  
                                                          
52
 See Ronald Mitchell, Bradley Agle and Donna Wood, ‘Towards a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and 
Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts’ (1997) 22 Academy Management Review 
853. 
53
 Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Pitman Publishers 1984), 32. 
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Chapter six examines in detail the potential of enforcing directors’ duties through the good faith duty. 
It is submitted that the good faith duty is primarily assessed on an objective basis and that it could be 
used as a means to ensure directors comply with the duty to act in the interests of the company.  
Chapter seven is the conclusion and outlines the final reasons for advocating the entity approach as a 
solution to the corporate objective.  
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Chapter 2 Shareholder Value 
2.01 Introduction 
Shareholder value theory requires the ultimate objective of the company to be the maximisation of 
shareholder wealth1 and so requires directors to manage the company in the interests of the 
shareholders. Shareholder value has been regarded to be the cornerstone of UK corporate governance2 
and is generally perceived to be the dominant judicial approach taken in the UK.3 Shareholder value 
has also significant support within Irish case law.4 Since the work of Berle and Means,5 academic 
support for the paradigm has remained strong,6 culminating with Hansmann and Kraakman 
concluding that there is ‘no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should 
principally strive to increase long term shareholder value’.7 The theory prioritises shareholder 
interests above all others while denying any responsibility to wider interests or any social 
responsibility, once compliant with the law. As Friedman states ‘There is one and only one social 
responsibility of business…to increase profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game’.8 
Despite the focus on increasing wealth for shareholders, shareholder value does not require directors 
to completely disregard all stakeholder interests. Instead, stakeholders are only to be considered to the 
extent to which they will assist the company in increasing wealth for the shareholders.9 However, 
there is a difference in considering stakeholder interests as a means to promote shareholder wealth and 
considering stakeholders to promote company success. Often the interests of the company and the 
interests of the shareholders will align. However there are times when what is doing best for the 
shareholders will not equate with doing what is best for the company as an entity. It is submitted that 
                                                          
1
 Stephen Banbridge, ‘Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance’ (2003) 97 
Northwestern University Law Review 547, 573. 
2
 Steve Toms and Mark Wright, ‘Divergence and Convergence within Anglo-American Corporate Governance 
Systems: Evidence from the US and UK, 1950-2000’ (2005) 47(2) Business History 267. 
3
 Paul Davies, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law (8th edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2008), 
507; Jingchen Zhao, ‘The Curious Case of Shareholder Primacy Norm: Calling for a More Realistic Theory’ 
(2012) 15 International Trade and Business Law Review 1, 1; Jill Fisch, ‘Measuring Efficiency in Corporate 
Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy’ (2006) Journal of Corporation Law 637, 647. 
4
 G & S Doherty Ltd v Doherty (19 June 1969, unreported) HC, 22; Irish Press Plc v Ingersoll Irish Publications 
Ltd (15 December 1993, unreported), 77; Re Frederick Inns Ltd.  [1994] 1 ILRM 387, 396. 
5
 Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Transaction 1932). 
6
 See Stephen Bainbridge, ‘In Defence of the Shareholder Wealth Maximisation Norm: A Reply to Professor 
Green’ (1993) 50 Washington and Lee Law Review 1423; Anant Sunderam and Andrew Inkpen, ‘The Corporate 
Objective Revisited’ (2004) 15(3) Organization Science 350; Alistair Alcock, ‘Corporate Governance: A 
Defence of Status Quo’ (1995) 58(6) Modern Law Review 898; Jonathon Macey, ‘An Economic Analysis of the 
Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Governance Fiduciary 
Duties’ (1991) 21 Stenson Law Review 23; Bernard Black and Reiner Kraakamn, ‘A Self Enforcing Model of 
Corporate Law’ (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 1911;  
7
 Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 Georgetown Law 
Review 440, 440. 
8
 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Profits, New York Times, 13 September 
1970, [32].  
9
 Paul Davies, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law (8th edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2008), 
509. 
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in such circumstances shareholder value is flawed and is not the best model to promote company 
success and therefore not the best way to achieve the goal of increasing wealth for all participants in 
the company. It would be extremely difficult to maximise a company’s success while consistently 
disregarding the interests of stakeholders10 and so will eventually damage the company.11 Yet in order 
to prioritise shareholders, it is inevitable stakeholder interests will be prejudiced.12 Pursuing a 
shareholder value approach can not only be damaging to stakeholders but also to the company itself 
when the company’s best interests do not align with the shareholders. Shareholder value has also been 
criticised on normative grounds with Handy stating that ‘the idea that companies exist for profit is a 
myth’13 and Hansmann et al state  
It is sometimes said that the appropriate goal of corporate law….is simply to assure that the 
corporation serves the best interests of its shareholders, or more specifically, to maximise 
financial returns to shareholders….these claims neither describe corporate law as we observe 
it nor offer a normatively appealing aspiration for that body of law.14 
Instead of applying shareholder value, when the interests of the company and the shareholders do not 
align, it is the entity’s interests which should be prioritised. A significant number of cases from the 
England and Wales support this view that there is a difference between shareholder value and 
company success and that it is the latter which should take priority. 
The legal basis for shareholder value stems from the common law fiduciary duty to act in the best 
interests of the company15 being equated to mean a duty to act in the interests of the shareholders. 
There is strong support for this interpretation in Irish case law16 and some English cases have also 
adopted this interpretation.17 This has led many academics to believe that the English common law 
required a shareholder value approach.18 However an examination of the English case law highlights 
                                                          
10
 Alexander Schall, Lilian Mines & Simon Goulding, ‘Promoting an Inclusive Approach on the part of the 
Directors: The UK and German Position’ (2006) 6 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 299, 306.  
11
 Bernard Black, ‘Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice’ (1992) 39 University 
of California at Los Angeles Law Review 811, 863.  
12
 Constance Bagley and Karen Page, ‘The Devil Made me do it: Replacing Corporate Directors’ Veil of 
Secrecy with the Mantle of Stewardship’ (1999) 36 San Diego Law Review 897, 898.  
13
 Charles Handy, ‘What is a Company For?’ (1993) 1 Corporate Governance 14, 14.  
14
 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, Paul Davies, Gerard Hertig, Hideki Kanda, Edward Rock, Klaus Hopt 
Luca Enriques, John Armour, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (2nd 
edn, Oxford University Press 2009), 28.  
15
 See Re Smith v Fawcett Ltd [1924] Ch 304; Hutton v West Cork Railway (1883) 23 Ch D 654; Mutual Life 
Insurance Co v Rank Organisation Ltd [1985] BCLC 11; Bamford v Bamford [1970] Ch 212; Banfi Ltd v Moran 
[2006] IEHC 257; JJ Harrison (Properties) Ltd v Harrison [2001] EWCA Civ 1467; West Merica Safety Wear 
v Dodd (1988) 4 BCC 30. 
16
 See G & S Doherty Ltd v Doherty (19 June 1969, unreported) HC, 22; Irish Press Plc v Ingersoll Irish 
Publications Ltd (15 December 1993, unreported), 77; Re Frederick Inns Ltd.  [1994] 1 ILRM 387, 396. 
17
 Parke v Daily News Ltd [1962] Ch 927; Brady v Brady [1988] 3 BCC 535; Heron International Ltd [1983] 
BCLC 244; Greenhalgh v Ardene Cinemas Ltd [1950] 2 All ER 1120.  
18
 See for example, Jill Fisch, ‘Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy’ 
(2006) Journal of Corporation Law 637, 647; Jingchen Zhao, ‘The Curious Case of Shareholder Primacy Norm: 
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that there is little support for shareholder value. As Deakin notes ‘it is surprisingly difficult to find 
support within company law for the notion of shareholder primacy’.19 Some cases which appear to 
support shareholder value are in contexts other than directors’ duties20  but are still cited in support of 
shareholder value in cases on directors’ duties.21  While there are a small number of cases which 
support a shareholder value approach to directors’ duties22 the common law often required stakeholder 
interests to be considered when deciding what was in the interests of the company.23 The courts have 
been even willing to disregard the interests of the shareholders when there was a conflict between the 
interests of the shareholders and the company as an entity.24  
The above cases demonstrate that the majority of case law does not offer support for the shareholder 
value doctrine. The duty to act in the interests of the company was held to include stakeholder 
interests and the company could be viewed as a separate entity when shareholder and company 
interest were in conflict. However, despite the commendable approach taken, the common law did 
have its difficulties, primarily that it was misunderstood, leading to a perception that the common law 
placed a duty on directors to promote short term shareholder value. A survey conducted by the 
Institute of Directors found that many directors believed that they were legally required to maximise 
short term shareholder benefits at the expense of the long term interests of the company itself.25 As 
Stout explains ‘The widespread perception that corporate directors and executives have a legal duty to 
maximise shareholder wealth plays a large role in explaining how shareholder value thinking has 
become so endemic in the business world today’.26 This mistaken perception of the common law led 
to the Company Law Review Group (CLRSG), who led the reform of UK company law, to conclude 
that the common law required directors to operate companies ‘for the benefit of shareholders’27 and 
that companies are formed and managed in the interests of shareholders.28 As will be discussed in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Calling for a More Realistic Theory’ (2012) 15 International Trade and Business Law Review 1, 1; Paul Davies, 
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International Review 11, 11. 
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 See Parke v Daily News Ltd [1962] Ch 927; Heron International Ltd [1983] BCLC 244; G & S Doherty Ltd v 
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 Parke v Daily News Ltd [1962] Ch 927; Heron International Ltd [1983] BCLC 244.  
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 See Evans v Brunner Mond & Co Ltd [1921] 1 Ch. 359; Lonhro v Shell Petroleum  [1980] 1 WLR 627; 
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  See Institute of Directors, Good Boardroom Practice: Company Law Review, The Stakeholder Debate 
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 Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, Corporations, 
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 CLRSG, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework (DTI, 1999) para 
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 CLRSG, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework (DTI, 1999) para 
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chapter four, this misconception of the common law ultimately led to the implementation of 
Enlightened Shareholder Value (ESV) which, through the clear legislative prioritisation of 
shareholders, establishes a clear application of shareholder value which was not evident under the 
common law.  
This chapter will first engage in a critical analysis of the arguments and justifications used in favour 
of shareholder value demonstrating that they are either legally incorrect or unpersuasive. Arguments 
based on property rights, agency theory and the nexus of contracts theory of the firm fail to reflect the 
legal reality that a company is a separate entity and that directors owe their duties to that entity while 
arguments based on company efficiency are unpersuasive when compared with prioritising the 
interests of the company as an entity. Secondly the chapter will outline the relevant case law. It will 
discuss the case law which offers support to the shareholder value principle and the case law which 
demonstrates that the company interests does not directly equate with the interests of the shareholders. 
The chapter argues that it is a misrepresentation of the majority of the English case law to describe it 
as requiring a shareholder value approach and that the entity approach is a superior model of the 
corporate objective.  
2.02 Shareholders as Owners  
One of the arguments often used in favour of shareholder value is that shareholders are owners of the 
company29 and operating the company in order to maximise the wealth of the shareholders respects 
the notion of private property.30 The argument is that shareholders, as owners of the company, should 
have the right to ensure that the company is run for their benefit.31 Any alternative view limits their 
freedom and impinges on the rights of private property.32 It has been argued to do anything other than 
to run a company with the goal of providing shareholder wealth maximisation amounts to spending 
‘other people’s money’.33  Berle and Means argued for shareholder value based on property rights 
believing that shareholders were owners of the company contending that ‘owner-shareholders ought 
to receive the profits of the corporation because they acquired ownership of the corporate venture and 
are the rightful benefactors of all corporate economic surplus to the exclusion of non-owners’.34  
                                                          
29
 See, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Transaction 1932), 6-
7; Caspar Rose, ‘Stakeholder Orientation vs Shareholder Value: A Matter of Contractual Failures’ (2004) 18 
European Journal of Law and Economics 77, 80.  
30
 Ben Pettet, Company Law (2nd edn, Longman 2005), 161. 
31
 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Profits, New York Times, 13 September 
1970, [32]. 
32
 Deryn Fisher, ‘The Enlightened shareholder – Leaving Stakeholders in the Dark: Will Section 172(1) of the 
Companies Acts 2006 Make Directors Consider the Impact of their Decisions on Third Parties’ (2009) 20(1) 
International Company and Commercial Law Review 10, 13. 
33
 Douglas Baird and Todd Henderson, ‘Other People’s Money’ (2008) 60 Stanford Law Review 1309. 
34
 Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Transaction, 1932), 6-7. 
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However the claim that shareholders own the company is based on an incorrect perception of 
company law.35 The company is a legal person incapable of being owned.36 Owning shares does not 
allow the shareholders ownership of the company, instead they own a corporate security in the form 
of shares or stock.37 In Short v Treasury Commissioners Evershed LJ stated ‘shareholders are not in 
the eyes of the law, part owners of the undertaking. The undertaking is something different from the 
totality of its shareholding’.38 Classic representations of ownership of property do not apply to 
shareholders, for example shareholders have no control over the company’s assets39 and have no 
automatic right to a dividend.40 The argument that shareholders own the company is legally 
untenable41 with Stout claiming it is the worst of all the arguments in favour of shareholder value.42 
Even advocates of the shareholder value model no longer maintain that shareholders own a company. 
Bainbridge states that no one group owns the totality of the company and that shareholders have none 
of the moral rights normally associated with ownership.43 While Fama states that the ownership of 
capital in a company ‘should not be confused with ownership of the firm’ and that it is important to 
dispel ‘the tenacious notion that a firm is owned by its security holders’.44 The idea of shareholders as 
owners of the company is no longer seen as a valid argument in favour of shareholder value having 
come under increasingly strong criticism.45 
2.03 The Nexus of Contracts Theory  
The nexus of contracts view of the company holds that companies should not be viewed as legal 
persons but rather as a set of complex set of explicit and implicit contracts based on a law and 
economics perspective.46 Under this theory, companies are regarded as nothing more than a network 
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 Ciaran O’ Kelly, ‘History Begins: Shareholder Value, Accountability and the Virtuous State’ (2009) 60(1) 
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Ltd (18 October, 1979, unreported) HC; Pearlberg v O’ Brien [1982] Crim LR 405.  
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44
 Eugene Fama, ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’ (1980) 88(2) Journal of Political Economy 288, 
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Southern California Law Review 1189, 1190. 
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of contract based relationships47 and are devoid of any social responsibilities.48 Due to the company 
being made up a collection of contractual arrangements, the argument is that the company should be 
operated for the benefit of the residual claimants, the shareholders. Easterbrook and Ficshel provide 
the classic contractarian argument in favour for shareholders as residual claimants.49 They argue that 
all stakeholders have the protection of contracts; employees, suppliers etc. have all set remuneration 
in the form of salaries or payment for services. Shareholders have no such set income and so are 
entitled to claim whatever is left once the company has fulfilled its explicit obligations.50 Because 
shareholders are residual claimants and are unprotected by explicit contract they receive the benefits 
and incur the costs of corporate decision making.51 Therefore they are more likely to be affected by 
directorial decisions and so are the primary risk bearers in the company.52According to the theory, 
because the shareholders are the primary risk bearers and because their claims will be satisfied last in 
liquidation, shareholders have the greatest stake in the company and so the business should be run in 
their interests.53 Shareholders bear the most risk as they are contractually speaking in a weaker 
position by comparison to other stakeholders and so are relatively indifferent to corporate decision 
making.54  
There are a number of difficulties with the reasoning used in favour of the nexus of contracts view of 
the firm. The argument comes from an economic view of the company and is promoted primarily by 
economists and economically orientated corporate law scholars.55 For example, Macey attempts to 
describe corporate law as not being mandatory but rather as simply as a convenient tool to reduce 
costs56 basing his argument on the work of economist Oliver Hart.57 Such views are incompatible with 
the reality of company law and there is a clear distinction between an economic view of a company 
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and a legal one.58 The company is a separate legal person59 not simply a web of contracts. In the 
words of Courtney, a company ‘is more than an aggregation of individual units; it constitutes a juristic 
or legal person’.60 A company has legal rights such as perpetual succession, a company can own 
property,61 can sue62 and be sued.63 Viewing the company in purely economic terms as a collection of 
contracts fails to recognise the reality of a corporation and also has inherent inconsistencies. As Keay 
notes, the theorists advocating the nexus of contracts theory deny the separate personality of the 
company in some circumstances but at other times, particularly in relation to liability issues, invoke 
separate legal personality.64 This point was summed up in Wallersteiner v Moir (no.2)65 and the 
statement that ‘It is a fundamental principle of our law that a company is a legal person, with its own 
corporate identity, separate and distinct from the directors or shareholders, and with its own property 
rights and interests to which it alone is entitled’.66  
There are other difficulties with the nexus of contracts argument in favour of shareholder value. The 
only time that shareholders are actually treated as residual claimants is during liquidation, as long as 
the company is maintained as a going concern shareholders are not legally entitled to any payment, 
until the directors declare a dividend.67 Even on a winding up, the company’s creditors will have a 
prior claim, ahead of the shareholders, on any assets to the amount of the debt owed. While the 
company remains as a going concern, it is inaccurate to describe shareholders as the sole residual 
claimants.68 Stakeholders also receive benefits from a successful company such as bonuses for 
employees and discounts for customers.69 Shareholders are also not the sole risk bearers in a 
company. Shareholders are often not the interest group most affected by corporate decision making70 
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and other stakeholders do bear risk in the company. Even those in favour of the nexus of contracts 
theory accept that stakeholders can bear greater risk than shareholders. Macey uses the example of an 
employee who has gained a firm specific skill which is non-transferable and states that in such a case 
the employee bears much greater risk from directors deciding on employee redundancies or plant 
closures than the shareholders.71 Similarly, liquidation will have negative effects on stakeholders as 
well as shareholders, employees will lose their jobs and if the liquidation is insolvent, creditors will be 
affected as they will not receive payment to the full amount of the debt owed. Further, shareholders do 
not go completely unprotected by contract. Shareholders can alter the articles and memorandum of 
association and also can negotiate terms of an issue when applying for an allotment or otherwise 
purchasing shares. These legal realities significantly weaken the argument that shareholders are the 
sole residual claimants and sole risk bearers, undermining the residual claimant argument in favour of 
shareholder value.  
2.04 Agency Theory 
Another argument which supports shareholder value is based on agency theory.72 The agency 
argument has two main elements; first that directors are agents for the shareholders and owe them a 
fiduciary duty to act for their benefit. Second, that operating the company for the shareholders’ benefit 
allows shareholders to supervise directors and therefore reduce agency costs. Agency costs are the 
costs associated with directors misusing their position73 and engaging in opportunistic behaviour.74 
The first argument is based on the work of Berle and asserts that because directors are agents of the 
shareholders they have a responsibility to take decisions for the benefit of those shareholders.75 Berle 
argued that all powers granted to the management of a corporation were ‘at all times exercisable only 
for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders’.76 His general belief was that because the power to run a 
company had been delegated from the shareholders to the directors and that the directors had the sole 
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responsibility to run the corporation in the interests of those shareholders.77 Other scholars have also 
argued for directors owing their fiduciary duties directly to shareholders.78  
However, similar to the last two arguments in favour of shareholder value, the argument that directors 
are agents to the shareholders and owe their fiduciary duties to the shareholders directly is legally 
incorrect. As Dodd stated in his rebuttal to Berle, the law treats the company ‘as an institution directed 
by persons who are primarily fiduciaries for the institution rather than for its members’.79 The 
company is legally a separate entity distinct from its shareholders and directors are fiduciaries to the 
company and owe their duties exclusively to the company, not to the shareholders.80 As was stated by 
Dillon LJ in Multinational Gas81 ‘[t]he directors indeed stand in a fiduciary relationship to the 
company, as they are appointed to manage the affairs of the company, and they owe duties to the 
company though not to the creditors, present or future, or to individual shareholders’.82 In Re A 
Company it was held that ‘it is long established and basic law that the directors of a company owe 
their fiduciary duties to the company and not to the shareholders’.83 Irish law has also made it clear 
that directors owe their duties to the company and not the shareholders.84 The UK Companies Act 
200685 and the Irish Companies Act 201486 also state that directors’ fiduciary duties are owed to the 
company. Unless a special relationship exists between a director and a shareholder directors have no 
fiduciary duty to act for the shareholders’ benefit.87 As a result they cannot be legally held to be 
agents for the shareholders. As Watson puts it, the fatal flaw of agency theory is that it does not take 
into account the fact that a modern company is a legal entity, distinct from the holders of its shares.88  
The second agency based argument is that if directors are agents of the shareholders agency costs will 
be reduced. Berle saw the imposition of fiduciary duties to shareholders as a solution to agency 
costs,89 arguing it would curb managers from serving their own self-interest and would provide the 
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tools to hold them accountable when they acted irresponsibly.90 The argument is that shareholder 
value provides shareholders with a clear means of assessing directors’ performance through profit or 
increases in share price and they can reward them or fine them accordingly.91 It is the shareholders’ 
responsibility to assess whether they are doing their job correctly, taking on a supervisory role 
ensuring that directors use their powers in the proper manner. Therefore a principal argument in 
favour of shareholder value is that it allows for directors to be directly accountable to the 
shareholders92 and therefore reduces agency costs. Stout has claimed the agency cost argument to be 
the most influential of all arguments in favour of shareholder value arguing that directors’ being 
accountable to shareholders is likely to increase efficiency of the company by reducing agency 
costs.93  
However, the degree to which shareholders can effectively monitor and control directors is 
questionable, particularly in public companies. Shareholders do have the power to remove a director 
but it is a somewhat illusory power in practice.94 Shareholder voting can be a ‘fraud or mere ceremony 
designed to give a veneer of legitimacy to managerial power’95 rather than being an effective method 
of disciplining directors. While shareholders have the ability to bring a derivative action against a 
director, derivative actions are rarely an effective method for enforcing director’s duties.96 Many 
scholars acknowledge that shareholders have limited control over directors and that directors cannot 
be seen as being accountable to shareholders.97 As Clarke states, the majority of large public 
corporations escape effective shareholder control.98 As a result directors are not always going to be 
held to account for agency costs under shareholder value.99 This is particularly the case in large public 
companies where rational apathy theory holds that shareholders are generally passive100 and much 
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more likely to sell their shares rather than supervise directors101 or become actively involved in 
management.102 Sappideen argues that the large corporation is largely independent of shareholder 
influence103 and Keay describes shareholders as ‘impotent’ stating that directors will not be held 
accountable to shareholders for increasing agency costs.104 The result of this is that shareholder value 
is unlikely to provide the type of accountability necessary to significantly reduce agency costs. 
Therefore agency theory is not a reason to advocate shareholder value ahead of more normatively 
superior models of the corporate objective.  
2.05 Efficiency 
The most persuasive argument in favour of shareholder value is that it encourages economic 
efficiency within a company. Efficiency has been described as the core principle driving the 
shareholder value paradigm in corporate governance.105 By providing directors a clear objective, 
shareholder value allows directors to act in a way which facilitates companies being financially 
successful and profitable. The claim is that increased economic efficiency, achieved by following a 
shareholder value approach, creates the best environment for the creation of wealth.106 By generating 
wealth, companies not only benefit shareholders but also meet a number of other social objectives107 
such as providing employment, paying corporation tax and providing products and services for the 
public. As a result pursuing shareholder value can be viewed as the best way to promote wealth for all 
constituents in the company.108 As O’ Sullivan argues the most compelling argument in favour of 
shareholder value is that the employment of the theory increases social wealth.109 On this basis it can 
be argued that it is not just shareholders who benefit from a shareholder value approach but many 
other constituents110 and that stakeholders of profitable companies often benefit from knock-on 
                                                          
101
 See Dalia Mitchell, ‘Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy’ (2006) 63 
Washington and Lee Law Review 1502, 1564.  
102
  Blanaid Clarke, ‘Corporate Responsibility in Light of the Separation of Ownership and Control (1997) 1 
Dublin University Law Journal 57, 57. 
103
 Razeen Sappiden, ‘Ownership of the Large Corporation: Why Clothe the Emperor?’ (1996) 7 King’s College 
Law Journal  27, 41.  
104
 Andrew Keay, The Corporate Objective: Corporations, Globalisation and the Law (Elgar 2011), 91. 
105
 Ciaran O’ Kelly, ‘History Begins: Shareholder Value, Accountability and the Virtuous State’ (2009) 60(1) 
Northern Ireland law Quarterly 35, 45.  
106
 Sarah Kiarie, ‘At Crossroads: Shareholder Value, Stakeholder Value and Enlightened Shareholder Value: 
Which Road should the United Kingdom Take?’ (2006) 1 International Company and Commercial Law Review 
329, 333. 
107
 James Wallace, ‘Value Maximisation and Stakeholder Theory: Compatible or Not’ (2003) 15(3) Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance 120, 121.  
108
 Anant Sunderam and Andrew Inkpen, ‘The Corporate Objective Revisited’ (2004) 15(3) Organization 
Science 350, 353.  
109
 Mary O’Sullivan, ‘The Innovative Enterprise and Corporate Governance’ (2000) 24 Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 393, 395. 
110
 Jeffrey Macintosh, ‘Designing an Efficient Fiduciary Law’ (1993) 43 University of Toronto Law Journal 
425, 452. 
23 
 
effects.111 A study taken by Copeland, Koller and Murrin concluded that ‘empirical evidence indicates 
that increasing shareholder value does not conflict with the long-run interests of other stakeholders. 
Winning companies seem to create relatively greater value for all stakeholders’.112 As a result it can 
be said that shareholder value and stakeholder welfare are not contradictory goals and according to 
some scholars there is no significant distinction between a shareholder value and a stakeholder 
approach to corporate governance.113  
The persuasiveness of the efficiency argument is based primarily on the weaknesses of stakeholder 
theory. As will be discussed in chapter three, stakeholder theory requires the company to be run for 
the benefit of all stakeholders but practical application of theory proves to be very difficult.114 
Directors attempting to cater to the needs of all stakeholders will end up trying to maximise in several 
different directions, something which will be detrimental to the company’s attempts to successful.115 
The stakeholder model provides no guidance how to choose between stakeholders when their interests 
are in conflict.116 As a result it is impossible for directors to balance all divergent agendas meaning 
that the company is likely to become inefficient.117 Therefore implementation of stakeholder theory 
can be even more likely to damage the company than application of shareholder value. Shareholder 
value is the pragmatic solution to the issue of the corporate objective as stakeholder theory has been 
the only traditional alternative. As Berle argued, the only workable solution is to identify the company 
with its shareholders because it is ‘the only effective way of ordering business affairs’ and that 
extending directors’ duties to stakeholders would not work until there was ‘a clear and reasonably 
enforceable scheme of responsibilities’.118 Berle’s point is that because stakeholder theory is 
unworkable, the only effective way to operate a company is by applying shareholder value. Therefore, 
due to the difficulties of practical application, the argument that shareholder value is the best way to 
benefit all constituents in a company is true when stakeholder theory is the proposed alternative.  
However, it is submitted that shareholder value is not the best way to achieve maximum benefits for 
all constituents, rather the theory primarily benefits shareholders119 and even then, only some of the 
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shareholders.120 There are times when pursuing shareholder value can harm the company’s ability to 
be successful. The interests of the company as an entity may not always coincide with those of the 
current shareholders.121 Directors may determine that the only way to increase shareholder value is to 
harm stakeholder interests by closing factories or employee redundancies for example.122 As 
highlighted by Stout123, the reality that shareholder value can be damaging to stakeholders and the 
company as an entity can be nicely illustrated by reference to a hypothetical. Take a company subject 
to two separate takeover bids. One bid offers a higher price to shareholders but plans to make all 
employees redundant, shut down production operations, and discontinue the company as a going 
concern. At a slightly lower price, the second bidder plans to continue production and retain all staff 
members. From a stakeholder and societal point of view the second bidder would be the preferred 
option. However, adhering to the shareholder value principle, the former bidder must be given priority 
by the directors, despite the consequences to the company itself, the employees and the local 
community. In examples such as this where shareholder value is not the best approach and does not 
represent the best model for company efficiency or economic success. 
Shareholder value has also other negative consequences such as its link to short-termism124 i.e. that 
under shareholder value directors are more likely to prioritise the short term wealth of the 
shareholders rather than the long term health of the company. Grinyer, Russell and Collision describe 
short termism as ‘foregoing economically worthwhile investments with long term benefits in order to 
increase reported earnings for the current period’.125 While shareholder value theory can cover both 
short term and long term, the emphasis in the past has been on short term increases in value126 and 
shareholder value has long been linked with producing this short term focus which over shadows all 
else.127 The problem with focusing on short term shareholder value is that it is likely to be damaging 
for stakeholders and harmful to the company as an entity.128 For example, drastic cost cutting may 
increase profit in the short term but long term is likely to be harmful to the company’s business.129 
Blair and Stout argue that a short term shareholder value approach discourages stakeholders from 
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investing in the company, investments that can be essential to a company’s success.130 Parkinson et al 
agree saying that stakeholders will be unlikely to invest in companies who pursue shareholder value 
as they will be aware at all times that their investments will be subordinate to shareholders.131 Short 
term focused shareholder value is also closely linked to a corporate culture of excessive risk taking 
from directors132 which can lead to corporate collapses.133 Excessive risk taking in order to maximise 
shareholder wealth is one of the primary negatives associated with shareholder value and the collapse 
of several large companies has led to criticism of the shareholder value doctrine.134 Corporate 
collapses and excessive risk taking in order to increase short term shareholder wealth can have an 
extremely negative impact on stakeholders and on wider society. As a result the short term approach 
to shareholder value has come in for increasing criticism in recent years.135  
2.06 Entity Maximisation and Sustainability 
The efficiency argument in favour of shareholder value breaks down when compared to viewing the 
company as an entity. Many of the negatives associated with both shareholder value and stakeholder 
theory can be avoided by viewing the company as a separate legal entity and directors focusing on the 
maximisation of the wealth for the company. For example, viewing the company as a separate legal 
entity is likely to facilitate a more long term approach to company decision making by comparison to 
a shareholder value approach ‘where the goal of short term profits is likely to prevail’.136 The view 
that the company is a real entity and should be treated as separate and distinct from all its constituents 
is not a new formulation of the company. Maitland in 1900 argued that the company ‘is in no sense 
artificial or fictitious, but is every whit as real and natural as is the personality of a man’.137 Shortly 
after Deiser argued that the company has an existence which was completely distinct from the 
members that compose it.138 Machen in 1911 also argued for the company to be seen as a separate 
entity stating that in real entity theory ‘There are two basic propositions, (1) that a corporation is an 
entity distinct from the sum of the members that compose it, and (2) that the entity is a person’.139 The 
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premise for real entity theory is that the company is ‘an institution in its own right’140 and is 
completely independent from all other parties who are connected with it.141 
This view of the company is much better equipped to explain many principles of company law. 
Unlike viewing the company as a nexus of contracts, real entity theory is not at odds with the doctrine 
of separate legal personality. Real entity theory also explains why directors can owe their duties 
directly to the company and not to the shareholders. Real entity theory is also well equipped to justify 
the dominant position of directors and the relatively weak role of shareholders in large companies142 
and also explains why shareholders can be members of the company and still bring legal action 
against the company.143 Entity theory can also provide an explanation for the legal distinction between 
corporate liability and the personal acts of shareholders and directors which leads to personal 
liability.144 As a result this view of the company as a separate entity is more plausible than any other 
theory of what a company is.145 Viewing the company as a distinct entity provides justification for 
directors to maximise the wealth of the company as a separate entity free from shareholder value. If 
the company is seen as a distinct entity from its shareholders, the company’s actions do not need to 
reflect the shareholders’ interests146 and it allows for the fact that the interests of the company and the 
interests of the shareholders can diverge.147 In such scenarios the real entity view of the firm would 
allow directors to act for the benefit of the entity even at the expense of the shareholders or act for the 
benefit of stakeholders where such action would benefit the company as an entity.  
It is accepted that the company is obviously not an actual physical person and does rely on natural 
persons to act in order for the company to take action. Companies are also dependent on shareholders 
to begin their existence. However neither of these statements detracts from the point of view that the 
company is a separate legal person. Simply because the company requires the action of human 
persons to take decisions does not mean that the company cannot be seen as an entity distinct from the 
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people who are running it. This point was explained by Lord Reid in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v 
Natrass.148  
A living person has a mind which can have knowledge or intention or be negligent and he has 
hands to carry out his intentions. A corporation has none of these: it must act through living 
persons, though not always one or the same person. Then the person who acts is not speaking 
or acting for the company. He is acting as the company and his mind which directs his acts is 
the mind of the company. There is no question of the company being vicariously liable. He is 
not acting as a servant, representative, agent or delegate. He is an embodiment of the company 
or, one could say, he hears and speaks through the persona of the company, within his 
appropriate sphere, and his mind is the mind of the company.149 
Secondly just because a company is created by the shareholders it does not mean that in the future the 
interests of the company and the shareholders cannot diverge. As Blair and Stout state, once 
shareholders have formed a company they ‘have created a new and separate entity that takes on a life 
of its own and could, potentially, act against their interests’.150 This idea that a company is capable of 
having interests in its own right was expressed in Dawson International Plc v Coats.151 
At the outset I do not accept as a general proposition that a company can have no interests in 
the change of identity of its shareholders on a take-over. It appears to me that there will be 
cases in which its agents, the directors, will see the takeover of its shares by a particular bidder 
as beneficial to the company. For example, it may provide the opportunity for integrating 
operations or obtaining additional resources. In other cases the directors will not see a 
particular bid as not in the interests of the company.152 
Entity maximisation involves directors endeavouring to increase the market value of the company as a 
whole over the long term and seek to maximise the total wealth creating potential of the company.153 
Focusing on the sustainability of the entity limits excessive risk taking in order to maximise entity 
wealth. Seeking maximisation without regard for the company’s survival may well lead to the 
company not surviving and if a company cannot sustain itself it will not benefit any constituent.154 
The reason for arguing in favour of an entity maximisation and sustainability approach to the 
corporate objective is that it is more likely to achieve the normative goal of increased benefits for all 
company constituents, including shareholders. This is despite the fact that entity maximisation is 
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different to shareholder value as stakeholders’ interests will not be sacrificed simply to benefit 
shareholders.155 Yet shareholders are more likely to benefit from promoting the interests of the 
company as an entity rather than pursuing shareholder value as the company itself will be more likely 
to be successful, survive and develop.156 The entity approach does not necessarily mean focusing on 
increased profitability for shareholders but may entail a focus on research and development that may 
reduce profitability in the short term but may have benefits in the long term. For example, the 
company might decline a project which would be profitable in the short term but would alienate its 
community and damage its reputation to such a degree which may cost the company in the future.157 
The company would be more likely to be successful in the long term gaining the benefits from 
research and development and from not harming the company’s reputation. The more successful and 
profitable the company becomes over the long term the more likely shareholders will receive benefits. 
Therefore it is submitted that the best way to achieve shareholder value is through entity maximisation 
rather than constantly prioritising the shareholders at the expense of stakeholder interests. In the 
words of Goldberg ‘it is only by giving appropriate weight to all stakeholders that directors can 
maximise the sustainable growth in value of their companies for the benefit of shareholders’.158  
Entity maximisation is different from stakeholder theory but has the potential to benefit stakeholders 
to a greater degree than other competing models. Stakeholder theory requires directors to be guardians 
of all stakeholders159 but under entity maximisation directors’ duties will be owed to the company and 
the directors’ objective will be on fostering the entity’s wealth, not individual stakeholders. Yet as 
stakeholder theory is likely to lead to economic inefficiencies due to the difficulties involved in 
balancing competing interests the theory is, in practice, unlikely to actually provide much benefit to 
stakeholders. Stakeholders are more likely to receive benefits from an economically successful 
company but a company which does not automatically prioritise shareholders.  
As with any model however, entity maximisation will not benefit all stakeholders and shareholders all 
of the time and there will be instances when these interests clash. However, unlike stakeholder theory, 
treating the company as a distinct entity provides a clear way for directors to act in such scenarios. 
Directors should act in the interests of which ever interest group is most likely to benefit the company 
as an entity. As a result entity maximisation does not have the issue of balancing competing interests 
and the problem of having to maximise in different directions, one interest prevails above the others - 
the company’s.160 Bainbridge gives the example of a company closing down an old factory and 
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opening a new one, whereby the employees and local community will be harmed but creditors, 
shareholders and new employees will all benefit from opening the new plant.161 Under shareholder 
value, as advocated by Bainbridge, directors must take the option which provides most benefit to the 
shareholders while stakeholder theory would seem to offer no guidance in such a scenario. In order to 
make any theory workable some guidance must be given to directors in scenarios where interests 
clash and under entity theory the determining factor would be what benefits the company in the long 
term.162 Yet under entity theory the automatic prioritisation of shareholders does not exist so 
stakeholders are relevant to the decision and may well determine the decision if acting for their 
benefit would be the best for the company. There is not a balancing of different interests groups but 
rather a balancing of factors in order to determine what is best for the company.163 
The entity maximisation approach can be criticised on accountability grounds. The argument would 
be that similar to stakeholder theory, directors are not accountable to any one interest group and so 
agency costs will increase and the company will suffer as a result. Yet all the current methods of 
holding directors to account will continue to be available under the entity maximisation. For example 
shareholders will still be able to take a derivative action when directors breach their duty to act in the 
interests of the company. Liquidators will also be able to actions against directors for such a breach 
and it is possible that directors will be restricted or disqualified if they act contrary to the company’s 
interests. Enforcement is discussed in detail in chapter six where it submitted that it is possible to hold 
directors to account under an entity maximisation approach when they fail to act in the interests of the 
company. The accountability argument also assumes that under shareholder value directors are 
regularly held to account to shareholders. As argued above, it is very doubtful that shareholders can 
effectively enforce directors’ duties,164 particularly in public companies. There is plenty of 
opportunity to increase agency costs under shareholder value165 and shareholders retain too little 
control over directors to be relied on to reduce agency costs.166 As a result directors are not always 
going to be held accountable for agency costs under shareholder value.167 By treating the company as 
an entity, the directors have one clear objective: promote the company’s interests. Their performance 
will be objectively measurable and enforcement of the model is achievable as will be outlined in 
chapter six.  
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2.07 Case law Advocating a Shareholder Value Approach  
As well as weaknesses in shareholder value in theory, there is little judicial support for a shareholder 
value approach. While there may have been a perception that the English common law required a 
short term shareholder value approach, the majority of cases did not endorse shareholder value. An 
examination of the case law does not show an unequivocal acceptance of shareholder value.168 The 
judgments show a much more diverse approach to the corporate objective and many cases quite 
clearly do not support the shareholder value principle.169 Yet there are some English and Irish cases 
which do equate the duty to act in the interests of the company with a duty to act for the benefit of the 
shareholders.170 One of the earliest and well known cases advocating the shareholder value approach 
is the American judgment of Dodge v Ford.171 Henry Ford was pursuing a policy of reducing 
dividends in order to subsidise the sale price of Ford cars. The aim of the policy was to stimulate the 
market, increase company sales and thereby secure the jobs of the company’s employees.172 The 
Dodge brothers, as shareholders, argued this approach was at the expense of shareholders and an 
improper use of power. The court held that such a policy was not proper as it was not in the interests 
of the company’s shareholders and the court stated that ‘the business corporation is organised and 
carried on primarily for the profit of stockholders. The powers of directors are to be employed for that 
end’.173 The case would seem to represent a clear endorsement of shareholder value although its 
relevance in modern US company law has been questioned.174  
In the UK and Ireland the shareholder value approach originates from the duty to act in the interests of 
the company. This fiduciary duty is owed by the directors to the company and comes from the cases 
of Hutton v West Cork Railway175and Re Smith and Fawcett.176 In Hutton v West Cork Railway, 
Bowen LJ, gave the oft cited statement ‘the law does not say that there shall be no cakes and ale, but 
there are to be no cakes and ale except as such as are required for the benefit of the company’.177 In Re 
Smith and Fawcett Lord Greene MR speaking in the Court of Appeal observed that ‘directors must 
act, bona fide, in what they consider - not what the court considers - is in the best interests of the 
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company.’178 The duty to act in the best interests of the company has since become a well-established 
fiduciary duty in common law courts.179 However despite Hutton and Re Smith and Fawcett often 
being cited a support for shareholder value,180 the duty to act in the best interests of the company, by 
itself, does not support a shareholder value approach. It is the courts, by equating the duty to act in the 
interests of the company with a duty to act in the interests of the shareholders, which imposes a 
shareholder value model. As Ahern states, the application of shareholder primacy results in the 
interests of the company being equated with the collective interests of the shareholders.181  
In the UK, the company’s interests have sometimes been viewed as being synonymous with 
shareholders’ interests and the duty to act in the best interests of the company has been equated with a 
duty to act in the interests of the shareholders.182 This interpretation of the duty has also been evident 
in Ireland.183 One case which is regularly cited in favour of this interpretation is Greenhalgh v Ardene 
Cinemas where Lord Evershed MR stated that, ‘[t]he phrase, the company as a whole does not mean 
the company as a commercial entity as distinct from the corporators. It means the corporators as a 
general body’.184 Despite the case dealing with the shareholders’ power to alter the articles, the quote 
has been cited on many occasions in support of a shareholder value approach to directors’ duties.185 
However there seems to be little or no rationale for the courts to apply Greenhalgh to directors’ 
duties186 because the case dealt with how shareholders are to act, not directors.187 It is Attenborough’s 
view that it is doubtful if Evershed MR actually intended to lay down a principle of general 
application188 as Lord Greene MR statements were obiter and his statements were limited to ‘such a 
case as the present’.189 In addition, the interpretation given to the phrase ‘the interests of the company’ 
in Greenhalgh is not universally applied in relation to shareholder action. The judgment in 
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Greenhlagh is at direct odds with Allen v Gold Reefs190 which held when altering the articles the 
interests of the company as an entity should take priority over shareholders’ interests.191 Despite both 
Allen v Gold Reefs and Greenhalgh v Ardene Cinemas reaching directly opposed conclusions on this 
topic, it is Greenhalgh which is often cited in directors’ duties cases and not the judgment in Allen v 
Gold Reefs. Another case which is regularly used to support shareholder value is Brady v Brady192 
where Nourse LJ stated ‘[t]he interests of a company, an artificial person, cannot be distinguished 
from the interests of the person who are interested in it. Who are those persons? Where a company is 
both going and solvent, first and foremost come the shareholders present and no doubt future as 
well.’193 The judgment is often cited in support of the view that the common law required a 
shareholder value approach but as highlighted by Keay,194 the statement was made in the context of a 
potential breach of section 151 of the Companies Act 1985, which deals with financial assistance and 
not directors’ duties.195  
One of the few cases which does support a shareholder value approach in the context of directors’ 
duties is Parke v Daily News Ltd.196 The case involved payments to employees on the winding up of 
the company. The shareholders ratified the payment by a vote at a general meeting however Plowman 
J held that the payments were contrary to the duty to act in the interests of the company. Plowman J 
viewed the duty to act for the benefit of the company as meaning a duty to act for the benefit of the 
shareholders as a general body citing Greenhalgh v Ardene Cinemas as support for such an 
interpretation.197 Plowman J stated that  
the view that directors, in having regard to the question what is in the best interests of their 
company, are entitled to take into account the interests of the employees, irrespective of any 
consequential benefit to the company is one which may be widely held….but no authority to 
support that proposition of law was cited to me; I know of none and in my judgment such is 
not the law.198 
There can be no other interpretation of the case than viewing it as one which supports shareholder 
value. The general principle of the case is that generosity to employees has no place in the boardroom 
unless it furthers the shareholders’ interests.199 Despite the statements of Ploughman J, generosity 
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towards employees has long been seen as lawful. The early cases of Hampson v Price200 and Hutton v 
West Cork Railway201 did not advocate such strict adherence to shareholder value principles. Both 
cases held that gratuitous payments to employees were legal if they had the potential to indirectly 
benefit the company202 and at no point, in either judgment, were the company’s interests equated with 
the interests of the shareholders. In Hampson v Price’s Patent Candle Co203 the directors made 
payments to employees in recognition of their action to help the company be profitable. A shareholder 
brought an action alleging the directors had acted beyond their powers. The court rejected the claims 
of the shareholder stating that giving gratuitous payments to employees would likely to be beneficial 
to the company in the future.204 The Hutton v West Cork Railway case also involved payments to 
employees who were dismissed and payments to directors for past services. Both were held to be legal 
once reasonable in the management of the affairs of the company.205 It is difficult to see any real 
benefit to the shareholders for payments to redundant employees and to directors for past services yet 
both were seen as legal in the Hutton case. However Parke v Daily News seems to go against the 
principles laid down in Hutton and Hampson and Lowry criticises the decision stating it is a decision 
that belongs to a different age.206 The decision in Parke v Daily News was reversed by section 74 of 
the UK Companies Act 1980. The section conferred a power on directors to make provision for the 
benefit of employees or former employees on the transfer or cessation of the company and is now in 
force under section 247 of the Companies Act 2006.  
Another case which represents a shareholder value approach is Heron International207 which dealt 
with a company subject to two rival takeover bids. Lawton LJ held that when the directors have 
established that it is in the interests of the company that the company should be taken over, and there 
are two bidders, the directors’ duty is to obtain the best price for the shareholders.208 Lawton LJ went 
on to state that when directors must decide between the rival bidders the ‘interests of the company 
must be the interests of the shareholders’.209 While this statement was expressly limited to the 
scenario of rival takeover bids, it still advocates a shareholder value approach. According to Lawton 
LJ no other consideration is to be given to stakeholder interests when considering the takeover bid, 
such as the effects on employees. In this regard the judgment can be contrasted to Dawson 
International Plc v Coats210 discussed below, where employees interests played an important role in 
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determining the success of rival bidders. These are the main cases which support a shareholder value 
approach in the UK. By comparison, as will be highlighted below, there is much greater support for a 
less shareholder value focused interpretation of the duty to act in the best interests of the company.  
However Ireland seems to endorse the shareholder value principle to a much greater degree. Support 
for shareholder value in the Irish context stems from G&S Doherty v Doherty where Henchy J stated 
that ‘directors are in a fiduciary position, and must exercise their power bona fide for the benefit of 
the company as a whole, that is to say, the shareholders as a whole: See Greenhalgh v Ardene 
Cinemas Ltd’.211 The shareholder value approach was echoed in Irish Press v Ingersoll where Barron 
J stated that ‘acting in the interests of the company is no more than acting in the interests of all its 
shareholders’212 and was also endorsed in the case of Re Frederick Inns Ltd.213 In Re Frederick Inns 
the Supreme Court of Ireland followed a shareholder value approach with Blaney J, citing with 
approval the case of Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty. Ltd214 which stated ‘In a solvent company the 
proprietary interests of the shareholders entitle them as a general body to be regarded as the company 
when questions of the duty of directors arise’. Although Re Frederick Inns dealt with ultra vires 
payments and the duties of directors to creditors, endorsing the statement would seem to advocate a 
shareholder value approach.  
2.08 Case Law which does not Represent a Shareholder Value Approach 
The majority of cases from the UK, prior to the enactment of the UK Companies Act 2006, allowed 
for stakeholder interests to be considered during the decision making process in so far as it benefitted 
the company, either directly or indirectly. This did not necessarily mean that there would have to be a 
benefit to the shareholders which highlights that the courts recognised that the interests of the 
company and the interests of the shareholders are not always aligned. Therein lies the difference 
between shareholder value and the common law approach taken in the UK. The common law allowed 
directors to act for stakeholder interests even when it cannot benefit the shareholders, if there is a 
possibility it will benefit the company as an entity. Dodd argued for a similar approach when he stated 
that a corporation becomes a distinct legal entity upon incorporation215 and as such viewed the 
company as more than just a collection of shareholders.216 Equating the duty to act in the interests of 
the company as being identical to a duty to act in the interests of the shareholders is also contrary to 
some well-established legal doctrines, the same legal doctrines which undermine many of the 
arguments in favour of a shareholder value approach. Firstly it is a fundamental principle of company 
                                                          
211
 G & S Doherty Ltd v Doherty (19 June 1969, unreported) HC, 22. 
212
 Irish Press Plc v Ingersoll Irish Publications Ltd (15 December 1993, unreported), 77. 
213
 Re Frederick Inns Ltd.  [1994] 1 ILRM 387, 396.  
214
 Kinsela v. Russell Kinsela Pty. Ltd. (in liquidation) [1986] 4 NSWLR 722. 
215
 Merrick Dodd, ‘For Whom are Managers Trustees?’ (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1145, 1146.  
216
 Ibid, 1148. 
35 
 
law that the company is a legal entity which is separate from its shareholders.217 The case which 
established the doctrine of separate legal personality was Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd where Lord 
Halsbury LC stated that: 
Once the company is legally incorporated it must be treated like any other independent person 
with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself, and that the motives of those who took part 
in the promotion of the company are absolutely irrelevant in discussing what those rights and 
liabilities are.218 
In the same case Lord MacNaughton said that the corporation at law is a different person entirely 
from the subscribers to the memorandum of the company.219 Since the judgment in Salomon v A 
Salomon  there has been widespread judicial support of this separation between the company and its 
shareholders.220 In Credit Suisse v Allerdale Borough Council Hobhouse LJ held that ‘it is elementary 
law that shareholders are not to be identified with the corporate entity even if there is only one 
shareholder’.221 Similarly Lord Millet in Johnson v Gore Wood stated that the company is a legal 
entity ‘separate and distinct from its members.’222 The Irish courts have also consistently applied the 
principle laid down in Salomon.223 This well established doctrine of separate legal personality is 
contradictory to the approach of equating the company’s interests with the shareholders’ interests. The 
potential distinction between the interests of the company and its shareholder is illustrated by Gaiman 
v National Association for Mental Health.224 Megarry J first stated that ‘it is not very easy to 
determine what is in the best for the company without paying due regard to the members’.225 This 
would seem to endorse a shareholder value approach however he went on to state that paying due 
regard to the members does not mean prioritising the members’ interests above all others. Megarry J 
stated: 
in the case of a company, whether limited by shares or guarantee, a new legal entity comes 
into existence, namely, the company; and many of the powers have to be exercised for the 
benefit of that entity. This distinguishes a company from an ordinary club, which is not a legal 
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entity distinct from its members…..the conversion of a club into a limited company is no mere 
formality, but a change of substance. Where there is corporate personality, the directors or 
others exercising the powers in question are bound not merely by their duties towards other 
members, but also by their duties towards the corporation.226 
This quote demonstrates that the shareholders’ interests are not synonymous with the company’s 
interests and that the company is an entity distinct from its shareholders. In further support of the 
separation between the company’s interests and the shareholders’ interests is the fact that the common 
law duty to act in the best interests of the company227 is owed to the company as an entity and not to 
any individual shareholder or to any group of shareholders.228 This rule was recognised in Ireland in 
the case of  Crindle Investments which stated, ‘[t]here can be no doubt that, in general, although the 
directors of a company occupy a fiduciary position in relation to the company, they do not owe a 
fiduciary duty, merely by a virtue of their offices, to the individual members.’229 In certain 
circumstances directors can owe special duties to shareholders as was noted in the case of Peskin v 
Anderson.230 However Lord Justice Mummery noted that: 
The fiduciary duties owed to the company arise from the legal relationship between the 
directors and the company directed and controlled by them. The fiduciary duties owed to the 
shareholders do not arise from that legal relationship. They are dependent on establishing a 
special factual relationship between the directors and the shareholders in the particular case. 231 
An example of such a special relationship can be seen in Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum where a 
special duty was held to be owed by directors to shareholders when directors had used their power to 
allot shares for a different purpose for which it was granted.232 However there is no general duty owed 
to shareholders from directors. Despite the doctrine of separate legal personality and the nature of 
directors’ fiduciary duties  there is evidence, particularly from Parke v Daily News233 and Heron 
International234, as well as the Irish judgments,235 that when it comes to directors’ duties the best 
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interests of the company equates directly with the best interests of the shareholders. However this 
interpretation represents the minority of the judgments. As Keay states there does not seem to be a 
clear strain of authority running through the UK common law cases that supports the view that the 
best interests of the company means the best interests of the shareholders and certainly no patent 
support of shareholder value principle.236  
There are two main stands of case law which interpret the duty to act in the interests of the company 
as not simply equating with a duty to act for the shareholders’ interests. The first demonstrates that 
stakeholders can be taken into account when determining what is in the best interests of the company. 
Early cases such as Hampson237 and Hutton238 indicate that employee interests can be considered in 
determining what is best for the company even though there is no direct benefit to the shareholders. A 
similar conclusion was reached in Evans v Brunner Mond & Co Ltd.239 In this case a large chemical 
company had resolved in a general meeting to make large donations to universities and other 
institutions for scientific research. Eve J rejected claims that the resolution was ultra vires on the basis 
that any benefit to the company would be too indirect, that it would benefit competitors, and that it 
amounted only to a benefit to the community. Despite the fact that there was going to be no direct 
benefit to the current shareholders Eve J held that such research was necessary for the compnay’s 
continued progress as a chemical manufacturer.240 These cases would support Wen’s argument that 
the principle of non-shareholder consideration which leads to eventual benefit of the company has 
been acknowledged by English common law for over a century.241  
Some more recent judgments have made very clear statements that the duty to act in the interests of 
the company can include considering stakeholder interests. In Lonhro v Shell Petroleum242 it was 
stated that the best interests of the company were not exclusively those of the shareholders but may 
include the creditors.243 Similarly in Fulham Football Club v Cabra Estates244 Chadwick J held ‘[t]he 
duties owed by the directors are to the company and the company is more than just the sum total of its 
members’ and includes creditors and employees.’245 Cases such as Gaiman, Fulham Football Club 
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and Lonhro v Shell Petroleum represent the reality that the company is not simply a collection of 
shareholders. 
The second strand of case law demonstrates that not only should stakeholder interests be taken into 
account when acting in the interests of the company but also that if there is a conflict between the 
company as an entity and the shareholders, it is the company’s interests which should be prioritised. 
These cases are clearly contrary to shareholder value and provide evidence that several of the 
common law cases from the UK did not endorse shareholder value. This approach can be seen in Re 
BSB Holdings Ltd246 where it was stated that ‘As respects the potential conflict between the interests 
of the members and the interests of the company, it seems to me….. the interests of the company 
prevail’.247 Arden J went on to state that ‘the law does not require the interests of the company to be 
sacrificed in the particular interests of a group of shareholders’.248 
In the case of Re Welfab Engineers249 the directors were subject to a suit from a liquidator under 
section 212 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986 in which it was alleged the directors had breached their 
duty to the company by accepting an undervalue bid for the company’s principal asset. The directors 
chose not to sell to the highest bidder as the company would not have been able to continue as a going 
concern due to time constraints and its employees would have been made redundant. Accepting the 
lower bid allowed the company to continue in business and the bidder had agreed to preserve the jobs 
of the employees and the directors. The liquidator argued that the directors were in breach of their 
duties ‘because they gave priority to the preservation of the business and the jobs of the employees’250 
however Hoffman J held that the directors were not liable for a breach. What the case demonstrates is 
that directors, under the common law, were not in breach of their duties for prioritising the interests of 
the employees and the interests of the company as an entity ahead of maximising shareholder wealth.  
In relation to how directors are to act when subject to takeover bid, the Scottish case of Dawson 
International Plc v Coats Platon plc251  held that a director owe a duty to act in the best interests of 
the company and not the shareholders’ best interests. He stated that there was ‘no good reason why it 
should be supposed that directors are, in general, under a fiduciary duty to shareholders’.252 Lord 
Cullen accepted that the interests of the company and its shareholders may well diverge and stated 
‘[w]hat is in the interests of current shareholders who are sellers of their shares may not necessarily 
coincide with what is in the interests of the company. The creation of parallel duties could lead to 
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conflict. Directors have but one master, the company’.253 This case is a good example of why the 
company should be viewed as an entity and capable of having its own interests as accepting a 
takeover bid can be deleterious to the company in the long term.254 As a result directors in deciding 
between takeover bidders should be able to act in the interests of the company instead of prioritising 
shareholder wealth at the expense of the company as an entity and its stakeholders. 
Lord Cullen also explained why he was not following the decisions in Greenhalgh v Ardene Cinemas 
and Parke v Daily News.255 In relation to Greenhalgh he stated that the case dealt with different issues 
as it was concerned with the actions of shareholders who were not fiduciaries of the company. In 
regards to Parke v Daily News Lord Cullen recognised that the case adopted the statement from 
Greenhalgh ‘that the benefit of the company meant the benefit of the shareholders as a general body’ 
and that the Parke v Daily News applied the doctrine to directors’ duties but stated that ‘I have some 
doubt as to whether that was an accurate way of putting the matter’.256 He also recognised that the 
effect of the decision in Parke v Daily News reversed by a legislative amendment.257  
The decisions in the above cases have led to claims that the common law may not have adopted a 
shareholder value approach at all258 and certainly never advocated a strict interpretation of shareholder 
value.259 It is submitted that the approach taken by these cases represent a far superior approach to 
shareholder value and the approach taken in the Irish case law. However, as will be highlighted in 
chapter four, the commendable approach taken by the courts is no longer possible due to the 
legislative intervention of the section 172(1) of the Companies Acts 2006 and ESV which represents a 
clear endorsement of shareholder value. Ireland has declined to follow the UK approach and still has 
the possibility of embracing a more entity focused view of the company as is the topic of chapter five. 
2.09 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the theoretical foundations of shareholder value are significantly flawed. 
Arguments such as property rights, nexus of contracts theory and agency theory attempt to provide the 
justification for the prioritisation of shareholders ahead of stakeholder interests such as consumers, 
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employees and creditors.260 The focus on shareholders and shareholder primacy are based on an 
outmoded conception of the company261 and represent on a misunderstanding of the concepts of 
separate legal personality and the nature of directors’ duties. The more legally accurate view is that a 
company is a separate legal entity distinct from all its participants. This view of the company is not 
only more legally accurate but also the theory of the firm which is most likely to benefit all 
constituents. Many of the cases would seem to agree with the proposal that shareholder value is not 
the optimal solution to the corporate objective. There are times when the interests of the company 
should be seen a separate from the shareholders and that stakeholder interests should have a 
significant role in determining what is in the interests of the company. However the problem with the 
common law was that it was misunderstood as requiring a short term shareholder value approach, a 
belief which was held by academics262, directors263 and the Company Law Review Steering Group.264 
This misconception ultimately led to ESV being introduced through the UK Companies Act 2006.  
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Chapter 3 Stakeholder Theory and German Codetermination 
3.01 Introduction 
Stakeholder theory has been the traditional alternative to shareholder value. In answering the question 
of in whose interests should a company be run, stakeholder theory requires that companies should be 
run for the benefit of all stakeholders. While the US scholarship has generally been supportive of 
shareholder value, the work of Edward Freeman1 became the catalyst for economists and business 
strategists to analyse the validity of stakeholder theory2 and the theory has since received significant 
support from within the academic community.3 Freeman argued that managing companies for 
shareholder wealth was outdated and that stakeholders should no longer be seen as a means to attain 
shareholder value but instead increasing benefits for stakeholders should become an end in itself.4 The 
primary aim of stakeholder theory is to get all parties involved in a company to ‘work together for a 
common goal and to obtain shared benefits’.5 Instead of taking decisions for the sole benefit of the 
shareholders, stakeholder theory advocates that directors operate the company for the creation of 
wealth for all stakeholders. Despite having a strong normative basis, no way has been found to 
practically implement stakeholder theory.6 The theory’s fundamental flaw is that it requires directors 
to balance the interests of all stakeholders but provides directors with little guidance as to how to do 
so when these interests clash and as a result the theory becomes unworkable in practice.7 
Another alternative to shareholder value is the German model of codetermination where employees 
are given a significant role in the governance of companies. Through a two-tiered board structure, 
employees are given up to a fifty per cent representation on a supervisory board whose primary role is 
to monitor the performance of the management board and appoint directors on to the management 
board. Because of the strong representation of employees, the focus of German companies is not 
focused solely on increasing shareholder wealth. In addition directors’ duties do not require directors 
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to pursue shareholder value and instead all directors must promote the success of the company.8 
Therefore the German model does not represent shareholder value but is not a practical application of 
stakeholder theory as only one stakeholder is being represented. As a result the German approach 
does not have the problem of balancing many different competing interests.   
The positive aspects of the codetermination model prompted action at EU level through the Fifth 
Directive on company law,9 the aim of the Directive being to implement a German style 
codetermination model throughout the European Union. The initial draft required that all public 
companies would have to establish a second supervisory board with significant employee 
representation. However despite repeated dilution the Directive has never been enacted into law and is 
now extremely unlikely to ever be enacted. A Directive and a European Council Regulation, 
introduced in 2001, now protects the rights of different Member States to choose their own style of 
management structures and employee participation models.10 The primary reason for the failure of the 
Directive was that it was too major a reform for some corporate cultures.11 There is unwillingness in 
some jurisdictions to radically alter their corporate culture, an argument referred to as path 
dependency. Path dependency theory suggests that transplanting a governance model with many 
historical and cultural influences is unlikely to work in a jurisdiction with a very different history and 
corporate culture.12 There are many differences between European continental corporate governance 
systems and the approach taken in common law jurisdictions and Keay believes that path dependence 
is perhaps the reason for the resilience of shareholder value in common law countries.13 The failure to 
reach an agreement on the draft Fifth Directive would seem to support Keay’s view. Due to these 
difficulties with transplanting the model very few German commentators argue for codetermination as 
a model for other jurisdictions.14 However it is submitted that it is possible to implement some 
positive elements of the German approach without altering the institutional structure of companies. 
Employee representation in Irish companies has been expanded in recent years through introduction 
of work councils15 and increased employee consultation.16 Furthermore, as argued for in this thesis, a 
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reinterpretation of what it means to act in the interests of the company could ensure that, like 
Germany, the focus of directors is not solely on increasing shareholder value. 
This chapter first provides a description and analysis of stakeholder theory and highlights why 
practical application of theory proves to be so problematic. Secondly the chapter outlines the legal 
rules of German codetermination and historical background leading to the development of the model. 
Thirdly it describes the legal requirements contained in the draft Fifth Directive and outline the 
reasons for its failure to be implemented and also the reasons why a two-tiered board model is so 
difficult to transplant to common law jurisdictions. Finally the chapter analyses the German model as 
a solution to the corporate objective and concludes that it is possible to follow elements of the model 
without implementing a two-tiered board structure.  
3.02 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory rejects the idea that directors are agents of shareholders with the sole goal of 
increasing shareholder value but instead argues that directors should act as mediators between all 
interest groups and share the benefits of a company between them.17 The main tenant of the theory is 
that no one interest group automatically ranks above any other.18 Stakeholder theory holds that the 
economic and social purpose of the company is to create and distribute wealth and value to all 
stakeholder groups without favouring one interest group at the expense of others.19 In achieving this 
goal directors are required to balance all stakeholders which involves ‘assessing, weighing and 
addressing the competing claims of those who have a stake in the company in the actions of the 
organisation’.20 The facts of the situation faced by the directors are to guide how the different interests 
are to be balanced21 and stakeholder management involves ‘a never ending task of balancing and 
integrating multiple objectives’.22 The theory correctly asserts that there is nothing unique about the 
investment given by shareholders and it is often the case that many different stakeholders make large 
investments in their companies.23 For example, an employee may train to develop highly specific 
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skills with little relevance outside that company once he thinks his job is secure24 or a supplier may 
invest in equipment for the use of a single customer.25 Some employees may work in excess of what 
they are required to without extra remuneration and governments may invest in infrastructure to 
support major corporations.26 As a result, each group of stakeholders merits consideration on its own 
right not simply to be seen as a vessel to further the interests of shareholders.27  
From a normative point of view stakeholder theory is preferable to shareholder value as its primary 
aim is to benefit all participants in the company.28 However stakeholder theory breaks down when it 
comes to practical application. A central aspect of stakeholder theory is the need to satisfy the 
legitimate expectations of all stakeholders and the need to fairly balance stakeholder interests.29 
However the theory provides no guidelines as to how directors are to achieve this goal.30 The primary 
difficulty is that effectively balancing many different competing interests is very difficult when no set 
of interests are prioritised over the others. It is a fact of business that different interest groups involved 
in a company will come into conflict and it is not possible to consistently advance the interests of 
shareholders and at the same time advance the interests of many different stakeholders,31 for example, 
the interests of employees will often be different to those of the creditors or the shareholders. In 
addition to balancing competing stakeholder groups directors must also find an effective and fair way 
to balance competing interests from within these groups.32 For example creditors with different levels 
of security, different classes of employees, and different community groups can all have competing 
interests.33 Balancing these different interests is an exceedingly difficult task particularly when 
stakeholder theory provides little guidance as to which interests should be prioritised in a given 
scenario.34 Efforts have been made as to how different interests are to be ranked such as the 
importance of the stakeholder.35 However as Sundaram and Inkpen highlight, without an overall 
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criterion to assess importance, directors are still left with no way to distinguish important stakeholders 
from unimportant ones.36 
The problem with the lack of guidance given to directors is that it leads to confusion between 
objectives.37 All purposeful behaviour requires the existence of a clear objective38 and directors can 
generally work more efficiently if their focus is on one objective only.39 However stakeholder theory 
provides directors with no such clear objective. Jensen sums up the issue by stating, ‘it is logically 
impossible to maximise in more than one direction at the same time….In effect it leaves the manager 
with no objective. The result will be confusion and a lack of purpose that will fundamentally handicap 
the firm in its competition for survival’.40 This confusion between objective can cause directors to 
become trapped in a ‘no win situation’ and the best thing to do is nothing at all.41 As Goodpaster 
states, adopting stakeholder theory would push director ‘decision making towards paralysis because of 
the dilemmas posed by divided loyalties’.42 In addition, when directors are given no clear objective 
their performance cannot be evaluated in any principled way43 and the potential for agency costs 
increase. In the words of Eastebrook and Fischel ‘[a] manager who is told to serve two masters...has 
been freed of both and is answerable to neither...agency costs rise and social wealth falls’.44 Because 
there is no clear goal, stakeholder theory provides no way to measure director performance and 
directors become completely unaccountable for their actions.45 As Mark Roe puts it ‘a stakeholder 
measure of managerial accountability could leave managers so much discretion that managers could 
easily pursue their own agenda, one that might maximise neither shareholder, employee, consumer, 
nor national wealth but only their own’.46 Therefore, in attempting to operate the company for the 
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benefit of all participants, application of stakeholder theory will actually damage the company and 
reduce its ability to benefit any constituent. 
The counter argument to the issue of balancing competing interests is to say it is a director’s job to 
balance different objectives from different sectors.47 However Sternberg argues that the reason that 
directors are capable of balancing competing interests, in practice, is because directors use the goal of 
company success as a criterion for selecting which interests to favour.48 Under stakeholder theory all 
stakeholder interests are seen as equal and so there is no criterion for how directors are to resolve 
situations when interests do not align. By comparison, competing models do offer guidance as to how 
directors are to act in situations where interests clash. Entity maximisation provides directors with a 
clear objective of enhancing the value and sustainability of the company and provides a means to 
balance competing interests by requiring directors to take the decision which provides most benefit to 
the company as an entity. Similarly, the reason why shareholder value is seen as practical and 
workable49 is that it gives directors a clear objective to maximise benefits conferred on shareholders 
and all other interests groups are subordinate to this one clear goal. Berle argued that shareholder 
value cannot be abandoned without a reasonably enforceable scheme to put in its place.50 However, 
many years on, stakeholder theory has still failed to provide such a legally suitable and enforceable 
framework. One way to implement stakeholder theory would be to change the nature of directors’ 
duties to confer a direct duty on directors to meet the legitimate expectations of all stakeholders. 
However, if a direct duty was placed on directors to act in the interests of a set group of stakeholders 
it would open directors up to a potentially never ending list of actions which would not be of benefit 
to the company. It would also be likely that directors would be able to escape liability because if they 
are required to act for the benefit of all stakeholders then every decision becomes justifiable and as 
described above, directors become completely unaccountable. The Hampel Committee51 outlined the 
problems associated with extending directors’ duties stating that if directors’ duties were defined in 
terms of benefit to stakeholders it would mean 
Identifying all the various stakeholder groups: and deciding the extent and nature of the 
directors’ responsibility to each. The result would be that the directors were not effectively 
accountable to anyone since there would be no clear yardstick by which to judge their 
performance. This is a recipe neither for good governance nor for corporate success.52 
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In addition the courts in deciding cases under such a broad set of duties would be required to assess 
the likely impact of business policies on a diverse range of stakeholder interests which would 
represent a near-impossible take.53 It is difficult to disagree with Attenborough’s assertion that it is not 
possible to hold directors, systematically accountable to multiple non-shareholder constituents.54 
While normatively desirable, there seems to be no way to establish a legal framework which actually 
implements stakeholder theory.  
3.03 German Codetermination  
As discussed above, application of stakeholder theory, where no one stakeholder group is prioritised 
over any other, appears to be impossible to implement in practice. What can be implemented however 
is a model which provides one specific stakeholder group, employees, with a direct say in the 
management of a company. Jurisdictions such as Germany divide the boards of certain companies into 
two separate structures: the management board (the Vorstand) and the supervisory board 
(Aufsichtsrat). Through a model known as codetermination, employees are represented on the 
supervisory board, varying from equal representation to one third representation depending on the 
type of company and the number of employees. The supervisory board has two primary functions: to 
appoint directors on to the management board and to supervise the management board.55 They also 
have other functions such as the power to call shareholders meetings, to examine financial statements, 
and certain transactions may need supervisory board approval depending on the company’s articles.56 
The supervisory board may also inspect the company books and records at any time57 and the 
management board must inform the supervisory board of its policies for the future conduct of business 
as well as report to the supervisory board regularly regarding company affairs.58  
Employee representation and the two-tiered model each developed quite independently of each other 
and a unique set of historical events led to the intermingling of the principles. Initially, the two-tiered 
board structure contained no employee representation and the early form of two-tiered management 
was focused on creation of wealth for shareholders. German companies are usually split into two 
types of company: companies who are on the stock market (AG) and the German equivalent of private 
companies (GmbH) and the separation of management and supervisory boards date back to 1861 
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when the German Commercial Code introduced a supervisory board for AG companies. The Code 
certainly did not have the effect of accommodating employee interests and at its inception the 
supervisory board role effectively supervised on behalf of the shareholders.59 The fact that the original 
effect of the supervisory board was to serve the shareholders’ interests caused the merits of the two-
tiered system to be viewed for some time with considerable suspicion by stakeholders.60 However the 
effect of supervising on the shareholders’ behalf was not the intended purpose behind the supervisory 
board.61 The supervisory board replaced a model whereby companies were subject to oversight and 
control by the then socialist Government62 and this is the historical reason why the supervisory board 
serves interests other than the shareholders.63 The supervisory board was intended to replace 
government supervision and reflect the interests of all stakeholders such as the state, employees and 
investors.64 However the Commercial Code failed to achieve such ends. Instead companies took 
advantage of the removal of direct state oversight as an opportunity to focus solely on profits.65 The 
response of the legislator was to continue with the two-tiered system but to adopt a series of specific 
reforms which would clarify the exact roles of each board.66 These reforms led to the first 
implementation of codetermination in 1922, when employees were given the power to elect 
representatives on to the supervisory board.67 The employee representation applied to a very small 
number of companies and was repealed in 1934 but was seen as a major breakthrough in terms of 
breaking the dominance of shareholders on the supervisory board.68  
Equal representation on the supervisory board was secured for employees for the first time in 195169 
making it meaning that 80 years separated the introduction of the supervisory board and parity 
between employees and shareholders. The system that the trade unions campaigned for was to make it 
compulsory for labour and management to work together, the aim being to ensure that a strict class 
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distinction would not emerge again in Germany after the Second World War.70 Other nations also 
implemented codetermination models after the Second World War but Germany was the nation which 
provided the most far reaching powers to employees.71 The 1951 Act required that any company (AG 
or GmbH) in the iron, coal or steel industry which had over 1,000 employees was obliged to have a 
two-tier board.72 The supervisory board was to consist of five shareholder representatives and five 
employee representatives with an eleventh neutral member from outside the company73 thereby 
ensuring complete equality between employees and shareholders on the supervisory board.  
What followed the 1951 Act was a series of expansions to codetermination. The adoption of 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz in 1952 required every AG and GmbH with over 500 employees to 
establish a supervisory board.74 The board was to be made of a number divisible by three with 
employee representation making up one third75 and the other two thirds were to be made up of 
shareholder representatives elected at shareholder meetings. As a result there is no employee parity in 
companies which fall under this piece of legislation. The next expansion occurred with the 
implementation of the Codetermination Act 1976,76 the effect of which was to ensure all companies 
who employed over 2,000 were to implement a form of codetermination. This was to include co-
operatives and all companies limited by shares, thus extending the scope beyond just AG and GmbH 
companies. The supervisory boards of companies who fall under this legislation are to be made up of 
one half of shareholders, while employee delegates take up the other half. The chairman is to be 
appointed by the shareholders and does have the deciding vote on the board thus tipping the balance 
in favour of the shareholders. 77 This power of shareholders to have the deciding vote was upheld after 
a constitutional challenge in the Federal Constitutional Court.78 
From the above description there are essentially three different types of codetermination. Each of the 
three pieces of legislation applies to different types of company and varies in the levels of employee 
participation. The 1951 Act provides parity for employees on the supervisory board but only applies 
to the iron, coal and steel industries. The supervisory boards of all other industries are still balanced in 
favour of shareholders by a two thirds majority or by a deciding vote of a chairman elected by the 
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shareholders. Therefore the power of supervisory boards in most companies is still held by the 
shareholders and in companies with a majority shareholder that shareholder will still dominate both 
supervisory and management boards.79 However, even with the balance of most supervisory boards 
being in favour of the shareholders the German model could not be described as representing a 
shareholder value approach. In direct contrast to shareholder value and Enlightened Shareholder 
Value (ESV), where directors are elected by the shareholders and are legally required to prioritise the 
interests of the shareholders, codetermination ensures that shareholder value is not the exclusive 
priority of directors.80 While codetermination prevents a sole focus on shareholder value, directors’ 
duties in Germany also do not require a shareholder value approach. Section 93 of the Aktiengesetz is 
the main provision in German law dealing with directors’ duties and requires directors to act in good 
faith and in the best interests of the corporation.81 This rule is the same for all directors in Germany, 
even those elected by employees. There is no specific requirement to promote any interests other than 
the company’s and as a result there is no legal obligation on German directors to maximise value for 
shareholders.82 Therefore, due to the combination of the nature of directors’ duties and employee 
representation on the supervisory board, the German model is a framework which does not implement 
shareholder value. 
While the German model does not follow a shareholder value focused approach, it also does not 
represent a practical application of stakeholder theory. Under stakeholder theory operating a company 
in the interests of a single stakeholder group is expressly rejected83 and balanced benefits for each set 
of stakeholders must be the definitive objective of the company.84 Stakeholder theory is dedicated to 
benefit of all stakeholders equally however the German model clearly focuses on the interests of 
employees and shareholders, however it is this reason which allows the practical implementation of 
the codetermination model. Because only shareholders and employees are represented on the 
supervisory board there is requirement to balance many different competing interests and so there is 
not likely to be a confusion between objectives as would be the case under stakeholder theory. 
Therefore the German two-tiered board and codetermination model seems to be quite different to both 
shareholder value and stakeholder theory and does seem more likely to achieve the goal of increased 
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benefits for all constituents.85 It is possible that strong employee representation can benefit other 
stakeholder interests even without their representation on the supervisory board. For example if the 
employees live in the local community then they are very likely to oppose any action from the 
company which would harm that community.86 Robilotti believes that strong employee representation 
may also force the supervisory board to give greater consideration to the social consequences of the 
company’s actions.87 The German model does possess some advantages over both shareholder value 
and stakeholder theory however legally implementing a two-tiered board model in a common law 
jurisdiction is fraught with difficulties.  
3.04 Codetermination as a Solution for Common Law Jurisdictions 
The German corporate governance system is a product of the country’s unique culture and history88 
and its development has taken place over a long period of time. Attempting to emulate the German 
model in a common law country with its own corporate culture would require quite radical reforms 
and could not be established without extraordinary stresses.89 The institutional make up of companies 
would have to be altered significantly and the powers of shareholders, such as the exclusive power to 
appoint directors, would need to be eroded. Such wide ranging reforms would be likely to be met with 
resistance from shareholders and directors and the theory of path dependence offers an explanation as 
to why. Path dependence was first applied to corporate governance in order to argue that different 
corporate governance models in different countries were unlikely to converge to a single system of 
best practice.90 Path dependency theory holds that a corporate governance structure is deeply 
embedded in a country through both its historical evolution and its coherence with interrelated forces 
such as politics, legal influences and cultural backgrounds.91 The internal workings of the corporate 
governance system such as shareholder powers and labour relations are shaped by surrounding legal, 
economic and social contexts which consequentially lead to persistence with the current corporate 
governance model.92 These political, economic, legal, cultural and social contexts mean that there is 
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an unwillingness to move away from the current regime.93 The basic argument of path dependency is 
that fundamental changes cannot occur in corporate governance in the absence of changes of the other 
complimentary factors.94 Hence path dependency leads to a significant resistance from those involved 
in companies when major reforms are proposed. 
This resistance to major change has been evident in both the UK and Irish Reforms of company law. 
The Company Law Review Steering Group (CLRSG) in the UK stated that altering board 
composition would require a ‘radical change to British corporate culture and would be unlikely to 
receive wide support.’95 In the Irish context the Company Law Review Group (CLRG) did not 
recommend any changes to board structures stating that there was ‘little domestic pressure to change 
the board structure of companies’.96 The most obvious evidence of the difficulties involved in 
applying major reforms to corporate governance can be seen from the failure of the draft Fifth 
Directive. The Fifth Directive97 attempted to harmonise the approach in all EU Member States on the 
issue of employee participation in public companies. The original draft had a compulsory two-tiered 
board model but by the third draft of the Directive, several different options to include employee 
participation were made available to Member States. Despite the many concessions the Directive still 
did not receive the support necessary to be enacted into law.  
The first draft of the Fifth Directive was issued in September 197298 and dealt with the structures of 
the public companies and employee participation. It has been argued that of all the EU harmonisation 
of company law, the issue of worker participation has proven to be the most challenging.99 The 
primary difficulty involved was that the continental European model and the British approach to 
worker participation were in direct conflict.100 Traditionally British and Irish company law has had no 
employee representation on the boards of companies and management’s accountability has always 
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been to the shareholders.101 As a result any European legislation requiring employee representation on 
the boards of UK public companies would require major reform to British and Irish law. Attempting 
to harmonise the common law approach with a model which incorporates employee participation 
caused considerable tension.102  The original draft of the Fifth Directive was aimed at implementing a 
German style codetermination throughout the European Economic Community103 and was to apply to 
all public companies.104 In order to achieve increased employee participation the Directive favoured 
the two-tiered board structure105 with the explanatory notes to the Directive stating that the one-tiered 
board system ‘no longer answers the needs of modern management undertakings’106 and that it ‘does 
not afford equivalent safeguards to shareholders and third parties’.107 The Directive required all public 
companies with over 500 employees to allow the employees to elect up to one third of the supervisory 
board.  
Unsurprisingly the First Draft Directive was met with substantial opposition from the UK.108 And this 
opposition led to the redrafting of the Directive which diluted the degree of reform required from 
common law Member States.109 The second draft required that employee participation would only be 
mandatory from public companies of over 1,000 employees.110 Instead of having a mandatory two-
tiered structure the second draft required Member States to choose between a one or two tiered-board 
structure. However if a single-tier board was chosen employees would still have to be given 
representation on the board.111 Thus the only real change proposed by the second draft Directive was 
to remove the mandatory requirement of a two-tiered board structure and increase the threshold 
number of employees as opposed to any withdrawal of the mandatory requirement of employee 
participation.112 
The second draft was also subject to opposition from the UK and most of the alterations which led to 
the third draft of the Directive came as a result of the objections from the UK.113 However, in the third 
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draft directive other countries’ demands were also accommodated.114 The result was a complete 
dilution of the principles which were included in the original draft. The third draft115 maintained the 
overall objective of establishing employee participation for companies with over 1,000 employees116 
but included a wide ranging set of options for how to introduce employee participation into public 
companies. Options such as the collectively agreed system based on the Italian model, where 
employee participation would be achieved by agreements between bodies such as trade unions and the 
companies.117 Another change proposed by the Third draft of the Directive was the inclusion of an 
opt-out clause available to companies to completely avoid employee participation.118 Member States 
would have the power to allow public companies to avoid employee participation if the employees of 
the company voted by a majority that they did not want any form of employee participation.  
Despite the third draft of the Directive attempting to accommodate most Member States, the Fifth 
Directive could still not be agreed upon. Ultimately the conflict between the UK and continental 
systems proved too great an obstacle to overcome and was the reason why the Fifth Directive was 
never implemented in the EU.119 The efforts at harmonising law on the area of codetermination have 
ceased with the introduction of a Directive and a European Council Regulation, introduced in 2001, 
protecting the rights of different Member States to choose their own style of management structures 
and employee participation models.120 The primary aim of the Directive and the Regulation is to 
protect the different models within Member States and respect the wide diversity between the laws of 
the Member States in relation to employee participation in the management of companies.121 It is now 
generally accepted that no harmonisation in the EU in the form of the Fifth Directive will ever be 
implemented.122 
The experience of the draft Fifth Directive and the recent reforms in Ireland and the UK would 
suggest that path dependence theory does apply to this area of corporate governance and major 
reforms in relation to the institutional structure of companies and shareholders’ power are unlikely to 
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occur. It is the conclusion of many authors that replication of the German model should be done with 
caution123 and even German commentators warn that their two-tiered system is not ideal for other 
countries.124 
3.05 German Codetermination as a Solution to the Corporate Objective 
It appears that a two-tiered system of corporate governance will not be applied in a common law 
jurisdiction for the foreseeable future. However the strength of the German model is not necessarily 
based simply on its two-tiered structure but rather that it does not apply either shareholder value or 
stakeholder theory. It is submitted that many of the positives of the German approach stem from 
employees being given a significant role in the governance of companies and from a framework of 
directors’ duties which requires directors to focus on the best interests of the company rather than 
shareholders’ interests. German companies are perceived to serve a broad social function rather than 
simply having an objective to increase shareholder wealth and there is significant freedom under 
German law for company directors to consider purposes other than profit maximisation for 
shareholders.125 It is these factors which prevent a single focus on shareholder value rather than 
simply having a two-tiered board. As discussed above, the two-tiered board model itself does not 
guarantee an avoidance of shareholder value as early forms of supervisory boards operated on behalf 
of the shareholders. There can also be issues with the two-tiered model and certainly does not provide 
a perfect solution to all issues in corporate governance. For example the supervisory board is 
ineffective in monitoring against abuses by management126 and is unlikely to prevent agency costs.127 
This is because there is a significant asymmetry of information between the two boards128 due to the 
supervisory board being dependent on the management board for its information, the body that it is 
supposed to be supervising.129 Further, if the management board is aware that there will be some 
resistance from the supervisory board they will normally try to inform the supervisory board as late as 
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possible.130 In addition, while employee representation on the supervisory boards helps ensure that 
shareholder value is not applied, ultimately the power of supervisory boards is limited.131 The 
supervisory board does not make strategic management decisions of its own and is generally not 
involved in the decision making process.132 Instead its role is limited to evaluating measures which 
have already been taken and so the supervisory board is always acting in a reactive way.133  
The two-tiered board model does not provide a perfect solution. It is submitted Du Plessis is correct 
when he states ‘[t]he so-called fit all board structure does not exist and will probably never exist 
because there are simply too many local conditions, perceptions and practical realities applying to 
boards, their functions and their effectiveness’.134 Davies would seem to agree when he argues that 
there is no one best system of board structure and corporate governance.135 It is submitted that many 
of the benefits of the German model can be achieved without implementing a two-tiered board. When 
aiming to maximise benefits for all constituents the structures of boards themselves are less important 
than the objectives and perceptions of company directors and the legal requirements placed on them. 
It is possible for Ireland to follow elements of the German approach without changing the institutional 
structures of companies. For example the legislation on directors’ duties in Ireland are similar to 
Germany in that they require that directors act in the interests of the company and there is no express 
requirement to act for the benefit of shareholders.136 It is the Irish courts who have determined that the 
duty to act in the interests of the company equates with a duty to act for the benefit of the 
shareholders.137 As argued for in chapter five, with a reinterpretation of this duty from the Irish courts, 
the current shareholder value approach in Ireland could be altered to mean a duty to promote the 
success of the company as an entity. Should such a reinterpretation occur then Irish directors would be 
under a similar legal position to German directors where there is no specific requirement to promote 
any interests other than the company’s and as a consequence there is no legal obligation to maximise 
value for shareholders.138 Such a reinterpretation would also help change any perception among 
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directors that they must promote shareholder value. There has long been a spirit of broader corporate 
responsibilities in Germany and a philosophy that companies should be managed for the good of the 
enterprise, the employees and the country as a whole.139 In this regard Ireland has seen a shift in the 
perceived role of companies and directors’ duties from shareholder value to directors’ duties serving a 
public interest function.140 As will be discussed in chapter five, this change in perception is evidenced 
by the establishment of the Office of the Director for Corporate Enforcement, the introduction of 
restriction regime, the main aim of which is to protect the public from persons who are deemed unfit 
to be directors141 and the introduction of a new fiduciary duty to act honestly and responsibly.142 A 
reinterpretation of what it means to act in the interests of the company would continue this trend of 
moving away from shareholder value towards the law of directors’ duties fulfilling a broader public 
function. 
The most obvious difference between the Irish and German models is the significant representation 
afforded to employees of German companies. However it is not just through representation on 
supervisory boards which grants employees with a significant role in the management of companies. 
Work councils also play an important role in the Governance of German companies as all German 
companies, of five or more employees, must have work councils serving as labour representatives.143 
The work councils negotiate specific terms of union collective bargaining agreements and must be 
consulted with regards to any lay-offs, relocations or any fundamental change in business operations. 
The resolution of many specific employees issue such as collective bargaining or dispute resolution 
occurs through employee work councils rather than through supervisory boards.144 The work councils 
generally assist to implement decisions taken by the board and provide employees with the 
opportunity to influence how those decisions are realised.145 Similar work councils have been 
introduced in Ireland through Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Act 1996 
which implements the European Works Councils Directive.146 Employee consultation has further been 
expanded by the Employees (Provision of Information and Consultation) Act 2006 which applies to 
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companies of fifty employees or more. The purpose of the Act is to set a general framework of 
minimum requirements for the right to information and consultation of employees, and to provide a 
general right to information and consultation for employees from their employers on matters which 
directly affect them.147 This expansion of employee consultation rights in Irish law is the reason why 
the CLRG recommended maintaining the status quo in relation to board structure and shareholders’ 
exclusive right to elect directors.148 As discussed previously, the CLRG declined to recommend a 
second-tiered board but subsequently went on to consider granting employees an entrenched right to 
elect a single representative on to single-tiered boards.149 The stated reason for declining to grant such 
a right was because the group believed that employee involvement in large companies had been 
significantly improved by the European Works Councils150 and that existing consultation legislation in 
Ireland had ‘dealt with the requirement for employer/employee interface’.151 The expansion of 
employee consultation practices in Ireland, while not representing a strong a representation of 
employee interests as the German model, does go some way towards ensuring employee interests are 
represented in large Irish companies.  
3.06 Conclusion 
While stakeholder theory contains the normatively desirable goal of creating and distributing wealth 
to all stakeholder groups152 when scrutinised, the theory becomes unworkable. The primary difficulty 
is that stakeholder theory provides no way for directors to balance competing interests. A superior 
alternative to both shareholder value and stakeholder theory is the German model of codetermination. 
However introducing a two-tiered board model, in line with that of Germany’s, appears to be unlikely 
to occur in common law jurisdictions.153 Both UK and Irish company law reform groups declined to 
make any recommendations for significant reforms to board structures and the failure of the draft fifth 
Directive indicates just how difficult major reforms are to introduce in corporate governance. Even by 
allowing Member States a wide range of options included in the third draft Directive an agreement 
could still not be reached. While major reforms are unlikely to occur it is submitted that an entity 
focused approach can achieve some of the positive aspects of German codetermination. Ultimately the 
strength of the German model is that the country’s legal system allows companies to have an 
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objective beyond the goal of shareholder value154 and views companies as serving the public 
interest.155 The German model achieves this in a practical way without requiring directors to engage in 
a never ending balancing of competing interests at the expense of the economic success of the 
company. The entity focused model it is also different from the flawed models of shareholder value 
and stakeholder theory and in the Irish context implementing it would not require any major reform of 
company law and while employee representation is unlikely to meet the high levels of Germany, 
significant strides have been made with the representation of employee interests in Irish law.  
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Chapter 4 Enlightened Shareholder Value 
4.01 Introduction 
The reform of company law in the UK began in 1998 when the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) established the Company Law Review Steering Group (CLRSG). Over the following three 
years, the CLRSG published several consultation papers outlining the reasons for reform, how it 
recommended the reforms to be applied and seeking feedback from the interested parties.1 The 
primary reason given for the overall reform of company law was the sheer complexity of the existing 
common law framework.2 In relation to directors’ duties, a particular concern was expressed that the 
duties were detailed in case law as opposed to statute and as a consequence were more difficult to 
locate and understand making them less well known to the people to whom they applied.3 The 
CLRSG published its final report in July 2001, which was followed by the publication of the British 
Government’s white paper which responded to many of the claims and statements set out by the 
CLRSG.4 The Company Law Reform Bill was submitted to Parliament in November 2005 and 
received the Royal Assent as the Companies Act 2006.  
During the reform process, the CLRSG spent a significant amount of time addressing what it referred 
to as the proper ‘scope’ of company law.5 It defined the scope issue as identifying in whose interests 
should company law serve and in whose interests should a company be run.6 The group, after 
significant analysis of the different potential options, decided that Enlightened Shareholder Value 
(ESV) should become its proposed solution to the issue of the corporate objective believing it to be 
the best way of securing overall prosperity and welfare for all participants in the company.7 To 
implement ESV the CLRSG recommended that a new codified set of directors’ duties be enacted, 
recommendations with which the British Government agreed, ultimately leading to the enactment of 
section 172(1) of the UK Companies Act 2006:  
A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely 
to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing 
so have regard (amongst other matters) to— 
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(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,  
(b) the interests of the company's employees,  
(c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers and 
others, . 
(d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and the environment,  
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business 
conduct, and  
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company. 
The most noteworthy element of section 172(1) is that the success of the company is now framed in 
the overall context of providing benefit to the members as a whole. The CLRSG claimed that the 
common law required directors to operate companies for the benefit of shareholders and that its aim 
was simply to clarify the principles of the common law.8 As highlighted in chapter two, this 
interpretation simply does not accurately represent the common law judgments on this issue.9 The 
consequence of this misunderstanding of the common law position is that ESV represents a clear 
endorsement of shareholder value. Shareholders’ interests are given clear priority and stakeholders are 
only to be considered to the extent that they promote success of the company for the benefit of the 
members.10 This shareholder focused model was clearly intended to be offset by the express 
requirement to have regard to the stakeholder interests. However, difficulties in enforcing this 
requirement renders the stakeholder element of section 172(1) ineffective. As will be outlined in 
chapter six, enforcing the duty to have regard stakeholder interests is extremely difficult, particularly 
when company success in framed in such a way as to prioritise the interests of shareholders.  
However in its original plans for ESV, the CLRSG intended that increased disclosure and 
transparency would ensure that stakeholder interests were considered by directors. ESV was originally 
to be made up of two elements; the updated set of directors’ duties in section 172(1) and an increased 
reporting requirement called the Operating and Financial Review (OFR).11 The CLRSG’s hope was 
that the increased transparency and reporting requirement would help ensure directors would pursue a 
more stakeholder orientated approach to business. The OFR required mandatory disclosure of 
company policy on a range of stakeholder issues and details about the successful implementation of 
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those polices.12 It was legally required13 to be prepared in accordance with a detailed reporting 
standard14 and was to be reviewed by the company’s auditors.15 The CLRSG believed that the OFR 
and the updated set of directors’ duties working in combination offered the best solution to the scope 
issue. This outlook was agreed with by the British Government16 and the OFR was enacted in 2005.17 
However the OFR was withdrawn18 only a few months after its enactment and was replaced by the 
much less prescriptive Business Review.19 The withdrawal of the OFR seemed to undermine the 
overall framework planned by the CLRSG as the importance of the OFR was emphasised at numerous 
pints throughout the reform documents.20 Certainly the less demanding Business Review stood very 
little chance of ensuring a more stakeholder approach.21 However it is questionable as to what extent 
the OFR would have effectively ensured compliance with the stakeholder element of ESV as there are 
limitations in relation to the effect that corporate reporting can have on director behaviour. This is 
particularly the case under a system where directors are under a legislative duty to prioritise the 
shareholders’ interests and even if the more detailed OFR was still in operation, as Villier argues, it is 
debateable whether corporate reporting would assist in achieving the aims associated with ESV.22  
The aim of this chapter is to analyse ESV and the reform process which led to its implementation. The 
chapter will examine the CLRSG’s consideration of stakeholder theory and the reasons why it was 
rejected. The chapter will then argue that ESV represents a significant departure from the common 
law despite the CLRSG’s view that ESV represented only minor changes of substance.23 The chapter 
will also address the corporate disclosure aspect of ESV. It will outline the requirements of the OFR 
and the Business Review and evaluate the likelihood of detailed corporate reporting ensuring 
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stakeholder consideration under the ESV approach. Finally the chapter will analyse ESV and its likely 
impacts on some of the stakeholders listed in section 172(1).  
4.02 The Pluralist Approach 
In order to achieve its goal of ‘efficient creation of wealth and other benefits for all participants in the 
enterprise’24 the CLRSG considered two models: ESV and Pluralism. Pluralism seemed to be identical 
to stakeholder theory and represented the option for major reform. Under the CLRSG’s model of 
pluralism directors would serve a wide range of stakeholder interests not subordinate to or as a means 
of achieving shareholder value.25 The CLRSG stated that the implementation of pluralism would 
require a reform of directors’ duties to allow directors to further the interests of non-shareholder 
participants even at the detriment of shareholders.26 The CLRSG sought responses on whether it 
should be obligatory for directors to operate the company for purposes other than shareholder value, 
in cases where the needs of ‘employees, or suppliers or the local community or the wider public 
interest demanded it’.27  
The principal argument proffered in favour of pluralism was that shareholder value failed to recognise 
that companies’ best generate wealth when all participants operate harmoniously and so directors 
should recognise stakeholder interests in their activities.28 The shareholder value model, in making 
shareholder interests ultimately overriding, reinforces an environment which relationships of trust are 
difficult to sustain which decreases efficiency between directors and it stakeholders.29 As a result of 
this environment, stakeholders will be less likely to make firm specific investments in a company, 
such as an employee requiring a specialised skill or a supplier investing in equipment for a particular 
customer. The CLRSG viewed such investments as being extremely beneficial to a company but that 
such investments are risky as they are very difficult to transfer and are generally long term in nature.30 
The counter argument was that pluralism was not the only model which would allow a company to 
build relationships with non-shareholders, the CLRSG believed that ESV also had the capabilities of 
meeting such goals.31 The only other argument, offered by the CLRSG in favour of Pluralism was that 
shareholders should no longer be regarded as the sole bearers of residual risk and hence the economic 
case for giving shareholders ultimate control of the company is no longer valid.32 These were the only 
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two arguments examined in favour of pluralism which suggests the CLRSG were sceptical of its 
potential to be a workable model.  
The CLRSG recognised that implementing pluralism would represent a dramatic change in British 
corporate culture as well as requiring significant institutional changes such as adopting a two-tiered 
board system and removing shareholders exclusive rights to elect directors.33 It stated,  
if the legal basis were to be changed, to allow possible priority for interests other than 
shareholders’, this would require underpinning with changes in institutional rules. For 
example it might require change in rules on board composition and relationships between 
directors, shareholders and others – particularly, perhaps in the rules which give the 
shareholders’ ultimate exclusive power to appoint, dismiss and control directors. An obvious 
example of such a structure would be a two-tiered board system.34 
While acknowledging the need for institutional changes, the CLRSG believed that altering board 
composition would require a ‘radical change to British corporate culture and would be unlikely to 
receive wide support.’35 The Group stated that attempting to graft a continental model of directors 
duties into a different culture and political-economic environment would not produce the benefits 
desired and instead create an environment of decreased accountability.36 The CLRSG went on to state 
that the continental approaches of the two-tiered boards have developed in a juridical and politico-
economic environment which is very different from the UK.37 This outlook of the CLRSG would lend 
support to the view that path dependency is a block on any radical reforms taking place in corporate 
law as was discussed in chapter three. The CLRSG stated there was ‘no support for, and we would not 
favour, any institutional modification of the relationship between directors and shareholders which 
changes the ultimate power of shareholders to intervene in management to the extent that the 
constitution permits’.38 
One peculiar element of the CLRSG’s analysis is when, considering institutional changes, it stated 
‘there is clearly an inconsistency between leaving these powers of shareholders intact and enabling or 
requiring directors to have regard to wider interests’.39 Ultimately ESV did exactly this, no 
institutional changes were implemented, the power of shareholders to elect and remove directors 
remained in place, yet directors were required to ‘have regard to’ a wide range of stakeholder 
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interests. As recognised in the above quote from the CLRSG’s report, conferring a legal duty on 
directors to consider stakeholder interests in the overall context of a shareholder value model is 
inconsistent and fraught with difficulties. In the absence of institutional changes to the structure of 
companies enforcing stakeholder consideration proves to be very difficult. In this context of 
implementing significant reforms in order to apply pluralism, the CLRSG did consider changing the 
definition of the company. The CLRSG believed that to implement pluralism the definition of the 
company would have to be changed and instead of equating the interests of the company with the 
interests of the shareholders, the company would have to be defined as an entity, not wholly reducible 
to its shareholders.40 The CLRSG recognised that directors aiming to promote the success of the 
company as an entity will often be beneficial to shareholders and other participants.41 It believed the 
difficulty with such an approach was that, inevitably, there will be a choice between competing 
interests. The Group provided the example of making employees redundant or sacrificing a long term 
supply relationship when continuation, in either case, is expected to have a negative effect on 
shareholder returns.42 The CLRSG argue, quite correctly, that the law must give some guidance to 
directors in such a case43 and support the argument with referencing to the difficulties of balancing 
competing interests under stakeholder theory. The CLRSG argued that  
an appeal to the ‘interests of the company’ will not resolve the issue, unless it is first decided 
whether ‘the company’ is to be equated with its shareholders alone (enlightened shareholder 
value), or the shareholders plus other participants (pluralism). 
The issue with the CLRSG’s reasoning is that it viewed the entity argument as a means of 
implementing stakeholder theory. The issue of balancing competing interests makes the 
implementation of stakeholder theory or pluralism impossible in practice.44 However there is a 
difference between viewing the company as an entity in order to apply stakeholder theory and viewing 
the company as a separate legal entity in its own right. The CLRSG viewed the phrase ‘the interests of 
the company’ as having two possible interpretations: it meant either the interests of the shareholders 
or the shareholders plus other participants. The Group did not consider the possibility of the company 
existing as a qua legal person independent of third parties. The above problem between choosing 
between employee redundancies and increased shareholder returns could be answered determining 
which action benefits the company as an entity.  
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The CLRSG’s main reasons for not recommending pluralism were the requirement for significant 
institutional changes and the difficulty for directors in attempting to balance competing interests. It 
feared that changing directors’ responsibilities from one single clear objective to a trade-off between 
members and a wide variety of interest groups would ‘dangerously distract management into a 
political balancing style at the expense of economic growth’45 and would create a dangerously broad 
and unaccountable discretion for directors.46 The CLRSG concluded that the practical difficulties 
involved in implementing pluralism made it as neither ‘workable nor desirable’, the issues with 
balancing competing interests being  a ‘key objection’.47 The CLRSG proposed the way forward on 
the scope issue to be ESV but maintained that the reforms involved in ESV should be seen as 
pluralist, in the sense that the aim was that companies should be run in a way which maximises 
overall competitiveness and wealth for all.48  
4.03 Enlightened Shareholder Value  
ESV, as envisaged by the CLRSG, aimed to continue but clarify, the common law. The CLRSG 
viewed the common law as primarily shareholder orientated. It stated that the common law required 
directors to operate companies ‘for the benefit of shareholders’49 and that companies are formed and 
managed in the interests of shareholders.50 While the CLRSG wished to implement a shareholder 
orientated model, it had issues with the existing structure. The CLRSG believed that the duties as 
expressed and interpreted by directors under the common law, resulted in an undue focus on the short 
term interests of the members at the expense of the longer term interests of the enterprise.51 The group 
believed directors were misinterpreting the common law and had the erroneous belief that increased 
short term profits equated with shareholder value.52 The CLRSG blamed this misunderstanding that 
the common law required short term shareholder value on the fact that directors’ duties were derived 
from 250 years of case law.53 The issue the CLRSG had with the common law was in relation to the 
focus on the short term rather than having an issue with shareholder value itself and stated that the 
belief that the common law required a short term increase in shareholder value was based on a 
misunderstanding.  
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However the CLRSG went to state that ESV has the ultimate objective as currently enshrined by law 
i.e. to generate maximum value for shareholders.54 The CLRSG noted that directors’ fiduciary duties 
required them to act for the benefit of the company but that this usually meant ‘the benefit of the 
shareholders as a whole’.55 At no point did the CLRSG discuss the case law or outline how it arrived 
at the conclusion that the common law represented this shareholder value approach. While the 
CLRSG was correct to attempt to remove the erroneous perception that the common law required 
short term increases in shareholder wealth, its view that the common law represented shareholder 
value was also based on a misunderstanding. There was insufficient evidence in the case law to 
legislatively redefine the duty to act in the interests of the company into a duty to promote the success 
of the company for the benefit of the members. As Bavoso argues, the assumption from the CLRSG 
that the interests of the company meant the interests of the shareholders does not reflect what the 
courts have suggested.56 Many of the cases which equated the duty to act in the interests of the 
company with a duty to act in the shareholders’ benefit came from contexts other than directors’ 
duties.57 Several cases indicated that that wider interests than simply shareholders could be considered 
if it benefited the company as an entity to do so.58 While there is some evidence to suggest that in a 
directors’ duties context the duty to act in the interests of the company can mean a duty to act for the 
shareholders59 it has also been held to mean duty to act for the benefit of the separate entity, even at 
the expense of shareholders.60 The introduction of the legislative requirement to promote the success 
of the company for the benefit of the members introduces a clear shareholder value approach and ESV 
currently possesses what the common law never did, a clear corporate objective of running the 
company for the benefit of the shareholders. As Alcock states, ‘there is no longer any room for a 
distinction between the interests of the shareholders and those of the company as a separate entity’61 
and that defining company success in terms of a benefit to the shareholders amounts to a ‘strident 
affirmation of shareholder value’.62  
The description of ESV during the reform process leaves it in little doubt that the CLRSG were in 
favour of implementing shareholder value. In its initial explanation of ESV, the CLRSG accepted that 
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the theory is based on ‘shareholder wealth maximisation’63 and described the overriding interest of 
members as central to the concept of ESV.64 Under ESV, directors’ duties were intended to have a 
proper balanced view of the short and long term as well as the need to sustain effective on-going 
relationships with employees, consumers, suppliers and others and to consider the impact on the 
community and environment.65 However the CLRSG was anxious to point out that that the listed 
stakeholders are subordinate to the objective of success on behalf of the shareholders and are to be 
regarded as being of value only to the extent that they contribute to that objective,66 thus making it 
clear that priority is to be given to shareholders’ interests. In an address to the Parliament Lord 
Goldsmith, Attorney General at the time of the debates of the Companies Bill 2005, gave an insight 
into what it might mean to promote the success of the company for the benefit of the members, ‘for 
most people who invest in companies, there is never any doubt about it—money. That is what they 
want’.67 As a consequence of the heavy focus on members’ interests in determining what success is to 
be under section 172(1) directors will typically define success in commercial terms68 and have little 
consideration of stakeholders when it comes to determining the objective of the company.   
The first trial draft of the updated directors’ duties included a duty to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of members.69 The CLRSG rejected omitting the reference to the members as 
it believed referencing success only in terms of the ‘company’ would leave it to the good faith 
discretion of the directors to determine what is in the best interests of the company.70 The Group 
disagreed with such an outcome as it would allow directors too much discretionary power to set any 
interest above that of shareholders whenever their view of what constituted company success required 
it.71 This statement highlights just how shareholder focused ESV is. The CLRSG were against any 
scenario where a stakeholder interest could be placed above the shareholders’ interests. The 
prioritisation of the shareholders would seem to apply even if giving priority to a stakeholder would 
be the better outcome for the company as a separate legal entity. As a result the shareholders’ interests 
take priority over the company’s if the two interests do not align. The issue is that the shareholder 
value model does not always meet the CLRSG’s goal of maximising wealth for all constituents. 
Instead, it is submitted that, the best way to achieve the goal of increased benefit for all constituents is 
to promote the company’s interests as an entity. As will be discussed in detail in chapter five, the legal 
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framework to allow this entity focused approach has been implemented in Ireland through a general 
duty to act in the interests of the company. A similar legislative duty in the UK would have allowed 
directors to act for the benefit of stakeholders, even ahead of shareholders, when it was best for the 
company to do so. It would also allow the continuation of the common law cases where a shareholder 
value was not implemented. The duty could have included a reference to the long term which would 
have clarified the misunderstanding that the common law required a short term shareholder value 
approach. The issue that the CLRSG seemed to have with taking such an approach is that it would 
give directors too much discretion to determine what is in the interests of the company. Surely it is the 
directors who are best placed to make the determination as to what is in the best interests of the 
company.  
In its final report the CLRSG summarised the need for a legislative restatement on directors’ duties by 
stating that it will ‘it will provide greater clarity on what is expected of directors and make the law 
more accessible’.72 The trial draft on directors’ duties was almost unanimously welcomed by 
respondents73 and the British Government also agreed with the CLRSG on the topic of directors’ 
duties and by stating in its white paper and that the question of ‘scope’ of the company was to be 
answered by: 
[Embedding] in statute the concept of Enlightened Shareholder Value by making clear that 
directors must promote the success of the company for the benefit of its shareholders, and this 
can only be achieved by taking due account of both the long-term and short-term, and wider 
factors such as employees, effects on the environment, suppliers and customers….The 
Government agrees that directors’ duties are fundamental to company law, and that it is very 
important that the duties are widely known and understood.74  
ESV was to be the solution to the scope issue. A statutory, more inclusive, set of directors’ duties was 
to be introduced into the Companies Act 2006. However, as far as the CLRSG were concerned, this 
was the first element of a two-tier model of ESV, the second element coming in the form of an 
increased reporting requirement, the OFR.  
4.04 The Operating and Financial Review  
The CLRSG believed that the problem of ESV being overly shareholder focused would be offset by 
the requirement to have regard to the stakeholder interests and the increased reporting standards 
required by the OFR. The CLRSG viewed increased reporting, disclosure and transparency as central 
to the concept of ESV. When outlining its proposed way forward on the scope issue, it described the 
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key components of ESV as the updated directors’ duties and broader accountability, ‘in particular the 
inclusive operating review’.75 It saw the OFR not simply as increasing the transparency of companies 
but a way of increasing the likelihood that directors would consider the listed interests in the updated 
directors’ duties. The CLRSG believed that mandatory reporting, operating within a legal structure of 
the updated directors’ duties would have the capacity to achieve the objectives of a more stakeholder 
orientated approach.76 The legislative directors’ duties required directors to take into account a wider 
range of interests and by requiring companies to publish detailed information on stakeholder issues 
the transparency element was intended to provide the information needed to underpin this approach.77 
The CLRSG stated that an effective reporting regime was capable of achieving a more pluralist 
approach by allowing the public at large to evaluate its performance and thereby bring pressure on the 
company to satisfy wider social interests.78 The group felt the increased reporting would reduce short 
term pressures on directors from shareholders79 and would enable shareholders and the community to 
monitor performance by directors which would affect its reputation.80 The CLRSG stated that the 
OFR would enable ‘shareholders and the community as a whole to monitor performance by directors 
of the broadly expressed inclusive duty and for all concerned to develop flexible and responsive 
standards for reporting on the matters covered and to provide appropriate feedback to the company. 
This in turn would affect its reputation’.81 The CLRSG seemed to take the view that the duty to 
consider stakeholder interests would acquire its force through corporate disclosure requirements rather 
than the threat of litigation82 and that increased reporting and transparency were better methods to 
ensure compliance with section 172(1) than private mechanisms such as derivative actions.  
During the consultation, the OFR was widely welcomed by the respondents83 and was supported by a 
‘very large majority’.84 A minority of the responses from business and professionals preferred a less 
mandatory approach, not wanting the OFR to be implemented by statute.85 In rejecting this argument 
the CLRSG stated ‘We regard OFR reporting as a matter of such fundamental importance and so 
integral to a balanced approach to the scope issue, that the basic regime should be underpinned by 
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statute.’86 The CLRSG continued to stress the importance of the OFR by stating ‘before leaving the 
subject we would emphasise that we regard OFR disclosure as of central importance for the future’87 
and the OFR was also supported by the British government in its white paper.88 
On the 21st of March 2005 the OFR was introduced into legislation by the UK Companies Act 1985 
(Operating and Financial Review and Directors Report etc.) regulations 2005.89 Schedule 7ZA(1) of 
the regulations required a ‘balanced and comprehensive analysis’ of the development and 
performance of the company; the position of the company at end of year and the main trends and 
factors underlying the development, performance and position of the business as well as the main 
factors likely to affect it in the future.90 The review was also to include a statement of the business 
objectives and strategies of the company, a description of its resources, principal risks and 
uncertainties as well as outlining its capital structure and liquidity.91 The OFR was intended to cover 
all that is material to achieve a proper assessment of the performance and future plans and prospects 
of the business.92 The main stakeholder elements of the regulations were set out as follows: 
4. (1) The review must include—  
(a) information about environmental matters (including the impact of the business of the 
company on the environment), . 
(b) information about the company’s employees, and . 
(c) information about social and community issues. . 
4.(2) The review must, in particular, include —  
(a) information about the policies of the company in each area mentioned in sub-paragraph 
(1), and . 
(b) information about the extent to which those policies have been successfully 
implemented.93 
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The OFR did not just require information about company policy in relation to stakeholder groups but 
also required information about the company’s successful implementation of those policies. The OFR 
regulations further provided for disclosure on stakeholder matters by requiring that the ‘review must 
include analysis using financial and, where appropriate, other key performance indicators, including 
information relating to environmental matters and employee matters.’94 The OFR would need to be 
audited and the auditors would have had to state whether the information contained in the OFR was 
consistent with the company’s annual accounts and whether any matters have come to their attention 
that is inconsistent with the information in the OFR.95 From a practical viewpoint the CLRSG 
believed that the OFR would not be unduly burdensome on companies. It believed the information 
involved would already be a matter of concern for the directors and much of the material would be 
covered in the annual report through the chairman’s or chief executive’s report.96 The Group were 
eager to highlight that many companies already compiled a report similar to the proposed OFR and 
were keen to raise all companies to this standard.97 The important point was that under the OFR 
regulations disclosures would have been mandatory. The information would also need to be prepared 
in accordance with relevant reporting standards and give reasons for any departures from such 
standards.98 The relevant standard came from the Accounting Standards Board who released a detailed 
specific reporting statement and provided details on what directors were to include in their OFR.99 
These two elements were what set the OFR apart from its latter replacements, the Business Review 
and the Strategic Report, as neither required mandatory disclosure on stakeholder issues or had a 
requirement to comply with an accompanying reporting standard.  
4.05 The Repeal of the OFR, the Business Review and the Strategic Report  
Despite the continual emphasis on the importance of the OFR by the CLRSG after just a few months 
after its enactment into law the OFR was withdrawn100 on the basis that it imposed a disproportionate 
and unnecessary burden on companies.101 In a speech to the Confederation of British Industry in 
November 2005, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown withdrew the OFR on the 
basis that it was unnecessary red tape. In the speech, Brown stated that OFR amounted to 
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‘unnecessary burdens’ and stated ‘we will abolish this (OFR) requirement and will reduce the burden 
placed on you’.102 The reversal sparked widespread dissatisfaction from within stakeholder 
communities103 culminating in a court action taken by the Friends of the Earth. The Friends of the 
Earth sought judicial review of Brown’s decision claiming it was ‘procedurally unfair, irrational, 
perverse, a breach of legitimate expectations and based upon material errors of fact and that it was 
also in breach of the British Government’s code of practice on consultation’.104 The action was 
ultimately settled out of court when the Government agreed to a consultation about the future of 
corporate disclosure and paid the legal expenses of the Friends of the Earth.105 The decision to remove 
the OFR was seen as a blow to those advocating stakeholder interests and the inclusion of the OFR 
had led members of the CLRSG who had favoured pluralism into agreeing to the recommendation of 
ESV.106 While there are reasons to be sceptical about whether the OFR would have worked as 
planned, any possibility of corporate disclosure increasing stakeholder consideration was greatly 
reduced when the Business Review became the standard of corporate reporting. While there are broad 
similarities between the Business Review and the OFR, the main difference is in relation to disclosure 
of information relevant to stakeholders. While the OFR was aimed at benefiting stakeholders and 
fulfilling the enlightened aspect of ESV, the Business Review is focused on providing information to 
shareholders.107 The reporting requirements contained in the Business Review are not designed to 
promote social responsibility but rather for their value to the business, which is in keeping with the 
overall theme of ESV, promoting shareholder primacy.108   
Immediately after the withdrawal of the OFR there was no longer any requirement for companies to 
disclose information on stakeholder issues. However as a result of the legal action taken by the 
Friends of the Earth and the subsequent settlement out of court, the British Government began a new 
consultation on whether the OFR should be reinstated.109 The result of the consultation was not to 
reintroduce the OFR but include in the Business Review some of the provisions that existed under the 
OFR. The Business Review was introduced through section 417 of the Companies Act 2006 and 
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states ‘In the case of a quoted company the Business Review must, to the extent necessary for an 
understanding of the development, performance or position of the company’s business 
     (b) information about— 
     (i) environmental matters (including the impact of the company’s business on the  
environment) 
     (ii) the company’s employees, and 
     (iii) social and community issues,  
The Business Review was also to include information about any policies of the company in relation to 
the above stakeholder matters and the effectiveness of those policies. However in comparison to the 
OFR, the Business Review requires much less detailed reporting.110 The most notable change is that 
the disclosures on stakeholder issues are no longer mandatory and are now only to be reported to the 
extent that directors deem them relevant for an understanding of the business. There is no requirement 
for directors to say why particular matters are not necessary for an understanding of the company111 
thus allowing directors to freely decide whether or not to disclose information relating to stakeholder 
issues.112 Any incentive for directors to improve stakeholder consideration due to the requirement to 
report their policies on stakeholder issues has been removed due to the non-mandatory nature of 
disclosure. As Johnston states voluntary disclosure by companies is not a sufficient basis to anticipate 
the enlightenment of shareholder value.113 The other primary change in the Business Review is that 
compliance with the Accounting Standards Boards reporting standard is no longer mandatory. As a 
result there is no longer a legal requirement to comply with the detail set out in the standard and there 
will not be uniformity of information disclosed between companies. This lack of a requirement to 
comply with a reporting standard has the potential to undermine the Business Review’s practical 
effectiveness.114  
A Statutory Instrument115 in 2013 has altered some elements of the Business Review which is now 
referred to as the Strategic Report. However the Strategic Report maintains identical requirements on 
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matters of stakeholder disclosure. While there is an accompanying standard to the Strategic Report,116 
which outlines what directors are to include in the Strategic Report, compliance is at a voluntary 
level.117 The Statutory Instrument which introduced the Strategic Report stated that ‘[t]he purpose of 
the Strategic Report is to inform members of the company and help them assess how the directors 
have performed their duty under section 172’.118 Hence, like the Business Review, the purpose of the 
information disclosed is to benefit shareholder rather than achieve a more stakeholder focused 
approach under ESV. The Financial Reporting Council’s standard would back up such back view as it 
states ‘the Strategic Report should only contain information which is material to shareholders’.119 
4.06 Issues with Corporate Disclosure and Stakeholder Consideration.  
It seems that the CLRSG and the British government had two very different intentions for the role of 
corporate disclosure within ESV. The CLRSG hoped that the OFR would ensure that directors would 
comply with extended duties in section 172(1) and thereby ensure a more stakeholder orientated 
approach.120 While initially agreeing with this view, the British government have since been unwilling 
to implement a similarly prescriptive reporting regime to the one recommended by the CLRSG. 
However, the degree to which a more pluralist business environment can be established through 
corporate disclosure is questionable, even if the OFR was still in force.121 There are limits to the 
extent corporate disclosure can work to ensure a more stakeholder orientated approach from directors. 
The CLRSG hoped increased reporting would ensure a more stakeholder orientated approach in two 
ways; firstly by reducing short term pressure on directors to pursue shareholder value122 and secondly 
by the OFR having the ability to affect the company’s reputation.123 
The CLRSG hoped the OFR would reduce short term pressures on directors by fulfilling an educative 
function for shareholders, increasing their understanding of the company which would allow 
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shareholders to become more patient.124 However the issue with this reasoning is that, as rational 
apathy theory holds, there is very little pressure on directors from shareholders to do anything.125 This 
is particularly the case in public companies where shareholders are generally passive126 and much 
more likely to sell their shares rather than participate in the internal management of companies.127 In 
the quoted companies to which the OFR, Business Review and Strategic Report apply, there is likely 
to be a lack of shareholder interference in management128 so any short term pressure to pursue short 
term shareholder value is likely to be rare.  
In the rare event that short term pressures are being placed on directors the extent to which increased 
disclosure could change this behaviour is questionable.129 Meeting the standards required to shape 
shareholder behaviour is very difficult130 and this was recognised by the CLRSG who said there is a 
danger ‘that reporting duties without real content will lead to perfunctory, “boilerplate” 
compliance’.131 Johnston argues that the OFR did not demand a high enough standard to provide 
adequate disclosure on stakeholder issues to influence investor behaviour.132 What can be said with 
certainty is that the Business Review or the Strategic Report will not provide the standard of 
information necessary to alter shareholder behaviour. The Business Review and Strategic Report are 
likely to foster the boiler plate reporting that the CLRSG were keen to avoid. In Keay’s view there is 
nothing in the Business Review to stop directors making quite ‘neutral statements which give little 
detail about their thinking and discussions at board level.’133 Davies is also concerned with this issue 
and states that there is a risk the review will produce a ‘self-serving and vacuous narrative rather than 
analytical material which is of genuine use’.134 The conclusion of the Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skills is that when it comes to disclosures on stakeholder issues such as their relations 
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employees and the environment companies will insert generic boilerplate material in the Business 
Review.135 The fears of boiler plate reporting would seem to have played out in practice as empirical 
evidence gathered in 2011 found that the Business Review has made little difference to the quality of 
reports.136 Therefore corporate disclosure as contained in the Business Review and Strategic Report 
will be unlikely to remove any pressure that is being placed on directors.  
Secondly the CLRSG believed that the increased reporting would have the effect of allowing 
stakeholders and the public at large to evaluate company performance and which in turn would affect 
its reputation.137 This could make directors more likely to consider the listed stakeholders in order to 
not negatively impact the company’s reputation. This belief was shared by some academics. Arden 
claimed that OFR would ensure that the interests of stakeholders would be considered as directors 
would become accountable in a wider sense through peer pressure of the OFR.138 Arsalidou stated that 
the OFR would have allowed similar companies to be compared on issues like community concerns 
and employee welfare, and set the standards within a particular industry allowing a name and shame 
style enforcement.139 While a company’s reputation is widely regarded to be one of its most important 
intangible assets140 it is difficult how such information disclosure would significantly affect the 
company’s reputation. It is dependent on extremely detailed reporting and competing companies 
being objectively compared. The legal requirement141 to comply with the Accounting Standards 
Board’s standard was on a comply or explain basis which has had its own problems of non-
compliance in the context of corporate governance codes.142 Relying on comply or explain to ensure 
uniform reporting between companies and complete compliance with the Accounting Standards 
Board’s reporting standard was unlikely to have ensured perfect comparison between companies. 
Under the Strategic Report disclosure on stakeholder issues is no longer mandatory and leaving it to 
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companies whether or not to disclose stakeholder information will reduce the possibility of uniformly 
comparing companies’ performance across the board.143  
While there are question marks as to the OFR working as planned by the CLRSG, non-mandatory 
reporting under the Business Review or the Strategic Report has no chance of achieving such goals. 
The Business Review is weak by comparison to the OFR144 and Johnston notes that the Business 
Review will ‘be considerably less prescriptive and will offer even less guidance than the OFR about 
what should be disclosed.’145 Davies seems to agree that the Business Review is not going to be an 
equal replacement to the OFR and the Business Review contains ‘far from all of the substance of the 
OFR requirements…and the quality of what is disclosed under the Business Review may be less than 
would have been the case with the OFR.’146 Ultimately, when it comes to stakeholder disclosure it is 
highly debateable whether the Business Review, because of its vagueness will be able to provide any 
verification as to whether directors have discharged their duties under section 172(1).147  
4.07 The Impact of ESV on Employees  
Section 172(1) requires directors to promote the success of the company for the benefit of the 
members and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to— 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,  
(b) the interests of the company's employees, 
(c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers and 
others,  
(d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and the environment, 
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business 
conduct, and 
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company. 
The first point to note about the listed factors in section 172(1) is the term ‘amongst other matters’ 
which demonstrates that the factors mentioned in section 172(1) are non-exhaustive. The explanatory 
notes to the Companies Act 2006 state that the list is non-exhaustive but ‘highlights areas of particular 
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importance which reflect wider expectations of responsible business behaviour’.148 Therefore the 
factors mentioned in section 172(1) are deemed the most important but other interest groups can be 
considered. In relation to what directors are actually to do in having regard to the listed interests 
Margaret Hodge MP, Minister for Industry and the Regions, at the time of the enactment, stated in a 
speech to the House of Commons that ‘have regard to’ simply means ‘to think about’ and ‘to give 
proper consideration to’.149 She also commented on how she believed the directors were to satisfy this 
duty to have regard to the listed factors, 
We believe that a director should be required to give proper consideration to the list of factors, 
so far as it is relevant to the decisions that he is taking. That is the essence of enlightened 
shareholder value. At the same time, a director will not be required to consider any of the 
factors beyond the point at which to do so would conflict with the overarching duty to 
promote the success of the company.150 
A more comprehensive guide as to how directors are to act under section 172(1) comes in the 
explanatory notes which state, ‘It will not be sufficient to pay lip service to the factors, and, in many 
cases the directors will need to take action to comply with this aspect of the duty. At the same time, 
the duty does not require a director to do more than good faith’.151 Despite the claim that directors will 
have to do more than simply pay lip service the difficulties with enforcement means there is nothing 
preventing directors doing exactly that. The problems with ESV can be highlighted through a 
discussion of the potential impact of ESV on employees. Prior to the enactment of section 172(1), 
employees were owed a similar duty to be had regard to by directors. The requirement for directors to 
have regard to employee interests came from section 309 of the UK Companies Act 1985. Section 309 
provided: 
(1)     The matters to which the directors of a company are to have regard in the performance 
of their functions include the interests of the company's employees in general, as well as the 
interests of its members. 
(2)     Accordingly, the duty imposed by this section on the directors is owed by them to the 
company (and the company alone) and is enforceable in the same way as any other fiduciary 
duty owed to a company by its directors.152 
As under section 172(1), the duty to have regard to employees under section 309 was owed to the 
company and not to the employees and as such, employees could not enforce the duty directly. 
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Because of the unenforceable nature of the duty, section 309 became widely regarded as an 
ineffectual provision153 with even the CLRSG acknowledging the lack of effective means to enforce 
the provision.154 Due to its lack of benefit to employees, Sealy describes section 309 as ‘either one of 
the most incompetent or one of the most cynical pieces of drafting on record’.155 The inference being 
that section 309 gave the impression that directors were to have regard to employees but its 
unenforceable nature rendered the duty as merely lip service. The parallels with section 172(1) are 
obvious, with enforcement of the stakeholder provisions proving to be a significant difficulty with 
ESV.  
The only legal function section 309 actually served was to dilute shareholders’ power over directors 
rather than confer any actual power to employees.156 This was because directors were able to invoke 
the section when being sued by shareholders.157 If the board of directors decided to take a decision for 
the benefit of the employees rather than that of the shareholders, the directors could claim that it was 
taken for employee’s interests under section 309 and so would provide a defence to directors. This set 
of circumstances arose in Saul D. Harrisson and Sons Plc158 where the directors acted to protect the 
jobs of over 100 employees and section 309 played a central role in the directors escaping liability.159 
The case provides an example of how directors might use section 172(1) to render themselves 
immune from suit from shareholders.160 Protecting directors from suits taken by shareholders has the 
potential to be one of the very few advantages of ESV from a stakeholder point of view. Section 
172(1) extends this function from just employees to encompass community interests, the environment, 
customers, suppliers and long term planning. There is a possibility that this immunity from suit may 
increase the possibility of directors considering stakeholder interests by removing the possibility of 
being found in breach of duty for doing so. The CLRSG viewed this as a benefit of section 172(1) and 
it believed it would ‘confer an immunity on the directors, who would be able to resist legal actions by 
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the shareholders based on the ground that the directors had neglected their normal fiduciary duty to 
them.161  
However the importance of this function should not be overstated. If directors do not take decisions to 
promote the overall success of the company for the benefit of the members then they will be liable for 
a breach of duty.162 Under section 172(1) any stakeholder consideration would have to ultimately 
benefit the members. This is where ESV represents the more shareholder approach in comparison to 
the common law and section 309. The difference between section 309 and section 172(1) is that under 
section 172(1) members’ interests are given priority over all others. Section 309 stated that directors 
were to have regard to the ‘interests of the company’s employees in general, as well as the interests of 
the members’. Neither the members nor the employees were given priority over one another. It is this 
reason why section 309 represented an effective barrier for directors whereas under section 172(1) 
should the directors’ act in favour of employee interests at the expense of the members they will have 
failed to promote the success of the company for the benefit of the members. 
This difference between section 172(1) and section 309 can be highlighted by reference to Re Wellfab 
Engineers Ltd.163 In this case the directors were subject to a suit from a liquidator after choosing not 
to sell the company to the highest bidder. Accepting the lower bid allowed the company to continue in 
business and the bidder had agreed to preserve the jobs of the employees and the directors whereas the 
higher bidder planned on not continuing the company as a going concern. The liquidator’s case was 
that the directors were in breach ‘because they gave priority to the preservation of the business and the 
jobs of the employees’164 however it was held that the directors were not liable for a breach because 
they accepted the lower offer. While section 309 was not expressly mentioned in the case it has been 
suggested section 309 played a part in the deciding of the case.165 What this case demonstrates is that 
directors, under the common law, were not in breach of their duties if they prioritising employees and 
the company as an entity ahead of increasing financial return. The common law allowed such 
decisions to be reached, however it is submitted ESV does not, due to the prioritisation of the 
members and therefore the implementation of shareholder value. Lynch argues that this case would 
have been decided in the same way under section 172(1) as she believes maintaining the company as a 
going concern will always benefit the members. However this is not always the case. Three months 
after accepting the lower bid, Wellfab Ltd entered liquidation. The members may well have been 
worse off from the liquidation three months later than if the directors had accepted the higher offer 
and immediately went into liquidation. If that was the case, and this was foreseen by the directors, 
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then under section 172(1) the directors would have to be in breach of the duty to promote the success 
for the benefit of the members as the directors would have prioritised the entities and employee 
interests above that of the shareholders. Whereas, under the common law, free from the requirement 
to promote the members’ interests or under section 309 where employees interests were on an equal 
footing to that of the members, it would have been possible to act for the benefit of the company as an 
entity or act for the benefit of the employees.  
Section 309 was also invoked in the Scottish case of Dawson International Plc v Coats Platon plc166 
which also dealt with how directors are to act when the company is subject to takeover bid. This case 
held that, in general, the interests of the company do not automatically equate with the interests of the 
shareholders, and section 309 was used as part of the rationale for such a finding.167 Again under ESV 
it is unlikely that the courts could reach the same conclusion post the 2006 act due to the prioritisation 
of the shareholders.  This discussion represents the difference between a shareholder value model and 
the entity focused approach. Even the potential for section 172(1) to provide immunity from suit for 
directors is undermined by the prioritisation of the members and any stakeholder consideration must 
take place in the context of promoting the shareholders’ interests.  
4.08 The Position of the Creditors 
The argument of this chapter is that instead of defining company success in terms of the members, the 
common law duty to act in the interests of the company should have been given the scope to be 
developed by the courts. This would provide the courts with the latitude to potentially define the 
company as an entity which would allow shareholder interests to not to be prioritised over all other 
interests groups in every circumstance. This is the approach taken in Ireland168 and allowing the 
common law to develop is exactly what section 172(3) did in relation to creditors’ interests. Section 
172(3) provides that ‘The duty imposed by this section has effect subject to any enactment or rule of 
law requiring directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of creditors of the 
company’. The rule of law which section 172(3) refers to is the body of case law which provides that 
directors owe duties to creditors when a company is insolvent and when a company is nearing 
insolvency. Section 172(3) allows scope in this area of the common law for directors’ duties to 
continue to develop under the Companies Act 2006. The explanatory notes state that section 170(3) 
‘recognises that the duty to promote the success of the company is displaced when the company is 
insolvent’.169 The notes also makes reference to the case law concerning when a company is nearing 
insolvency and states that section 172(3) will ‘leave the law to develop in this area.’170 Clearly the 
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legislative intention is to maintain the common law position in relation to directors’ duties to creditors 
and is the reason why creditors are not mentioned in section 172(1).  
Under the common law when a company becomes insolvent the duty to act in the best interests of the 
company subsides and instead there is a duty to act in the creditors’ interests.171 Yet there is also a 
duty owed to creditors when the company is approaching insolvency. The predominant view of the 
case law is that the directors must give special consideration to the company’s creditors if the 
company is in a state of financial difficulty.172 The English courts in Re Horsely & Weight Ltd173, 
following Australia’s lead,174 made the existence of a pre-insolvency duty to creditors very clear. 
If the company had been doubtfully solvent at the date [of the grant of the pension] to the 
knowledge of the directors, the grant would have been both a misfeasance and a fraud on the 
creditors for which the directors would remain liable.175 
There is a very strong rationale for the application of the duty, primarily the duty is one of fairness 
and tries to ensure that creditors receive some fiduciary protection when the company is financially 
distressed.176 The case of Ultraframe Ltd. v Fielding177 provided a conclusive statement on the issue in 
England 
when a company, whether technically insolvent or not, is in financial difficulties to the extent 
that its creditors are at risk, the duties which the directors owe to the company are extended so 
as to encompass the interests of the company’s creditors as a whole (not to any individual), as 
well as those of the shareholders.178 
Due to section 172(3), the common law rules will continue to apply under ESV. Directors will owe a 
duty to consider creditors’ interest when the company is approaching insolvency allowing the 
common law to continue to develop. A similar approach to give the courts appropriate scope in 
relation to the duty to act in the interests of the company would have been superior to ESV.  
4.09 An Evaluation of ESV  
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There are some positive aspects of ESV which are worth highlighting. Firstly one possible benefit is 
that it will give directors’ immunity from suit from derivative action when directors take decisions in 
the interests of stakeholders. However, as discussed in the context of employees above, this effect is 
undermined by the prioritisation of the shareholders. Secondly, it is possible that section 172(1) could 
serve as a tool for educating directors and shareholders in the importance of stakeholders in achieving 
the long term sustainability and success of the company.179 Similarly section 172(1) could have a 
declaratory effect and serve a normative function in encouraging directors to take a long term 
approach.180 Section 172(1)(a) clarifies any confusion that the common  law required a short term 
approach as it expressly provides that directors should have regard to the ‘likely consequences of any 
decision in the long term’. Short term and long term strategies differ significantly181 and it was the 
main problem of the common law from the UK was that directors misunderstood that it required short 
term shareholder value. Directors seemed to be under the impression that they were legally required to 
maximise short term shareholder benefits at the expense of the long term interests of the company 
itself.182 While the CLRSG mistakenly believed that the common law required a shareholder value 
approach, the group did recognise that the common law did not require a focus on short term 
shareholder value. There was no actual legal requirement from the English common law to run the 
company for short term benefits to shareholders183 and the CLRSG put particular emphasis on the 
need to break the perception that directors must increase shareholder value in the short term184 and 
this was the reason for the inclusion of section 172(1)(a). While ESV embraces shareholder value to a 
greater degree than the common law from the UK, section 172(1)(a) should remove the perception 
that ESV requires a short term approach. However, the reference to the long term contained in section 
172(1) will not prevent directors from focusing on the short term if they believe that it will promote 
the success of the company for the benefit of the members.185 Directors are not prevented from 
managing for short term gains, it is left to their commercial judgment to evaluate what is in the 
members’ interests.186 The problem is that ESV represents such a strong endorsement of shareholder 
value that the requirement to consider the long term interests of the company may have little effect. 
While logically shareholder value should not necessarily lead to short-termism in practice, this is 
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often what occurs187 and shareholder value has long been linked to a short term approach.188 Because 
ESV is so shareholder focused directors may feel they have no option that in order to promote the 
success for the company for the benefit of the members requires them to take a short term approach.  
In an overall evaluation of ESV the relevant question is: does ESV represent the best model of the 
corporate objective to achieve the aim of the CLRSG to generate efficient creation of wealth and other 
benefits for all participants in the enterprise?189 Under ESV any possible benefit to stakeholders is 
undermined by the legislative prioritisation of the members and any consideration of the factors listed 
in section 172(1) must be such that it does not impinge on the shareholders’ interests.190 Company 
success is always couched in terms of benefits for the members191 and even if a course of action might 
benefit a number of stakeholders but will not benefit the shareholders, it should not be embraced 
under ESV.192 An analysis of ESV can only result in the conclusion that ESV implements a model of 
shareholder value. And as discussed at length in chapter two, shareholder value does not represent the 
best model to maximise benefit to all constituents. Adopting a legislative duty to act in the interests of 
the company and introducing a requirement to have due regard to the long term sustainability of the 
entity would have been a superior choice. It would have removed the misconception among directors 
that the common law required a short term shareholder value approach. It would have allowed courts 
the scope to be more flexible in their judgments and allowed them to view the company as an entity. It 
would also allow stakeholders to be considered when it benefited the company as an entity to do so. 
The CLRSG allowed the common law to continue to develop in respect of the duty to have regard to 
creditors’ interests when the company is nearing insolvency. A similar approach in regard to the duty 
to promote the success of the company would have been much likelier to attain the CLRSG’s original 
goal of maximising benefits to all participants.  
4.10 Conclusion 
The CLRSG’s and ultimately the UK’s solution to the issue of the corporate objective was to 
prioritise the members’ interests but also to require directors to consider a list of non-shareholder 
interest groups and the long term interests of the company. Davies sums up the eventual legal position 
by stating  
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The best view is probably that a section like 309 of the 1985 Act a more broadly-formulated 
pluralist section cannot itself operate so as to alter the decision making process of a board, 
unless coupled with further changes in company law, such as board level representation for 
the relevant stakeholder groups.193 
This statement represents why the recommendations of the CLRSG were never likely to be a success. 
A duty to consider wider interests without institutional reform is going to render those duties very 
difficult to enforce. The very system of requiring directors to have regard to stakeholder interests is 
unsatisfactory because of its unenforceable nature.194 The potential means available to enforce the 
duty to have regard to stakeholders are discussed in chapter six but are unlikely to provide a regular 
means to ensure directors consider the interest in section 172(1). The significant reforms considered 
under pluralism were extremely unlikely to ever be implemented given the resistance from the UK in 
relation to the draft Fifth Directive. Instead of recommending reforms to the compositions of company 
boards the ESV aimed to ensure directors would consider stakeholder interests through increased 
corporate reporting. However after significant dilution of the reporting requirement proposed by the 
CLRSG there is very little chance of corporate reporting ensuring directors do consider stakeholder 
interests. Information disclosure on stakeholder issues is no longer mandatory the result of which will 
be the legal system enforcing a model indistinguishable from shareholder value.195 What would have 
been a much simpler and more effective solution to the issue of the corporate objective would have 
been allow the jurisprudence to continue under the duty to act in the interests of the company. No 
institutional reforms would have been necessary. There would have been no unenforceable duty to 
have regard to a wide range of stakeholders yet the courts would still have had the power to rule in 
favour of stakeholder interests when it was in the company’s interests to do so. This approach has 
been selected by the Irish reform of directors’ duties and allows for the possibility of the imposition of 
the entity maximisation model.  
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Chapter 5 The Irish Corporate Objective 
5.01 Introduction 
The issue of the corporate objective first came to prominence in the 1930’s with the well-known 
debate between Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd. Berle argued that all powers granted to the directors 
of a company are at all times exercisable only for the benefit of shareholders, for whom money is to 
be made.1 He believed that because the power to run a company has been delegated from the 
shareholders, directors had the sole responsibility to run the corporation in the interests of those 
shareholders.2 Dodd argued that a corporation becomes a distinct legal entity upon incorporation.3 He 
viewed the company as representing more than just shareholder interests and that companies should 
be obligated to fulfil a social service role.4 Dodd stated that the law was in favour of treating the 
company ‘as an institution directed by persons who are fiduciaries for the institution rather than for its 
members’.5 Some 85 years on and it is this same debate that is relevant in Ireland. The Companies Act 
2014 codifies directors’ fiduciary duties and requires directors to act in ‘the interests of the 
company’.6 It is the meaning attributed to this phrase which has a major role in determining the Irish 
approach to the corporate objective. The common law has generally two interpretations of what it 
means to act in the interests of the company.7 The first equates the interests of the company with the 
interests of the shareholders thus requiring directors to run the company in the interests of the 
shareholders.8 The second is that acting in the interests of the company means the directors acting in 
the interests of the company as a separate legal entity.9 This approach recognises that the interests of 
the company and the shareholders may well diverge10 and in such cases it is the entities interests 
which should take priority. It would also require directors to take decisions in favour of stakeholder 
interests, where such action would benefit the company,11 therefore allowing a more stakeholder 
orientated approach to business. 
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It is at this point where the debate becomes relevant to the impact that companies have on society as a 
whole and the potential benefits that can be conferred on a company’s constituents. The first 
interpretation leads to a shareholder value approach which dictates that directors are to manage the 
assets of the company and take decisions based on the objective of maximising shareholder gain.12 As 
discussed in detail in chapter two, shareholder value has many drawbacks such as an undue focus on 
short term shareholder wealth which can potentially be damaging to the company, its stakeholders and 
society generally. It is submitted that interpreting the duty to act in the interests of the company as 
meaning a duty to act in the interests of the company as a separate legal entity is the superior 
approach. It is also a more accurate reflection of the legal reality that a company is an entity in its own 
right, distinct from its shareholders.13 Further, directors owe their duties directly to the company and 
not to shareholders and are under no direct obligation to further the interests of the shareholders.14 
However Irish law seems to embrace the shareholder value model with the reported cases on this topic 
stating that acting in the interests of the company is synonymous with the acting in the shareholders’ 
interests.15 
However there is evidence to suggest that should a case come before the courts under the Companies 
Act 2014 the Irish courts would alter the current shareholder value approach. In recent years there has 
been a greater focus on directors’ duties serving a public interest function.16 This is evidenced by the 
introduction of the restriction regime, the main aim of which is to protect the public from persons who 
are deemed unfit to be directors.17 The Companies Act 2014 has placed a new fiduciary duty on 
directors, taken from the rules on restriction, to ‘act honestly and responsibly in relation to the 
conduct of the affairs of the company’.18  While this duty is a new fiduciary duty, it has a very well 
defined meaning in the context of directors seeking to avoid restriction. Acting honestly and 
responsibly is the only available defence to avoid restriction for a director of an insolvent company 
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and has been subject to numerous examinations by the courts.19 It is likely that when assessing the 
fiduciary duty to act honestly and responsibly the courts will rely on the interpretation given to the 
duty in the restriction context and there is some evidence to suggest that acting contrary to stakeholder 
interests is a breach of the duty to act honestly and responsibly.20 The inclusion of the duty to act 
honestly and responsibly is further indication that the law on directors’ duties is moving towards a 
more stakeholder and public interest focused approach. The changing context of Irish law in relation 
to directors’ duties makes it more likely that the courts will alter their current shareholder value 
focused interpretation of the duty to act in the interests of the company. There is also case law from 
other jurisdictions which provide persuasive authority to follow an entity focused approach. Scottish 
and English case law has advocated an entity based approach prior to the implementation of 
Enlightened Shareholder Value (ESV).21 There are also a number of cases from Canada, a jurisdiction 
which has very similar legislation to Ireland on this topic, which have strongly advocated an entity 
focused approach to directors’ duties.22 Therefore there is precedent supporting a reinterpretation of 
what it means to act in the interests of the company.   
This chapter will first outline the Irish common law approach to the issue of the corporate objective. 
Secondly it will discuss the reform processes which led to the enactment of the Companies Act 2014 
and the rationale used for not following ESV from the UK Companies Act 2006. Thirdly it will argue 
for a reinterpretation from the Irish courts of what it means to act in the interests of the company. 
Finally the chapter will discuss the possible impact of the duty to act honestly and responsibly and the 
reasons why the entity focused approach is superior to other models of the corporate objective.  
5.02 The Irish Common Law Approach 
The Irish common law judgments on the corporate objective have focused on the directors’ fiduciary 
duty to act in the best interests of the company. The foundations of the duty come from the English 
case of Hutton v West Cork Railway23 and the duty has been applied by the Irish courts on numerous 
occasions.24 When examining what it actually means to act in the interests of the company, the Irish 
courts have equated the company’s interests with the shareholders’ interests. This interpretation stems 
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from G&S Doherty v Doherty25 which dealt directly with the duty for directors to exercise their power 
in the interests of the company. Henchy J in the High Court stated that ‘directors are in a fiduciary 
position, and must exercise their power bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole, that is to 
say, the shareholders as a whole: See Greenhalgh v Ardene Cinemas Ltd’.26 Henchy J cited 
Greenhalgh v Ardene Cinemas Ltd27 as persuasive authority despite the case dealing with 
shareholders’ power to alter the articles and not the fiduciary duties of directors. This interpretation of 
the duty was echoed in Irish Press v Ingersoll28 where Barron J stated that ‘acting in the interests of 
the company is no more than acting in the interests of all its shareholders’.29 In Re Frederick Inns 
Ltd30 the Supreme Court also seemed to follow this interpretation of the duty. Blaney J quoted with 
approval from the Australian case of Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd31 which stated ‘[i]n a solvent 
company the proprietary interests of the shareholders entitle them as a general body to be regarded as 
the company when questions of the duty of directors arise’. Although Re Frederick Inns Ltd dealt with 
the duties of directors to creditors on insolvency, endorsing the statement would seem to advocate a 
shareholder value view of the duty to act in the interests of the company. More recently the High 
Court in the case of Bloxham (in Liquidation) v The Irish Stock Exchange Ltd32 cited with approval 
the decision of G&S Doherty v Doherty as evidence of the duty to act in the interests of the company. 
The Bloxham case is evidence that G&S Doherty v Doherty is still a persuasive authority in Ireland on 
the subject of directors’ duties however the case itself did not deal with how the duty was to be 
interpreted. The above cases would suggest that Irish law follows a shareholder value approach, as 
Ahern states, the interests of the company being equated with the collective interests of the 
shareholders results in the application of shareholder primacy.33  
5.03 The Reform of Irish Law  
The Companies Act 2014 has generally consolidated and modernised the law bringing together 33 
previous enactments into a single piece of legislation. The Act came into force on 1 June 201534 and 
has reformed a number of areas of company law including introducing an encoded set of directors’ 
fiduciary duties for the first time in Irish law.35 Section 228(1)(a) states that ‘A director of a company 
shall act in good faith in what the director considers to be the interests of the company’. While the 
legislative duty is new, section 227(5) provides that the legislative fiduciary duties will be interpreted 
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and applied in the same way as the common law rules. As a result, the common law interpretation of 
the duty to act in the interests of the company is likely to be carried forward under the new Companies 
Act thus ensuring the continuing application of the cases which advocate the shareholder value 
principle. Given the difficulties with a shareholder value approach, there does seem to be reluctance 
from jurisdictions to expressly endorse a shareholder value. Instead, broadly speaking, there are three 
legal frameworks which are introduced to deal with the corporate objective.  
Firstly, a model can be introduced where shareholders interests are expressly prioritised but there is a 
legislative requirement placed on directors to consider stakeholder interests. This approach is in 
operation in the UK through ESV and in the US, where the vast majority of states have constituency 
statutes which, generally speaking, give authority to directors to consider stakeholder interests.36 The 
primary issue with this approach is finding a way to effectively enforce the requirement to consider 
the stakeholder interests. A direct legal duty to stakeholders cannot be introduced as it opens directors 
up to a potentially never ending list of actions,37 which would not be beneficial to company. To 
provide stakeholders with a legally enforceable right would require a fundamental change in company 
affairs38 and is very unlikely to happen in common law jurisdictions in the short to medium term.39 
Therefore actual enforcement of the stakeholder element is very difficult, as can be seen in the 
discussion of enforcement under ESV in chapter six. Similar difficulties have been found in the US 
with the general view being that the statues are ‘toothless’.40 This problem with enforcement is 
aggravated in the UK and US due to the clear prioritisation of shareholder interests. Similar to ESV, 
any consideration of the stakeholder interests under the constituency statutes ‘must be rationally 
related to the interests of stockholders’.41 In addition the courts have not interpreted the statutes in a 
way to supplant shareholder primacy.42 What this type of model requires is considering stakeholders 
to the extent that they contribute to shareholder wealth which is completely consistent with 
shareholder value.43 The difficulties with enforcement with such a statutory obligation mean that 
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shareholder value is the outcome of such a model and the reference to stakeholders represents mere 
lip service to wider interests. The main benefit of this approach is that it provides express legitimacy 
to the practice of directors considering stakeholder interests.44 However this can also be achieved 
through judicial statements in case law.  
During the Irish reform process the Company Law Review Group (CLRG) did consider implementing 
ESV. The Irish codification of directors’ fiduciary duties is generally similar to the one imposed by 
the UK Companies Act 2006 with both encoding common law duties into statutory form.45 However 
the CLRG were strongly opposed to introducing ESV stating it was ‘not convinced’ by the UK 
Companies Act 2006 statement of directors’ duties and believed it to be ‘susceptible to 
fossilisation’.46 The CLRG believed that the UK reform sought to impose ‘additional duties’ while the 
Irish reform was aiming for a ‘consolidation of duties that have been well established in the Irish 
courts’.47 The CLRG stated that it preferred a more general statement of directors’ duties which would 
give the judiciary ‘interpretational latitude’.48  
However despite the reluctance of the CLRG to implement ESV, a statutory obligation to consider 
one particular stakeholder interest does exist in Irish law. Employee interests are to be had regard to 
by directors under section 224(1) of the Companies Act 2014 which states,  
The matters to which the directors of a company are to have regard in the performance of their 
functions shall include the interests of the company’s employees in general, as well as the 
interests of its members.49  
Section 224(1) re-enacts section 52(1) of the Companies Act 1990 and is identical to section 309 of 
the UK Companies Act 1985 discussed in chapter four.50 What is notable is that priority is not given 
to either interest group as employees interests are to be had regard to as well as the interests of 
shareholders. Despite the equal ranking of the two interest groups, section 52(1) was generally seen to 
be of little practical benefit when it came to ensuring directors considered employee interests51 and 
section 52(1) was often dealt with by companies in a cursory fashion.52 This was most likely the case 
because the duty was not directly enforceable by employees53 and there was no other available 
method of enforcement. The only positive effect from an employee point of view is that it legitimises 
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directors considering employee interests and protects directors from being subject to a derivative 
action for considering employee interests. However, as is the trend with this kind of duty, there is 
nothing to ensure directors do have regard to employee interests. Even if directors completely 
disregard regard employee interests they are unlikely to face any penalty. The net effect of section 
224(1), like section 52(1), is that it will prove to be little benefit to employees and identical criticisms 
can be made in relation to ESV. Applying ESV in Ireland would have meant simply paying lip service 
to a longer list of stakeholder interests instead of just employees. It would have also meant giving 
legislative priority to shareholders, something which is not done in either section 224 or 228 of the 
Companies Act 2014. Given the issues with the stakeholder element of ESV and the prioritisation of 
shareholders it amounts to a clear application of shareholder value. Given the issues attached with 
shareholder value the CLRG were correct not to adapt ESV in Ireland and there is an argument to be 
made that including section 224(1) was futile as it is unlikely to confer any benefit on employees.  
The second model which can be introduced is the imposition of a two-tiered management structure 
which gives stakeholders a direct say in the management of the company. As discussed in chapter 
three, a two-tiered board model was intended to be implemented across all EU Member States through 
the draft Fifth Directive.54 However the attempt was unsuccessful, primarily due to resistance from the 
UK55 and the difficulties associated in applying the German model in common law jurisdictions.56 The 
CLRG did briefly consider implementing a two-tiered board model similar to the draft Fifth Company 
Law Directive. The group ultimately declined such a reform as it believed there to be little desire in 
Ireland to change the makeup of board structure.57  
The third alternative is to adopt a general duty to act in the interests of the company. While this can 
lead to the application of shareholder value, the courts can instead take the view that the company’s 
interests are not to be equated with the interests of shareholders and apply an entity focused view of 
the duty. The entity focused approach to this general duty has been taken in Canada,58 where the duty 
to act in interests of the company is seen as a duty to act for the benefit of the separate entity. This 
allows directors the scope to act in favour of stakeholder interests to the extent that it benefits the 
company, even if such action does not benefit the shareholders. It is submitted that it is this model that 
is the optimal method to ensure maximum benefits for all constituents and also a model which is 
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possible to apply in Ireland. The UK reform group, The Company Law Review Steering Group 
(CLRSG), were unwilling to provide a simple duty to act in the interests of the company, believing 
that it would give directors a discretionary power to set any interest above that of shareholders 
whenever their view of ‘company success’ required it.59 As a result of this reluctance to allow any 
interest be prioritised ahead of the shareholders, the UK have implemented an excessively shareholder 
focused model. Commendably, the Irish reform group were willing to recommend a broad duty to act 
in the interests of the company. The issue in the Irish context is that, the courts have given a flawed 
interpretation of what it means to act in the interests of the company. Not only is equating the interests 
of the company with the shareholders’ interests legally flawed but it is also an inferior approach in 
relation to the goal of achieving maximum benefits for all company constituents. In order to achieve 
an entity focused view of the corporate objective it is necessary for the Irish courts to reinterpret what 
it means to act in the interests of the company.  
5.04 The Correct Interpretation of the ‘Best Interests of the Company’ 
While the Companies Act 2014 maintains the common law duty to act in the interests of the company, 
the shareholder value interpretation does not have to be the judicial approach taken. As was discussed 
in greater detail in chapter two, interpreting the duty to act in the interests of the company as simply 
meaning the shareholders is contrary to two very well established legal doctrines. Firstly, it is one of 
the fundamental principles of company law that the company is a separate legal entity, distinct from 
its shareholders.60 The case which laid down this principle of separate legal personality was Salomon 
v A Salomon & Co Ltd where Lord MacNaughton said that the corporation at law is a different person 
entirely from the subscribers to the memorandum of the company.61 Since the judgment in Saloman 
there has been widespread common law support of this separation between the company and its 
shareholders.62 The Irish courts have also consistently applied the principle laid down in Salomon63 
with McGovern J in Redfern v O’ Mahony providing a conclusive statement on the issue.  
The legal consequences of incorporating a limited liability company are that the company 
assumes a separate legal identity as distinct from its owners. This is not a fiction. The rule in 
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Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 is still the law in this jurisdiction. The company 
and its shareholders are separate legal entities.64  
Secondly directors owe their fiduciary duties to the company itself and not to any individual 
shareholder or group of shareholders.65 The doctrine was first applied in Ireland in Smith v Cork and 
Bandon Railway Co66 in 1870 when Christian LJ said that idea that directors were trustees for the 
shareholders was ‘a proposition which presents itself to my mind with all the effect of novelty’. It has 
since continued to be applied, for example in Crindle Investment v Wymes67 it was stated that, ‘[t]here 
can be no doubt that, in general, although the directors of a company occupy a fiduciary position in 
relation to the company, they do not owe a fiduciary duty, merely by a virtue of their offices, to the 
individual members’.68 More recently Charelton J in Bloxham (in Liquidation) v The Irish Stock 
Exchange Ltd,69 in quoting with approval Ussher’s Company law in Ireland, stated that  it is ‘well 
established that the director owes the duties arising out of his office to the company itself, the separate 
person, and to no one else’.70 
MacCann states that the refusal for the Irish courts to find a direct duty to shareholders is ‘based on 
the fact that the company is a separate legal person’.71 He also believes that the correct legal approach 
is to view the company as an entity stating that directors must consider the shareholders’ interests and 
the creditors in determining what is in the interests of the company but that ‘the company as a whole 
means the company as a separate legal entity’.72 Yet when it comes to a directors’ duty to act in the 
interests of the company, the Irish courts hold that the company’s interests are the same as the 
shareholders’. Given that the company is a separate legal entity, the fact that directors owe their duties 
to the company there is no legal basis to automatically equate the interests of the company with the 
interests of the shareholders. As Attenborugh argues, this interpretation of what it means to act in the 
best interests of the company is wide of the mark.73 There is also support to be found in Scottish and 
English case law for taking the entity focused approach. Several cases advocate directors taking 
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stakeholder interests into account74 and others view the company as a completely separate legal entity 
which has priority over shareholders’ interests.75 
The point is that there is persuasive precedent for a different interpretation that the one currently taken 
by the Irish courts. In the UK context, the debate regarding the two different interpretations of the best 
interests of the company has been made redundant through ESV as section 172(1) of the UK 
Companies Act 2006 requires directors to ‘promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
members’. In an Irish context however, the Companies Act 2014 maintains the duty to act in the 
interests of the company and the debate around the interpretation of this phrase is still relevant. What 
the above discussion highlights is that there are alternatives to taking a shareholder value approach 
and that there is a strong legal basis for avoiding such an approach. The doctrine of separate legal 
personality, the nature of directors’ fiduciary duties and several cases from Scotland and England all 
support the view that the company is a distinct entity, separate from its shareholders.  
5.05 The Proposed Solution 
To implement a more legally accurate framework and to take a superior approach to the corporate 
objective in Ireland, a reinterpretation of what it means to act in the interests of the company is 
required. The duty to act in the interests of the company should be interpreted to mean the interests of 
the company as a separate legal entity. In this regard inspiration can be drawn from Canadian law. 
The Canada Business Corporations Act 1985 states that directors have duty to act ‘in good faith with a 
view to the best interests of the corporation’.76 The provision is almost identical to the duty contained 
in section 228(1)(a) of the Companies Act 2014. Traditionally, like Ireland, Canada seemed to favour 
a shareholder value approach to corporate governance.77 Although the case of Teck Corp v Millar78 
would suggest that Canada has not always supported strict adherence to shareholder value. In this case 
Berger J stated 
If today the directors of a company were to consider the interests of its employees no one 
would argue that in doing so they were not acting bona fide in the interests of the company 
itself. Similarly, if the directors were to consider the consequences to the community of any 
policy that the company intended to pursue, and were deflected in their commitment to that 
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policy as a result, it could not be said that they had not considered bona fide the interests of 
the shareholders.79 
While the decision in Teck Corp v Millar allowed for the consideration of stakeholder interests, more 
recent judgments have advocated viewing the company as a separate legal entity. The Canadian duty 
to act in the interests of the company came under examination in Peoples Department Stores Inc. 
(Trustee of) v Wise80 with the Supreme Court holding that the duty to act in the best interests of the 
company is not to be simply equated with acting in interests of the shareholders. 
Insofar as the statutory fiduciary duty is concerned, it is clear that the phrase the ‘best interests 
of the corporation’ should be read not as simply the ‘best interests of the shareholders’. From 
an economic perspective, the ‘best interests of the corporation’ means the maximisation of the 
value of the corporation. However, the courts have long recognized that various other factors 
may be relevant in determining what directors should consider in soundly managing with a 
view to the best interests of the corporation.81 
The only interpretation of this passage is that the court is prioritising the interests of the entity. The 
court first states that the best interests of the corporation are not to be equated with the interests of the 
shareholders. Secondly the court held that from an economic perspective the interests of the 
corporation means maximising the ‘the value of the corporation’. The focus on increasing the value of 
the corporation and not on shareholder value is very similar to the normative models based on entity 
maximisation model and sustainability as advocated by Keay82 and Attenborough.83 The Peoples 
Department Stores case went on to acknowledge that doing what is best for the company, even from 
an economic perspective, includes considering stakeholder interests.  
We accept as an accurate statement of law that in determining whether they are acting with a 
view to the best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances 
of a given case, for the board of directors to consider  inter alia, the interests of shareholders, 
employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment.84 
This acknowledges that for company to be successful stakeholders must be taken into account. This 
statement appears to be identical to ESV, which has been criticised in this thesis for being essentially 
shareholder value under a different name, but there is one important difference. Under ESV the 
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success of the company is framed exclusively in terms of the shareholders. As a result any 
consideration of stakeholder interests are only in the context of yielding benefit to shareholders and in 
the event of a clash of interests between stakeholders and shareholders the shareholders’ interests 
always take priority. The difference under the entity based approach is that stakeholder interests are 
considered to the extent in which they benefit the company as an entity. Conflicts between 
shareholder interests and stakeholder interests are resolved by determining acting in favour of which 
group would be most likely to benefit the company as an entity. This allows directors to sacrifice 
shareholder value if the good of the company requires it. Similarly it allows directors to sacrifice 
shareholder value if a particular decision was damaging to a stakeholder interest, and the damage to 
that stakeholder would negatively impact the company as an entity. It is submitted that director acting 
in the interests of the entity is more likely to foster company success in the long term and most likely 
to confer the greatest benefit for all company constituents and the first passage quoted from Peoples 
Department Stores does seem to advocate this approach.   
The decision in BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders85 continued the focus on the company as an entity. 
The court first recognised ‘that a corporation is an entity that encompasses and affects various 
individuals and groups, some of whose interests may conflict with others’.86 The court did not view 
the company’s interests as the same as the shareholders’ and stated that the directors should take into 
account stakeholder interests when determining what is in the best interests of the corporation87 and 
directors may even be obliged to do so.88 However the most notable statement is when the Supreme 
Court added ‘There is no principle that one set of interests – for example the interests of the 
shareholders – should prevail over another set of interests. Everything depends on the particular 
situation faced by the directors’.89 This statement supports viewing the company as an entity and that, 
in particular circumstances, shareholder value is not what is best for the corporation. The interest 
group which should receive preference is the one which most benefits the entity given the particular 
set of facts. The Canadian case law recognises this fact and is in direct contrast to the approach in the 
UK where shareholders enjoy complete priority in all scenarios.  
However, the judgments of the Canadian Supreme Court in BCE Inc and Peoples Department Stores 
have been criticised for applying stakeholder theory.90 This view can be backed up from the 
statements in from the statements in BCE Inc that directors should not treat stakeholders unfairly91 
and that directors should act in the interests of the company as a good corporate citizen.92 Similarly 
                                                          
85
 BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders [2008] SCR 560. 
86
 Ibid, [64].  
87
 Ibid, [40].  
88
 Ibid, [66].  
89
 Ibid, [84].  
90
 James Tory, ‘A Comment on BCE Inc’ (2010) 48 Canadian Business Law Review 285, 286. 
91
 BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders [2008] SCR 560, [64].  
92
 Ibid, [66]. 
99 
 
the above statements that no one interest group should be prioritised over any other provide very little 
guidance for directors and could be interpreted to advocate stakeholder theory as well as advocating 
an entity approach. Requiring directors to focus on the entity’s success removes the problems of 
balancing competing interests93 which is the primary difficulty with stakeholder theory.94 However the 
Canadian Supreme Court did not expressly advocate taking such an approach. As a result, the 
decisions have also been criticised for viewing the company as a collection of stakeholders rather than 
a distinct legal entity.95 Keay states there is no suggestion from the Canadian courts that directors are 
to focus on the success of the entity and argues that the courts seem to look past the entity and view 
the company as being made up of a group of stakeholders.96 It is asserted that despite the courts not 
expressly stating they were in favour of the entity based approach, their statements fit much better 
with an entity focused approach as opposed to stakeholder theory. The court in BCE Inc emphasised 
that directors’ duties were owed to the corporation and not directly to any stakeholder97 and in 
Peoples Department Stores it was stated that ‘at all times directors and officers owe their fiduciary 
duties to the corporation. The interests of the corporation are not to be confused with the interests of 
the creditors or those of any other stakeholder’.98 This demonstrates that the company’s interests are 
to prevail over the interests of individual stakeholders. The statements from Peoples Department 
Stores that the best interests of the corporation means the ‘maximisation of the value of the 
corporation’ and the emphasis on considering stakeholders to the extent it benefits the company 
represents what can only be interpreted as an entity focused approach. Stakeholder theory demands 
that benefits to stakeholders is the objective of directors however the Canadian courts are instead 
focused on maximising the value of the company and considering stakeholder interests to the extent 
which it benefits the company. Success of the company is the ultimate goal rather than providing 
benefits to stakeholders. While BCE Inc could be interpreted as representing a model closer to 
stakeholder theory as well as an entity based approach, when interpreted in light of Peoples 
Department Stores, it can be said that Canada does follow an entity focused view of the corporate 
objective.  
It is submitted that there is sufficient scope afforded to the Irish courts under the Companies Act 2014 
to follow the above Canadian Supreme Court decisions and apply an entity focused approach. When 
assessing the UK’s reform of directors’ fiduciary duties, the CLRG stated that it preferred ‘a more 
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general statement which gives the judiciary interpretational latitude’.99 Unlike the UK legislation, 
which defines company success in terms of the shareholders, the Irish courts  have been given 
significant ‘interpretational latitude’ and so can follow example set by the Canadian Supreme Court 
and the strand of English and Scottish case law which views the company as an entity distinct from its 
shareholders.  
5.06 The Duty to Act Honestly and Responsibly  
Section 228 of the Companies Act 2014, as well as containing the duty to act in the best interests of 
the company, also contains a duty to ‘act honestly and responsibly in relation to the conduct of the 
affairs of the company’.100 This is a new fiduciary duty for directors but a duty which has a very well 
defined meaning in the context of restriction orders. Under section 819 of the Companies Act 2014 
the liquidators of insolvent companies are required to make a restriction application against the 
directors of that company.101 The effect of restriction is that a restricted person cannot be appointed as 
a director for a five year period unless the company meets certain capitalisation requirements.102 The 
rationale behind the restriction regime is to protect the public from directors whose past records as 
directors of insolvent companies have shown them to be a danger to other interest groups, particularly 
creditors.103 In La Moselle Clothing Ltd104 Shanley J stated the purpose of restriction orders were for 
‘the protection of the public from persons who, by their conduct have shown themselves unfit to hold 
the office of, and discharge the duties of, a director of a company.105 In order to avoid restriction the 
director must prove that they have ‘acted honestly and responsibly in relation to the conduct of the 
affairs of the company in question, whether before or after it became an insolvent company’.106 The 
aim of the defence is to protect directors from being restricted when they were not culpable for the 
insolvent liquidation.107 Under section 228(1)(b) of the Companies Act 2014 all directors are now 
under a positive duty to act honestly and responsibly rather than the duty being just a defence to avoid 
restriction. What it means to act honestly and responsibly has been the subject of numerous 
examinations by the courts in the context of directors avoiding restriction and what it will mean to 
comply with the duty is likely to draw heavily from the restriction case law.  
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The main test for acting honestly and responsibly comes from La Moselle Clothing Ltd108 which set 
out a number of elements which the court should have regard in whether or not directors should be 
able to avail themselves of the defence and included: 
A. The extent to which the director has or has not complied with any obligation imposed on him 
by the Companies Acts 
B. The extent to which his conduct could be regarded as so incompetent as to amount to 
irresponsibility  
C. The extent of the director’s responsibility for the insolvency of the company.  
In Kavanagh v Delaney109 part A of this test was further expanded to include all common law based 
directors’ duties, the expansion later being upheld by the Supreme Court.110 Whether the director 
acted in the interests of the company is a significant factor in determining whether the director acted 
honestly and responsibly. McGuiness J stated in Re Squash (Ireland) Ltd111 that the directors had 
acted honestly and responsibly and so would not be restricted because they ‘put the interests of the 
company in the forefront of their minds, even insofar as losing their own money in an effort to assist 
the continuation of the company’.112 However a duty to act in the interests of the company is already 
included in section 228(1)(a) and it is unlikely that acting honestly and responsibly under section 
228(1)(b) simply requires directors to act in the interests of the company. While there is obvious 
overlap,113 acting honestly and responsibly is likely to extend a greater responsibility on directors than 
simply acting in the interests of the company otherwise there would have been no reason to include 
the new duty in the codification of fiduciary duties.  
There is some evidence to suggest that a director will not be deemed to have acted honestly and 
responsibly if they act to the detriment of certain stakeholders. In Re Outdoor Advertising Services 
Ltd114 Costello J held that two directors who deliberately sought to benefit themselves personally at 
the expense of company creditors, had not acted honestly.115 Directors were also restricted for acting 
against the interests of employees in Duignan v Carway.116 McCraken J stated that ‘to try to justify 
trading by using what is in effect its employees’ money without their knowledge or consent, is to me 
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quite bizarre and totally irresponsible.117 McCraken J also stated that continuing to trade at the 
expense of the company’s creditors amounted to acting irresponsibly. The courts have also found that 
reckless risk taking which is likely to damage stakeholder or shareholder interests will amount to 
irresponsible behaviour. In Re Usit World118 Peart J addressed the issue of reckless risk taking which 
damages stakeholder interests. He stated that directors should engage in calculated risk taking which 
‘lacks recklessness or carelessness, or wilful disregard of the interests of others, whether creditor or 
shareholder or employee, which would classify it as irresponsible’.119 These cases demonstrate that 
acting honestly and responsibly under Irish law goes beyond simply acting in the interests of the 
company or acting in the interests of the shareholders and negatively impacting creditors or 
employees can amount to a failure to act honestly or responsibly. In this regard the exact wording of 
section 228(1)(b) is particularly interesting. The duty requires directors to act honestly and 
responsibly ‘in relation to the conduct of the affairs of the company’. In Griers’s view, the inclusion 
of the ‘affairs of the company’ means that the duty to act honestly and responsibly applies to ‘all those 
party to the affairs of the company’.120 If his interpretation is correct then the duty to act honestly and 
responsibly applies to a much greater number of interest groups than simply shareholders as 
potentially all stakeholders are party to the affairs of the company.  
Lowry argues that the more modern approach of the courts is to require directors to go beyond the 
narrow objective of shareholder wealth maximisation.121 It is possible that this more modern approach 
is recognised in Ireland through the duty to act honestly and responsibly. Ahern argues that the 
introduction of restriction into Irish law has occurred within an overall context of viewing compliance 
with directors’ duties as serving a public interest function rather than protecting the interests of 
shareholders.122 She states that enforcement of duties owed to the company in Ireland is based on a 
‘public enforcement, public interest model rather than private enforcement at the behest of a company 
or its minority shareholders’.123 The inclusion of a legislative fiduciary duty to act honestly and 
responsibly could be seen as further evidence of Ahern’s view. Undoubtedly the courts’ view is that 
the purpose of restriction regime is to protect the public.124 The courts have deemed directors’ 
behaviour to be dishonest or irresponsible when directors have acted to the detriment of employees,125 
                                                          
117
 Ibid, 7.  
118
 Re Usit World [2005] IEHC 285. 
119
 Ibid, 84.  
120
 Nicholas Grier, Enlightened Shareholder Value: Did Directors Deliver’ (2014) 2 Juridicial Review (2012) 95, 
111. 
121
 John Lowry, ‘The Duty Of Loyalty of Company Directors; Bridging the Accountability Gap Through 
Efficient Disclosure’ (2009) 68 Cambridge Law Journal 607, 617.  
122
 Deirdre Ahern, ‘Directors’ Duties: Broadening the Focus Beyond Current Context to Examine the 
Accountability Spectrum’ (2011) 33 Dublin University law Journal 116, 140.  
123
 Ibid, 141.  
124
 See La Moselle Clothing Ltd and Rosegem Ltd [1998] 2 ILRM 345; Duignan v Carway [2002] IEHC 1; Re 
Colm O’ Neil Engineering Services Ltd [2004] IEHC 83.  
125
 Duignan v Carway [2002] IEHC 1, 17.  
103 
 
creditors126 or if directors have engaged in reckless risk taking likely to harm stakeholders.127 
Including the duty to act honestly and responsibly as a directors’ fiduciary duty does implicitly signal 
that the legislature wished to protect interests broader than just shareholders. It is possible that the 
Irish courts could view the inclusion of the duty to act honestly and responsibly as indication that 
directors’ duties purpose encompasses more than simply a duty to protect the interests of the 
shareholders. If the courts did come to this conclusion the next logical step would be to stop viewing 
the company’s interests as synonymous with the shareholders and to reinterpret the duty to act in the 
interests of the company as a duty to act for the benefit of the entity.  
5.07 Conclusion 
The argument of this thesis is that the best model to deal with the question of the corporate objective 
is for directors to seek to maximise the wealth and sustainability of the company as a separate legal 
entity. It is possible to legally apply this model in Ireland. The Companies Act 2014 has introduced a 
statutory duty to act in the interests of the company free from any reference to success of the 
shareholders. However the common law interpretation of this duty is to equate this duty with a duty to 
act for the shareholders’ benefit. This approach is to be carried forward under the new act as the new 
duties are to be interpreted in light of the common law.128 However, unlike the corresponding UK 
reform, there is sufficient scope in the Companies Act 2014 for the Irish Courts to reinterpret this duty 
as a duty to act in the interests of the company as a separate legal entity. Based on the well-established 
legal doctrine of separate legal personality and the nature of directors’ fiduciary duties, in addition to 
English129 and Canadian130 case law, this chapter has asserted that there is a significant legal basis for 
the Irish courts to reinterpret this duty. The introduction of the duty to act honestly and responsibly 
also suggests that there is a general movement away from directors’ duties functioning simply to serve 
the interests of the shareholders. Viewing the company as an entity would not only provide a much 
truer reflection of the legal nature of a company but also provides a chance to better promote both 
private and social wealth through company law. 
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Chapter 6 Enforcement 
6.01 Introduction 
For any legal model to fulfil its intended function it must be possible to enforce the legal rules and 
duties operating within that model. In order for duty-based controls to be effective there must be a 
realistic chance of enforcing those duties.1 Therefore, if breaches of directors’ duties are not subject to 
an efficient and effective enforcement methods they will prove to be of little use.2 For the entity 
approach to offer a viable solution to the issue of the corporate objective it must be possible to enforce 
the requirements that are placed on directors. Therefore it must be possible to hold directors to 
account in situations where they fail to act in the best interests of the company as an entity. When it 
comes to acting in the interests of the company as an entity the main standard of behaviour imposed 
on directors is the duty to act in good faith, previously known under the common law as the duty to 
act bona fide in the interests of the company. Under the Companies Act 2014 a director must ‘act in 
good faith in what the director considers to be the interests of the company’.3 It is submitted that the 
duty to act in good faith can be used as a means to ensure directors do comply with their duty to act in 
the interests of the company. The basis for this argument is that good faith is primarily assessed on 
objective grounds, which makes it possible for directors to be found in breach of the duty. Several 
cases have shown directors to have breached the duty on the basis that their actions were not in line 
with reasonable standards.4 Other cases have set out a clear requirement for directors to meet 
reasonable standards before the courts will hold the duty to have been satisfied.5  
While the objective standard of good faith allows for directors to be found in breach of the duty, the 
derivative action, an action from a liquidator or public enforcement mechanisms allows directors to be 
held to account for their breach. Because the derivative action is designed for correcting wrongs 
committed against the company, it is the most obvious means for enforcing a breach of duty. However 
practical difficulties make the derivative action unlikely to provide a regular and effective means of 
enforcement. In Ireland shareholders taking a derivative claim are still subject to the common law 
rules and must establish an exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle which is a difficult task.6 Instead 
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of relying on private enforcement mechanisms to ensure directors comply with their duties to act in 
the interests of the company it is submitted that public or quasi-public means of enforcement are more 
likely to be successful, primarily through the Office of the Director for Corporate Enforcement 
(ODCE) and the restriction of directors. These mechanisms could act as a deterrent for directors 
breaching their duties and so act as a means to ensure that directors, in practice, act in the interests of 
the company.  
In order for good faith to work as an enforcement mechanism a clarification of the standard necessary 
to satisfy the duty is required. The issue is that the duty to act in good faith is seen to be judged by a 
subjective standard7 which is relatively easy for directors to satisfy. For example Davies believes that 
disproving a director’s assertion that they have acted in good faith is almost impossible except in the 
most obvious of cases.8 If this were indeed the case then it would be very difficult to hold directors in 
breach of the duty. While it is true that good faith is subjective in so far as what is relevant is the 
directors’ state of mind, an examination of the case law indicates that the test in operation for good 
faith is much more akin to an objective test. A wholly subjective test would allow directors to claim 
they have acted in good faith and their submission would be almost impossible to disprove and would 
yield irrational results. Because of the application of a more objective test, a director’s assertion that 
he acted or is acting in good faith is not unassailable. The objectivity relates to the honesty of the 
directors rather than examining whether his eventual decision actually benefited the company or not 
and so does not interfere with the well-established business judgment rule. In this regard Royal Brunei 
Airlines v Tan9  should be seen as an example of how to achieve the requisite clarity for a test of 
honesty. The case clarified a similar issue of law pertaining to dishonest assistance in the law of trusts 
and clearly established that the test for honesty is an objective one.  
However despite an objective test often being applied by the courts the problem is that the good faith 
duty is perceived to be a subjective test which is easy to satisfy. This perception can lead to directors 
believing it is unlikely they will be held to account for a breach of their good faith duty to act in the 
interests of the company and so will be less likely to comply with the duty. It is submitted that 
clarifying the duty in a way similar to Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan will have a declaratory effect on 
director behaviour as well as allowing directors to be subject to an action for a breach of duty. 
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Enforcement in this context does not mean that directors should be subject to a never ending list of 
litigations. Instead, enforcement should provide a realistic threat of legal action to ensure that 
directors comply with their duties. Enforcement must act as incentive to adhere to the objective of 
entity maximisation and a deterrent from engaging in non-compliant action.10 Therefore the 
importance of having an effective enforcement mechanism is that it acts as a deterrent to avoid non-
compliant action in the first place.11 Therefore the aim of clarifying the standard required in 
complying with good faith is that it will act as an incentive to comply with the duty to act in the 
interests of the company. 
In the UK context enforcing the stakeholder element of Enlightened Shareholder Value (ESV) is 
made extremely difficult due to the prioritisation of the members’ interests. Section 172(1) of the UK 
Companies Act 2006 states that directors ‘must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be 
most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of the members’ and in doing so 
have regard to the list of stakeholder interests. As argued in chapter four, ESV is a model which 
represents a shareholder value approach and in the absence of legislative reforms any attempt to move 
away from shareholder value in the UK must come from an enforcement of the stakeholder element of 
ESV and ensure directors consider the listed interests. It is possible the duty of good faith could be 
breached if a director fails to have regard to the listed interests in a way in which harms the 
company’s ability to promote the success of the members. For example, disregarding employee 
interests to such an extent that it would have a negative effect on the company.12 If such a breach were 
to exist an action could be taken under several grounds. The UK statutory derivative claim has 
removed the requirement to prove an exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle and allows claimants to 
take action for any breach of duty.13 Despite widening the grounds under which a derivative claim can 
be taken, there have still been relatively few claims taken14  which indicates that the derivative claim 
is unlikely to provide an effective means of enforcing directors’ duties. Liquidators can also take 
action against an errant director for a breach of duty15 and disqualification orders can also be sought 
by the courts where there is evidence of a breach of duty.16 There is also a provision in the UK 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 which allows for the Secretary of State to disqualify a 
director of an insolvent company if it is in the public interest to do so.17 However, it is submitted that 
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none of these mechanism will ensure the consideration of stakeholders under ESV. Instead, it is 
proposed that an entity focused approach coupled with the public enforcement of directors’ duties is 
much more likely to yield the effective enforcement of directors’ duties.  
This chapter will first draw a distinction between the business judgment rule and the duty to act in 
good faith. Secondly it argues that it is an objective test which is in operation for assessing 
compliance with the good faith duty. Thirdly it argues that the law of dishonest assistance from the 
law of trusts provides an excellent example of how the test for good faith should be perceived. 
Fourthly the chapter outlines possible applications of an objective test for good faith in the UK and 
examine whether an objective test could ensure a greater degree of compliance with the requirement 
that directors should have regard to the stakeholder interests. Finally the chapter discusses the options 
available of enforcement when directors breach their duty to act in good faith in the interests of the 
company. 
6.02 The Good Faith Duty and the Business Judgment Rule 
The first thing to note about the duty to act in good faith contained in the Companies Act 2014 and the 
UK Companies Act 2006 is that it is identical to its common law predecessor the duty to act bona fide 
in the interests of the company. Generally, the interpretation of the legislative fiduciary duties under 
both English and Irish law is highly dependent on the common law for guidance. Section 227(5) of 
the Companies Act 2014 and section 170(4) of the UK Companies Act 2006 Act provide that 
directors’ legislative fiduciary duties are to be interpreted and applied in the same way as the common 
law rules. As a result, it is unlikely that any reform has been implemented by the change from a duty 
to act bona fide in the interests of the company to the duty to act in good faith in the interests of the 
company. Keay states there is nothing to suggest that the legislative duty to act in good faith will be 
interpreted any differently from the common law duty to act bona fide.18 The UK case law would 
seem to back up such a view. It has been stated in Cobden Investments v RWM Langport Ltd19 that the 
good faith duty and the bona fide duty ‘come to the same thing’.20 Both Madoff Secuties Inernational 
Ltd (in liquidation) v Raven21 and Hellard v Carvalho22 have held that the good faith duty simply 
represents a codification of the duty to act bona fide. While there have been no cases taken in Ireland 
since the enactment of the Companies Act 2014, the Company Law Review Group (CLRG) did not 
propose that the good faith duty should be interpreted differently to the duty to act bona fide and it is 
reasonable to assume that in Ireland the good faith duty will be interpreted in the same way as its 
predecessor.  
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Despite its widespread use throughout company law23 there is no clear and common definition of the 
meaning of good faith24 with Eisenberg believing it to be easier to characterise an act which is lacking 
good faith rather than to say what good faith actually is.25 While it is difficult to formulate any precise 
definition of good faith, the broad concept behind the duty can be articulated. A duty to act in good 
faith is generally based on the notion of acting honestly26 and the good faith duty to act in the interests 
of the company is grounded in honesty and loyalty rather than in competence.27 Throughout the bona 
fide and good faith case law the phrase ‘the directors honestly held beliefs’ (or a derivative of that 
phrase) appears frequently during the judicial reasoning in determining whether the directors breached 
their duty.28 Therefore in assessing whether a director has complied with the good faith duty what is 
relevant is the honesty of the beliefs of the director rather than whether the impugned decision did or 
did not benefit the company. In other words the question is: did the director honestly believe that he 
was acting to promote the success of the company?  
It is important to distinguish this question of honesty from the application of the business judgment 
rule. The business judgment rule29 refers to the common law rule, derived from English cases, that a 
court will not substitute its own views in the place of those of an individual director. For the purposes 
of this thesis the business judgment rule refers to the English form of the rule and not the American 
rule which is stricter in its application and results in directors’ business judgments only being 
reviewed in extraordinary circumstances.30 Under the English business judgment rule the courts will 
never deem a director to have breached their duties simply because the court would have taken a 
different business decision in the same set of circumstances. Similarly, under the rule directors will 
not be in breach of good faith simply because a decision did out work as intended. 
                                                          
23
 See Noel McGrath, ‘Good Faith: A Puzzle for the Commercial Lawyer’ (2014) UCD Working Papers in Law, 
Criminology & Socio-Legal Studies Research Paper available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2500105.  
24
 Andrew Keay, The Enlightened Shareholder Value Principle and Corporate Governance (Routledge 2012), 
93. 
25
 Melvin Eisenberg, ‘The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law’ (2006) 31 Delaware Journal of Corporate 
Law 1, 21. 
26
 See Sean Griffith, ‘Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence’ 
(2005) 55 Duke Law Journal 1; Len Sealy, ‘”Bona Fides” and “Proper Purposes” in Corporate Decisions’ 
(1989) Monash University Law Review 265; John O’ Connor, Good Faith in English law (Dartmouth Publishing 
1990); Melvin Eisenberg, ‘The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law’ (2006) 31 Delaware Journal of 
Corporate Law 1; Andrew Keay, Directors’ Duties (2nd edn, Jordan 2014), 130.  
27
 Davy Wu, ‘Managerial Behaviour, Company Law and the Problem of the Enlightened Shareholder Value’ 
(2010) 31(2) Company Lawyer 53, 53. 
28
 See for example, Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum Limited [1974] AC 821, 842; Citco Banking Corp NV v 
Pussers Ltd [2007] 2 BCLC 638 (Ch),  649; Regentcrest plc v Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 80, 124, Extrasure Travel 
Insurances Ltd v Scattergood [2003] 1 BCLC 598, 90; Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd. [1924] Ch.304, 308. 
29
 For a discussion on the business judgment rule see Dennis Block, Nancy Barton and Stephen Raidin, The 
Business Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors (Aspen Law and Business 2002); Len Sealy, 
’”Bona fides” and “Proper Purposes” in Corporate Decisions’ (1989) Monash University Law Review 265, 277; 
John Birds et al, Boyle and Birds’ Company Law (7th edn, Jordan, 2007), 615; Derek French et al, Mayson, 
French and Ryan on Company Law (24th edn, Oxford University Press, 2007), 455. 
30
 See David Rosenberg, ‘Galactic Stupidity and the Business Judgment Rule’ (2006) 32 Journal of Corporation 
Law 301.  
109 
 
Several good rationales underlie the application of the business judgment rule. First of all it is a matter 
for the directors, not the courts, to decide what is in the best interests of the company.31 There is also 
an argument to be made that the courts would lack the expertise and information necessary to 
substitute their view of a business decision in place of that of the directors.32 It would also be 
inhibiting for directors if their every decision was subject to the prospect of review by the courts 
which could well make directors unduly hesitant when making decisions or unwilling to take any 
action. The business judgment rule also prevents courts relying on hindsight to reach unduly harsh 
conclusions on directors. The application of the business judgment rule is very well established and 
stretches as far back as 1812 when Lord Elson LC, in Carlen v Drury, stated that the court is not 
required ‘to take the management of every playhouse and brewhouse in the Kingdom’.33 Other cases 
such as Re Smith and Fawcett34 demonstrated an unwillingness to interfere in business decisions. Lord 
Greene MR speaking in the Court of Appeal observed that ‘directors must act, bona fide, in what they 
consider - not what the court considers - is in the best interests of the company’,35 a statement which 
was quoted with approval in the Irish case of Banfi ltd v Moran.36 In Regentcrest plc v Cohen,37  
Parker J in the Chancery Division gave a definitive statement on the business judgment rule.  
The question is not whether, viewed objectively by the court the particular act or omission 
which is challenged was in fact in the interests of the company; still less is the question 
whether the court, had it been in the position of the director at the relevant time, might have 
acted differently.38 
Parker J also emphasised the importance of not engaging in hindsight to second guess the directors 
decision and that he would place himself ‘so far as possible in their shoes’.39 Further evidence of the 
business judgment rule in operation can be seen in the Privy Council of Howard Smith v Ampol 
Petroleum.40 There Lord Wilberforce stated, ‘There is no appeal on merits from management 
decisions to courts of law: nor will courts of law assume to act as a kind of supervisory board over 
decisions within the powers of management honestly arrived at’.41 These statements highlight that 
questions pertaining to whether a director acted bona fide will not be decided on the basis of whether 
the impugned decision did or did not in fact prove ultimately beneficial for the company. Instead it is 
the honesty of the director at the time of the decision that will be in question.   
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6.03 The Nature of the Duty to Act in Good Faith  
The true nature of the duty to act in good faith in the interests of the company is obscured by an 
uncertainty as to whether the test for the duty is subjective, objective, or subjective with objective 
elements. One thing that is certain from the case law is that surrounding evidence can be used to 
establish if the director has acted in good faith.42 For example both Howard Smith v Ampol 
Petroleum43 and the Irish case of Clark v Workman44 cited with approval the following statement from 
Hindle v John Cotton Ltd.45  
Where the question is one of abuse of powers, the state of mind of those who acted, and the 
motive on which they acted, are all important, and you may go into the question of what their 
intention was, collecting from the surrounding circumstances all the materials which 
genuinely throw light upon that question of the state of mind of the directors so as to show 
whether they were honestly acting in discharge of their powers in the interests of the 
company.46 
In Ireland several cases have found directors to be in breach of their duty to act bona fide in the 
interests of the company based on surrounding evidence.47 For example in Banfi Ltd v Moran48 the 
plaintiff company was the beneficial owner of shares in a company called Emerald Group Holdings 
Ltd. The shares were presented for registration but the directors of Emerald Group Holding Ltd 
refused. At the same time there was an action pending for minority oppression taken by Banfi Ltd 
against the directors of Emerald Group Holdings Ltd. One of the defences used in this litigation was 
that the Banfi Ltd did not have standing to take such an action because the company was not a 
shareholder. Laffoy J stated that ‘the real reason for the refusal to register the plaintiff as a member 
was to ensure the plaintiff would never have the standing to prosecute such proceedings’. She held the 
decision to refuse to register shares was held to be ‘motivated by self-interest, not the interest of the 
company as a whole’ despite affidavit evidence from the defendants claiming they had acted in the 
interests of the company.  
While there is no doubt that surrounding circumstances can be used in an evaluation of a directors’ 
good faith there is significant confusion as to the standard actually required for directors to satisfy the 
duty. The test being applied to good faith in the majority of the cases states that the test is a subjective 
one. But despite the fact that no judgment explicitly refers to the test as being objective, it is 
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submitted that the test being applied by the courts is much closer to an objective standard. A 
subjective test would mean that once a director honestly believes they are acting in the interests of the 
company they will comply with the duty. This is regardless of whether the belief is reasonably held or 
whether the decision itself could be reasonably viewed as being in the interests of the company.49 The 
problem with the subjective test is that it would yield irrational results. The problem was identified 
first by Bowen LJ in Hutton v West Cork Railway speaking of a subjective test ‘bona fides cannot be 
the sole test, otherwise you might have a lunatic conducting the affairs of the company, and paying 
away its money with both hands in a manner perfectly bona fide yet perfectly irrational’.50 The 
problem is that if a director was capable of holding an unreasonable belief then under a subjective test 
they could act in a way which is completely unreasonable and yet still be deemed to be acting in good 
faith. This would be the case even if it was abundantly clear that such an act was not in the interests of 
the company and was not a belief which any reasonable director would hold. So, for example, the 
surrounding evidence could show that a director regularly held unreasonable beliefs and these beliefs 
were honestly held, then under a subjective test the director would satisfy a subjective test for good 
faith. Despite this problem the duty is regularly referred to as a subjective duty without any reference 
to a base level of objectivity or reasonableness both by the courts51 and by academics.52  
As well as the potential for irrational results labelling the test as subjective is also misleading for 
directors. It provides a sense that it is impossible for directors to be found in breach of the good faith 
duty. This view is articulated by Davies who argues that a finding of a lack of good faith will be 
difficult to establish ‘except in egregious cases or where the directors, obligingly, have left a clear 
record of their thought processes up to the challenged decision’.53 This would be the case if the test 
for good faith was evaluated on subjective grounds, however, despite referring to the test as 
subjective, when it comes to application of the test, it is often assessed on objective grounds with a 
strong focus on the reasonableness of the decision. As Sealy notes, the use of bona fide has led to a 
‘contention that a subjective honesty of purpose was all that is needed to be shown in order to repeal a 
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challenge to the exercise of discretion. This has never been the case’.54 ‘There has always been a 
bottom line, an objective threshold of reasonableness below which bona fides will not itself be 
sufficient for a decision to stand’.55  
This objective element of good faith is more difficult to define as the test could be objective in 
different ways. First an objective test could mean that the courts could assess what was in the interests 
of the company and evaluate if the directors acted accordingly with their determination. However it is 
submitted that this is not a test for good faith as it in no way relates to the honestly held beliefs of the 
director. As good faith is based on honesty such a test could not be applied to good faith and it would 
contravene the business judgment principle. The objective element of the test is only applied when 
considering whether a director honestly believed he was acting in the interests of the company. The 
criterion of reasonableness cannot be applied to assess whether a director’s decision actually 
benefitted the company.56 Instead an objective test would be applied if surrounding evidence was used 
to show that the belief of the director could not be reasonably held and so the director would be in 
breach of their good faith duty. This test would impose an objective standard in relation to honesty of 
the beliefs of the director and would only be subjective in the sense that what is relevant is the 
director’s own state of mind. An objective test could be implemented by reference to a reasonable 
director i.e. would a reasonable director have honestly believed the decision was taken for the benefit 
of the company.57 This test allows the court to determine that if an action taken by a director was 
unreasonable they can determine it to be a belief which was not honestly and reasonably held and so 
the director would be in breach of the good faith duty. This objective test has been used by the courts 
on several occasions and any act taken by a director which is deemed unreasonable by the courts is 
seen to be a view which could not be honestly held with the result that the directors are found in 
breach of the bona fide duty.58 As Keay states, the ‘courts can come to the conclusion that a director 
was not acting in good faith when he or she took a particular action, not only from a consideration of 
the evidence of the director, but also from an examination of objective matters, such as the 
reasonableness of what the director did or did not do’.59 What follows is a discussion of the case law 
relating to the test for good faith, the aim of which is to demonstrate that while the courts regularly 
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refer to the test as subjective, application of the test nearly always involves the comparison to 
reasonable standards.  
6.04 Case Law Relating to Bona Fide and Good Faith  
A leading case on the appropriate test for good faith is Regentcrest plc v Cohen.60 This case centred 
on a clawback claim which Regencrest, a property development company, made in respect of two of 
the firm’s directors. The two directors had sold shares in a company called Greenground to 
Regentcrest. The agreement provided for additional remuneration to be paid to these directors if the 
value of the shares had gone up by an agreed date but if the investment had lost money then the two 
directors were liable to pay any shortfall. The latter proved to be the case and the shortfall amounted 
to £1.5 million. The board of Regentcrest decided to waive this clawback provision at a board 
meeting. The two directors in question declared their interest at the meeting and took no part in the 
proceedings. Subsequently, the company went into liquidation and, on winding up, the liquidators 
claimed that the board had acted in breach of the duty to act in the best interests of the company by 
waiving the £1.5 million clawback. The issue was whether the board of directors had acted bona fide 
in the interests of the company in waiving the clawback claim. Parker J ruled that the test to be 
applied was a subjective one: 
The question is whether the director honestly believed that his act or omission was in the 
interests of the company. The issue is to the directors’ state of mind. No doubt where it is clear 
that the act or omission under challenge resulted in substantial detriment to the company, the 
director will have a harder task persuading the court that he honestly believed it to be in the 
company’s best interests; but that does not detract from the subjective nature of the test.61 
This test suggests that if the director truly believes he is acting in the interests of the company the 
director will comply with the duty to act in good faith. Surrounding evidence may make it harder to 
prove the director believed he was acting for the company’s benefit but if there was a genuine 
subjective belief from the directors they would satisfy the duty regardless if the decision or belief was 
reasonable or not. The board of directors believed that the company could continue trading62 and 
provided several reasons why they believed that it was in the best interests of Regentcrest to accept 
the waiver such as retaining the skills of the two directors and the need to maintain a united board in 
the face of pressure from creditors. Ultimately, Parker J decided that there was no reason to doubt that 
the managing directors honestly believed that they were acting in the best interests of Regentcrest and, 
hence, satisfied the bona fide duty.63 Parker J stated the reasons offered by the directors ‘could 
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reasonably have led a businessman in the position of the Richardson brothers [managing directors] on 
the 5th of September 1990 to conclude that the waiver of the claim on the terms proposed was in the 
best interests of Regentcrest’.64 Therefore the directors showed that their subjective belief was 
reasonably held. However, what if this was not the case, what would have been the decision of the 
court if the reasons offered by the managing directors could not have ‘reasonably led a businessman’ 
to the same decision? While this question is not answered in Regentcrest, other authority65 supports 
the view that if there were no reasonable grounds for their belief that they were acting in the 
company’s best interests, it would not have mattered what the directors actually believed themselves 
and they would be found in breach of the duty to act bona fide. 
One of the most frequently cited cases in support of the subjective test is Re Smith and Fawcett66 
where Lord Greene states, ‘directors must act, bona fide, in what they consider – not what the court 
considers - is in the best interests of the company.’67 Many judgments68 approve the passage as 
conclusive evidence for a subjective test on the basis that it is what they, the directors, consider to be 
in the best interests of the company. However, Lord Greene at no point in his judgment suggests that 
the issue of whether the directors consider their action to be in the best interests of the company 
cannot be judged on objective grounds. The statement alone is proof of that the business judgment 
rule is being applied but not that a subjective test need be applied when evaluating whether a belief 
was held bona fide. 
However support for a completely subjective test can be found in Extrasure Travel v Scattergood.69 
Extrasure had paid a sum of money, which amounted to the majority of its funds, to its holding 
company in a corporate group arrangement. Extrasure went into insolvency and was later sold. The 
buyer, along with Extrasure, took an action against the two former directors who had been responsible 
for the payment to the holding company on the basis that they were not acting bona fide in the best 
interests of Extrasure when the money was transferred. In response to the defendant directors’ claims 
that they were acting in the best interests of Extrasure by transferring the money Jonathan Crow QC 
(sitting as a deputy Judge of the High Court) outlined the test as follows: 
The fact that a director’s alleged belief is unreasonable may provide evidence that it was not 
honestly held at the time: but if having considered all the evidence, it appears that the director 
did honestly believe that he was acting in the best interests of the company, then he is not in 
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breach of his fiduciary duty merely because that belief appears to be the trial judge to be 
unreasonable, or because his actions happen, in the event, to cause injury to the company.70 
This statement endorses a completely subjective test. It states that once a director believed that what 
he was doing was in the best interests of the company, no matter how unreasonable that belief, he will 
not be in breach of his bona fide duty. However, Crow QC’s statement is deeply flawed and, as will 
be highlighted below, is in conflict with most other case law on the subject. It is difficult to imagine a 
court concluding that a belief that was manifestly unreasonable was, nonetheless, one that was 
honestly held. For example, could a director demonstrate that he honestly held an unreasonable belief, 
by proving himself to be an unreasonable person or, at the very least, proving himself to be capable of 
honestly holding unreasonable beliefs? Such an attempt was made in a similar area of trusts law and 
was rejected by the court.71 However if such a claim had been made and the test applied was Crow 
QC’s above, then the director would have to be deemed as acting bona fide. This highlights the 
problem with the subjective test for good faith, in order to avoid irrational outcomes there must be an 
objective element applied to the test for good faith. Ultimately in Extrasure, in an apparent 
contradiction of the passage quoted above, Crow QC refused to believe the directors when they 
claimed that they were acting in the company’s best interests because their claims were unreasonable, 
‘[i] have found that there was an absence of any honest belief that the transfer was in Extrasure’s best 
interests…..I do not consider that they acted reasonably’.72 Because the directors acted unreasonably, 
Crow QC refused to accept that the directors honestly believed that they were acting in the best 
interests of the company.73 In this case there appears to be a disconnect between the test stated and the 
test applied however the remainder of the case endorsees the objective test and require the belief to be 
reasonable before deeming it one which is honestly held.  
Support for an objective application of the bona fide test can be found in the Court of Appeal case 
Fassihi v ItemSoftware.74 In this case one of ItemSoftware’s directors attempted to personally take 
over one of the company’s contracts and ItemSoftware then sued him for breach of his bona fide duty. 
The court had to determine if the director had breached his bona fide duty by failing to inform 
ItemSoftware about his intentions to acquire the contract for himself. Arden LJ stated, ‘[o]n the facts 
of the case, there is no basis on which Mr Fassihi could reasonably have come to the conclusion that it 
was not in the interests of Item to know of his breach of duty’.75 If the test was decided on subjective 
grounds, as envisaged in Crow QC’s statement in Extrasure,76 then, at this point, Arden LJ should 
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have investigated whether this unreasonable action was genuinely believed by the director to be in the 
best interests of the company. If this question was answered in the affirmative then he would be found 
to have discharged his bona fide duty. But, once Arden LJ determined the director’s actions were 
unreasonable, she deemed that the director had breached his bona fide duty. The only interpretation 
one can draw from this case is that the court applied an objective test based on the unreasonableness 
of the action of the director.  
Cogent support for the objective nature of the good faith test is demonstrated in Heron International 
Ltd v Lord Grade.77 The Court of Appeal dealt with the directors of a broadcasting company ACC plc. 
The directors preferred one bidder over another rival bidder who had offered a higher price for the 
shares of ACC. Although the subjective good faith of the directors was not even in question yet this 
was not sufficient in the eyes of the court to conclude that they had satisfied their duty to act in the 
best interests of the company. Lawton LJ asked the following question:  
The good faith of the directors not being impugned, it follows that the directors on 13 January 
1982 genuinely believed that it was in the interests of ACC….The question is whether that 
genuine belief was a belief that could reasonably be held. In order to succeed on this part of 
the case, the plaintiffs must prove that no reasonable board of directors could have come to the 
conclusion that it was necessary in the interests of ACC.78 
There can be no doubt that Lawton LJ is applied an objective test in order to determine if the directors 
had acted bona fide. It was accepted by the court that the directors did honestly believe they were 
acting for the company’s best interests. Nonetheless the court required it to be shown that a reasonable 
board could have been of the same belief prior to the bona fide duty was complied with. While the 
directors of ACC were found to have acted bona fide79 this does not alter the fact that they had to 
satisfy an objective standard.  
Additional evidence that the test is objective in nature is provided by Re Genosyis Technology Ltd80 
where two directors were disqualified for entering into a settlement agreement which resulted in a 
significant loss of earnings for the company. Lindsay J found that the two directors would need to 
breach the bona fide duty both on subjective and objective grounds. However Lindsay J ruled that 
even if the directors had passed the subjective test, their claim would still have failed on objective 
grounds, ‘[t]here is no evidence drawn to my attention that the appellant did believe that the English 
company benefited from the transaction, and even if there had been, I would have been unable to 
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characterise the belief as reasonable’.81 More recently in Re Coroin Ltd82 it was alleged that the 
dismissal of an officer was not taken in the interests of the company. In deciding whether the 
termination was in the company’s interests Richards J stated ‘[l]ooked at objectively, it was in my 
judgment a view which a director could reasonably come to that the expense of continuing to engage 
Mr Hennebry was no longer justified’.83 Again there can be little doubt that an objective test is in 
operation. A similar test was outlined in Cobden Investments v RWM Langport Ltd84 where it was 
stated  that ‘a breach will have occurred if it is established that the relevant exercise of power is one 
which could not be considered by any reasonable director to be in the interests of the company’.85 
Australian law also seems to support an objective test for good faith, the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales recently addressed this issue in the case of Re Idyllic Solutions Pty Ltd.86 There can be 
no doubt Ward J was applying a completely objective test when he stated: 
It is to be noted that the test as to whether a director or officer has contravened [the statutory 
duty to act in the interests of the company] is an objective test, having regard to what a 
comparable person, having the same knowledge and skills as the relevant director or officer, 
would reasonably have done in the circumstances.87 
Judgments such as Heron International, ItemSoftware and Re Genosyis Technology and Re Coroin are 
all supportive of the application of an objective test, yet it continues to be the case that recent 
judgments88 and modern academics89 alike regularly refer to the test as being decided on a subjective 
basis. This creates the impression for directors that the duty to act in good faith in the interests of the 
company is a duty which is very easy to satisfy. If this is how the duty is viewed then it is easy to 
imagine situations where directors will not act in the interests of the company as they are unlikely to 
be found in breach of the duty and therefore unlikely to be held accountable. The problem is one of 
perception and the argument here is that the duty to act in good faith should not be seen as a purely 
subjective test. Even academics who acknowledge the existence of the objective test90 claim that it is 
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hard to find a single example of the objective test being used.91 As is evidenced by the cases discussed 
above a contrary view should be taken, which is that the objective test plays a significant role in 
deciding how cases are decided. As stated earlier enforcement in this context is about acting as a 
deterrent rather than requiring constant litigations. A clear objective standard of good faith could 
ensure that directors are more likely to comply with the duty to act in the interests of the company as 
they will be more aware of a higher standard involved and the increased likelihood of being held 
accountable when they fail to act in the interests of the company.   
The problem with referring to the test as wholly objective is that it suggests that the test will 
contravene the business judgment principle. One possible solution to remove the perception and the 
irrational outcomes of a wholly subjective test and still not interfere with the business judgment 
principle is to adopt a combined test of subjectivity and objectivity.92 It is claimed that such a test 
would promote accountability and would not interfere with the business judgment principle.93 
Langford and Ramsey explain a combined subjective and objective test as follows: 
Although the focus of this approach begins with the subjective belief of the relevant director 
courts can look beyond the director’s assertion of such belief to objective factors to assess 
whether the belief is honestly held and, in order to protect the interest of the company, to test 
whether the decision in question is one that no reasonable director would consider to be in the 
interests of the company.94  
This test has been applied in the recent Irish case of Bloxham v Irish Stock Exchange.95 The case 
examined, in detail, the test for acting bona fides in the interests of the company under Irish law. The 
Irish Stock Exchange argued that the test for directors acting bona fide in the interests of the company 
was entirely subjective. Charleton J refused to accept their argument. He stated that ‘in other branches 
of the law, entirely subjective principles rarely hold sway’96 and that ‘what a reasonable person would 
have concluded from a term or condition or from a particular representation or situation is the 
touchstone from which the law proceeds’.97 In direct contrast, Bloxham argued that that the test for 
bona fides required an objective determination from the court as to what was in fact in the interests of 
the company. Charleton J also refused this test on the grounds of the business judgment principle. He 
stated  
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‘For Bloxham, the argument goes the other way; in favour of an objective analysis of every 
decision made by a board of directors. Here the problem would be that in objectively 
analysing decisions, the courts might be in danger of stepping into the shoes of directors. This 
is not appropriate….The court cannot displace a decision simply because it does not like it; 
and this is what a completely objective principle would tend towards, instead of appropriate 
deference to the exigencies and pressures of business’.98  
This demonstrates the problem with referring to the test for good faith as objective as it suggests a 
contravention of the business judgment rule. Ultimately, Charleton J applied a subjective test with 
objective elements in relation to the beliefs held by the director, ‘Thus, it seems that the test for the 
exercise of directors’ duties must involve a scrutiny of…whether the presence or absence of 
reasonable grounds enables what is said subjectively to be an honest decision to stand as being in the 
best interests of the company as a whole’.99  
The problem with the combined subjective and objective tests is that it is unnecessarily complex and 
does not produce the requisite clarity to change the perception of good faith. There is a simpler 
solution available. Identify the duty of good faith and the business judgment rule as separate 
principles. It then would not be necessary to describe the bona fide test as subjective simply to avoid 
conflicting with the business judgment rule. Good faith relates to the honesty100 of the directors while 
the business judgment rule relates to courts not determining what was actually in the interests of the 
company. Once this clarification is made honesty can then be judged on a purely objective scale.  
6.05 The Proposed Test for Good Faith 
The first element of the proposed solution is that the difference between business judgment rule and 
the test for good faith should be made obvious by the courts. Some courts have made such a 
distinction, for example, in Citco Banking Corp v Pussers,101 a recent decision of the Privy Council, 
Lord Hoffman quoted,102 with approval, from the judgment of Scruttton LJ in the Court of Appeal 
case of Shuttleworth v Cox103 which stated: 
Now when persons, honestly endeavouring to decide what will be for the benefit of the 
company and to act accordingly, decide upon a particular course, then, provided there are 
grounds on which reasonable men could come to the same decision, it does not matter whether 
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the Court would or would not come to the same decision or a different decision. It is not the 
business of the Court to manage the affairs of the company. That is for the shareholders and 
directors.104 
The distinction has also been noted in Cobden Investments v RWM Langport Ltd105 under the UK 
Companies Act 2006 Warren J stated on the test for good faith that ‘[t]he question is whether the 
director honestly believed that his act or omission was in the interests of the company. The court does 
not consider that the duty is broken simply because, in the court’s opinion, the particular exercise of 
power was not to promote the success of the company’.106 The difference between the two questions 
has been best described by the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Westpac Banking Corporation 
v Bell107 where it was stated in respect of the bona fide test, ‘the objective considerations relate back 
to the question whether the directors honestly believed the transaction to be in the best interests of the 
company, not to whether (regardless of what the directors believed) it did benefit the company’.108 
These cases illustrate that the business judgment rule and the test for good faith relate to different 
concepts. The test for bona fides investigates whether the director honestly believed his action was in 
the best interests of the company; the business judgment rule relates to whether the decision actually 
benefitted the company.  
The second element of the proposed solution is to see honesty as a completely objective standard. In 
this regard guidance can be drawn from the law of trusts. The law on dishonest assistance has 
examined, in detail, whether the proper test for honesty is subjective or objective. The cases deal with 
scenarios where a person dishonestly assists in the misappropriation of trust property and honesty is 
the key determinant of liability. The trusts case law, although not completely free of complexity, 
possesses a higher level of refinement and clarity in relation to the test used for honesty. In the UK 
context, the trusts cases on this topic become all the more relevant after a reading of the explanatory 
notes of section 172(1) of the UK Companies Act 2006 which provides that the law of trusts and 
agency are to play a part in the interpretation of the new directors’ duties.109 The most notable 
statement is that ‘developments in the law and trusts and agency should be reflected in the 
interpretation and application of the duties’.110  This is likely to be the case because both areas of law 
deal with fiduciary duties and so the principles involved are transferable.  
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The leading case on the test for dishonest assistance is Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan.111 Prior to Royal 
Brunei the test for a breach of trust in misappropriating trust property focused knowledge and 
‘knowing assistance’ rather than dishonest assistance.112 However Lord Nicholls stated that 
‘knowingly’ is a term better avoided113 and this viewpoint has been seen by subsequent judgments as 
clarifying the law.114 Since these judgments the focus on whether a breach of trust has occurred has 
focused on the test involved for establishing dishonesty. In the Royal Brunei case, Royal Brunei 
contracted an agency agreement with a travel agency called BLT. The agreement provided that BLT 
was to sell tickets for Royal Brunei and BLT was to hold the money received in trust for Royal 
Brunei. Money was paid out of this trust account to the managing director of BLT. When BLT went 
into insolvency, Royal Brunei took an action against the managing director for assisting in the breach 
of trust. In applying a completely objective, test Lord Nicholls held that ‘in the context of the 
accessory liability principle acting dishonestly…. means simply not acting as an honest person would 
in the circumstances. This is an objective standard.’115 In other words the relevant question here is not 
what the defendant thought personally, but rather what an honest person would have done if they had 
been placed in the same circumstances as the defendant.116 If they fail to live up to this ‘honest person 
in the circumstances’ standard then they will be deemed to have failed the test. It was held in Royal 
Brunei that Tan did not act honestly and although Lord Nicholls accepted that Tan had ‘hoped, maybe 
expected, to be able to pay the airline’117  but this subjective belief was not enough to satisfy the test 
for honesty. In his summation that the test is completely objective, which is worth quoting in full, he 
states: 
At first sight this may seem surprising. Honesty has a connotation of subjectivity, as distinct 
from the objectivity of negligence. Honesty, indeed, does have a strong subjective element in 
that it is a description of a type of conduct assessed in the light of what a person actually knew 
at the time, as distinct from what a reasonable person would have known or 
appreciated……However, these subjective characteristics of honesty do not mean that 
individuals are free to set their own standards of honesty in particular circumstances. The 
standard of what constitutes honest conduct is not subjective. Honesty is not an optional scale, 
with higher or lower values according to the moral standards of each individual. If a person 
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knowingly appropriates another's property, he will not escape a finding of dishonesty simply 
because he sees nothing wrong in such behaviour.118 
The subtlety of Lord Nicholls’s explanation is, by contrast, lacking in relation to the cases on the bona 
fide duty. In this regard he clarifies a point which is often confused in the bona fide case law. Honesty 
is an objective standard and the bona fide duty should be seen in the same way. The courts are 
generally applying such an objective test but often refer to it as a subjective test which causes 
confusion and is misleading for directors. The Irish courts have yet to address the standard to be 
applied in relation to dishonest assistance however in Delaney’s view the Irish Courts would be very 
likely to follow Lord Nicholls test in Royal Brunei.119 The judgment in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley120 
seemed to introduce a subjective element into the test for honesty, however the decision of Barlow 
Clowes,121 approved in Abou-Rahmah v Abacha,122 has made it clear that the test for honesty remains 
objective. More recently the Court of Appeal case Starglade Properties Ltd v Nash123 Eherton C 
rejected any element of subjectivity for the test for honesty stating that the subjective understanding of 
the person concerned, as to whether their conduct is dishonest, is irrelevant.124  
In the Barlow Clowes case, £140 million had been given to Barlow Clowes by investors. Most of that 
money had been dissipated by the personal ventures of Clowes. Some of the investors’ money was 
paid through a company called ITC and it had been claimed that two of ITC’s directors had 
dishonestly assisted Clowes in misappropriating the investors’ funds. Following an appeal by one of 
the directors to the Privy Council Lord Hoffman stated: 
Although a dishonest state of mind is a subjective mental state, the standard by which the law 
determines whether it is dishonest is objective. If by ordinary standards a defendant’s mental 
state would be characterised as dishonest, it is irrelevant that the defendant judges by different 
standards.125 
One of the directors had argued at first instance that he lived by a different moral code and that his 
own moral standard simply meant following the instructions of his client. Lord Hoffman found that 
the director had an ‘exaggerated notion of dutiful service to his clients, which produced a warped 
moral approach that it was not improper to treat carrying out clients’ instructions as being all 
important. Mr. Henwood may well have thought this to be an honest attitude, but, if so, he was 
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wrong’.126 In querying the judgment of Extrasure127 it was questioned how it would be possible to 
prove to a court that a person could honestly hold an unreasonable belief.128 The director in Barlow 
Clowes attempted to prove that he blindly followed every order from his clients, a clearly 
unreasonable approach for a director to adopt. Yet, seemingly, he genuinely thought this was the 
honest thing to do. If he could show that this was his approach to business then, under a subjective 
test, he would be deemed to have acted honestly and there would be every reason to expect that the 
defence of the director would have been accepted.129 This example can be extended to bona fide duty 
where, if the director in Barlow, had blindly followed orders, even though to do so was obviously 
damaging to his company, and genuinely believed that it was for the benefit of the company, then 
under a subjective test he would satisfy the duty. Even though this subjectivist approach would yield 
irrational results, it is the test that Crow QC appeared to be advocating in Extrasure130 and Parker J in 
Regentcrest.131  
The pronouncement of an objective test for good faith would not represent any major departure from 
common law principles. A completely objective test is already in use in one very specific scenario: 
when a director fails to separately consider the company’s best interests. If a director, when taking a 
decision, fails to consider what is best for the company as a separate legal entity then the test involved 
for acting bona fide becomes wholly objective. This follows the judgment in Charterbridge v Lloyds 
Bank.132 Under this ruling a director does not breach the bona fide duty if he simply fails to consider 
separately the company’s interests. There will only be a breach if a director has acted without 
separately considering the company’s interest and there is no basis upon which a reasonable director 
could have reasonably concluded that the action was in the company’s interests.133 His Lordship made 
it very clear that this test was only to be used given that particular set of facts and the test set out in 
Charterbridge v Lloyds Bank only applies where a director fails to consider the company’s interests 
and should be seen as a separate test than the standard one for bona fides action, however it does 
highlight that objective tests are already in operation in this area of law. 
6.06 The Good Faith Duty as an Enforcement Mechanism 
The argument of the above passages is that while the test for good faith is generally perceived to be a 
subjective test, it is an objective standard which is often being applied by the courts. The description 
of good faith as being subjective is most likely due to a desire not to interfere with the business 
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judgment rule. The development of new case law providing a clear pronouncement of the objective 
standard of good faith, in a way similar to that of Royal Brunei, could provide the clarity necessary to 
increase compliance with the duty to act in the interests of the company. Stakeholder theory holds that 
directors can be trusted to adhere to their fiduciary duties.134 It is true that even without an 
enforcement mechanism, many directors will comply with their duties. This is because the very 
existence of codified directors’ duties has a normative and declaratory effect on director behaviour135 
and because most directors do wish to comply with their legal duties. Establishing a clear standard of 
good faith could amplify this declaratory effect on director behaviour because directors are less likely 
to breach a clear standard of behaviour as compared to the very complex and confusing statement of 
the law that currently exists. However, a declaratory effect by itself is not sufficient to ensure 
directors do comply with the duty to act in the interests of the company and directors’ duties should 
be legally enforceable.136 It is argued in this thesis that the best solution to the issue of the corporate 
objective is for directors to focus on the maximisation and sustainability of the company as a separate 
legal entity. It is submitted that this can be implemented through a general duty on directors to act in 
good faith in the interests of the company similar to section 228(1)(a) of the Companies Act 2014. 
However for this to be a workable model it must be possible for directors to be held to account when 
they fail to act in the interests of the company as an entity. The application of an objective test for 
good faith makes this possible. The duty to act in good faith in the interests of the company has many 
broad applications and can be invoked in many situations where directors do not promote the interests 
of the company.  
For example a breach has been found in scenarios ranging from, directors acting in self-interest rather 
than the company’s interests,137 directors refusing to register shares in order to prevent a challenge to 
directors’ salaries,138 and directors transferring company funds to a holding company resulting in 
liquidation.139 There has also been found to be a breach of the duty where an allotment of shares was 
in the interests of one shareholder rather than the company’s interests as a whole140 and where 
directors entered into a settlement agreement which resulted in a significant loss of earnings for the 
company.141 In Item Software Ltd v Fassihi142 the duty to act in the interests of the company was used 
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to establish a duty to confess a directors’ own misconduct.143Arden LJ, in finding the defendant had 
breached the duty to confess, stated that the good faith duty ‘was capable of application in cases 
where it had not been previously been applied’.144 The above examples demonstrate that the duty to 
act in good faith can be used in many different situations where directors fail to act in the interests of 
the company. However, it is submitted that if the duty was actually perceived as objective it could 
increase the number of actions being taken because it would be more apparent when a director has 
actually failed honestly act in the interests of the company.  
The aim of enforcement in this context, must act as incentive to adhere to the objective of entity 
maximisation and a deterrent from engaging in non-compliant action.145 The most obvious way to 
initiate proceedings when there is a breach of the good faith is through a derivative action. In Ireland 
the method most frequently used to hold directors to account is the minority oppression remedy146 
under section 212 of the Companies Act 2014.147 However this remedy is based on oppression of 
shareholders’ individual rights rather than damage to the company as an entity and therefore remedy 
is not suited to instances where the directors have acted contrary to the entity’s interests. Because the 
derivative action focuses on wrongs done to the company rather than oppression of a shareholder, it is 
well placed to enforce entity maximisation.148 In addition one of the primary purposes of the 
derivative action is that it deters directors from acting improperly.149 This deterrent purpose of the 
derivative action aligns well with the aim of enforcement under the proposed model as it focuses 
deterrence rather than frequent actions being taken against directors.  
The derivative action allows a shareholder to sue a director on behalf of the company for a wrong 
committed against the company. Under the Companies Act 2014 and the UK Companies Act 2006 
directors’ fiduciary duties are owed to the company and not directly to shareholders or any other 
interest group150 and the same was true at common law.151 As a consequence, under the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle,152 if a director breaches their duties to the company then it is the company who is the 
proper plaintiff.153 The basis behind this rule is that the company is a separate legal entity which is 
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separate from its shareholders154 and so is capable of taking actions on its own behalf. The second part 
of the rule in Foss v Harbottle is that minority shareholders may not bring proceedings to overturn a 
decision of the company where that decision is one which a majority of the members may confirm.155 
An explanation of the rule is Foss v Harbottle was given in Edwards v Halliwell,156 which was quoted 
with approval in the Irish case of  Balkanbank v Taher,157 ‘[t]he proper plaintiff in an action in respect 
of a wrong alleged to be done to a company….is, prima facie, the company’.158 As directors generally 
hold the powers of management, granted by the articles,159 it is usually the directors who are charged 
with the power to litigate any wrong committed against the company. However when it comes to 
directors having wronged the company, the board of directors are not always best placed to decide 
whether to litigate. While it is possible for a board of directors to choose to act independently and take 
action against a director on behalf of the company,160 a board are often unwilling to take action 
against fellow directors. As well as the board being unwilling to sue their fellow directors, the errant 
directors could still exercise control over the board making any legal action extremely unlikely. 
Boards have often refrained from taking action in such scenarios.161 In response to this problem the 
common law developed the derivative action.162  
For a shareholder to bring a derivative action they have to first establish standing to act on the 
company’s behalf163 because the shareholders’ right to take an action is derived from the company’s 
right to take action.164 In order to establish standing on behalf of the company the shareholder has to 
prove that they fall within an exception to the rule of Foss v Harbottle. The main exception used for a 
derivative action is fraud on the minority by those in control. Under this exception the shareholder has 
to prove that the fraud was incapable of being ratified by the shareholders at a general meeting and 
that the wrongdoers were still in control of the company.165 However the concepts of fraud on the 
minority and wrongdoer control are difficult to define and proving them is fraught with difficulties.166 
This is due to the exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle being construed quite narrowly and 
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minority shareholders only being allowed access to the courts on a very limited basis.167 A derivative 
action can be refused if it is not being brought in the interests of the company or if there was another 
remedy available to the shareholder.168 Generally the courts have taken a restrictive attitude towards 
derivative actions.169 Due to the narrow construction of exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle very 
few common law derivative actions have been successful170 with Ahern describing the exceptions to 
the rule in Foss v Harbottle as being ‘at best arcane, and, at worst, unwieldy and ill-suited to modern 
corporate life’.171  
Despite the suitability for the derivative action to act as an enforcement mechanism for an entity 
focused approach to the corporate objective, the derivative action has proven to be ineffective in 
enforcing directors’ duties.172 The Companies Act 2014 has not created a legislative derivative action 
and so the common law rules still apply. Even if the Companies Act 2014 had established a statutory 
derivative action and removed the rule in Foss v Harbottle, it is unlikely that the derivative action 
would have provided the means to regularly enforce of the duty to act in good faith. Such a statutory 
has been implemented under the UK Companies Act 2006 but it has done little to change the 
effectiveness of the derivative action as an enforcement mechanism to enforce directors’ duties.  
6.07 The Statutory Derivative Claim and Enforcement under ESV 
The difficulties involved in taking derivative actions under the common law rules prompted 
recommendations of reform in the UK173 which led to a statutory right to a derivative action being 
introduced by the UK Companies Act 2006.174 The 2006 Act completely overrides the common law 
action and removes the concepts of fraud on the minority and wrongdoer control.175 The statutory 
derivative claim is a cause of action which is vested in the company and seeks relief on behalf of the 
company, but is taken by a member.176 The grounds for taking a derivative claim have been expanded 
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to cases of negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by a director.177 Therefore a breach of 
the good faith provides sufficient grounds to take a derivative claim. The statutory derivative claim 
involves two separate hearings. The applicant must first establish prima facie case178 and then seek 
permission of the court to continue the action.179 At the second stage the court must refuse the 
application if a person acting in accordance with section 172 would not seek to continue the claim or 
the act or omission in question has been either authorised or ratified by the company.180 If the action is 
not dismissed on those grounds then the court must consider the following seven factors to allow 
permission for the action to continue:  
(a) whether the member is acting in good faith in seeking to continue the claim; 
(b) the importance that a person acting in accordance with section 172 (duty to promote the 
success of the company) would attach to continuing it;  
(c) where the cause of action results from an act or omission that is yet to occur, whether the 
act or omission could be, and in the circumstances would be likely to be; 
(i) authorised by the company before it occurs, or  
(ii) ratified by the company after it occurs;  
(d) where the cause of action arises from an act or omission that has already occurred, whether 
the act or omission could be, and in the circumstances would be likely to be, ratified by the 
company;  
(e) whether the company has decided not to pursue the claim; . 
(f) whether the act or omission in respect of which the claim is brought gives rise to a cause of 
action that the member could pursue in his own right rather than on behalf of the company.181 
Once the director’s action has not been and not likely to be authorised or ratified and the action is not 
being taken in bad faith, the success of the claim is likely to depend whether the action promotes the 
success of the company in line with section 172. Firstly a claim must be refused permission if a 
person, acting in accordance with section 172, would not continue the claim.182 The second 
examination of section 172 is in determining whether to grant permission to continue the claim the 
court must consider the importance that a person, acting in accordance with section 172, would attach 
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to the claim.183 This is a more difficult criterion to pass for potential claimants and is assessed by an 
objective standard.184 The standard which the courts have applied in recent cases is whether a 
hypothetical director, acting in accordance with section 172, would continue to the claim185 i.e. would 
a hypothetical director view the action to be in the interests of the company. In order to meet this 
criterion the claimant must be able to show that the company will stand to benefit from the action.186 
Therefore, harm to the company is unlikely to be enough for the action to be continued and there must 
be something for the company to gain from the action. In Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel187 William 
Tower QC (sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court) considered the requirement that the claim be 
in the interests of the company stating that it would include considering the prospects of success, the 
likelihood of the company being able to recover property or money, potential damage to the 
company’s reputation if the action was successful and how disruptive the action would be to the 
business.188 These requirements demonstrate that any potential derivative action still has to overcome 
a significant number of criteria in order to be allowed to proceed.  
ESV has been widely criticised for its inability to enforce the requirement for directors to have regard 
to the various stakeholder interests contained in section 172(1). In the absence of legislative reform, 
enforcement of the requirement to have regard to stakeholder interests is the obvious method to ensure 
movement away from the strict application of shareholder value. Is it possible that an objective test 
for good faith and the statutory derivative claim could ensure directors do actually have regard to the 
non-shareholder interests? Section 172(1) states ‘A director of a company must act in the way he 
considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit 
of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard to’ the listed interests such as employees, 
suppliers, the community etc. Girvin et al believe the verb ‘must’ qualifies the entire provision and 
requires that every non-shareholder interest should always be considered and the result is to make the 
listed stakeholders ‘issues which directors are compelled to consider as part of their duties as 
directors’.189 While this overstates the effect of section 172(1), it is submitted, as indicated by the 
words ‘in doing so’, that directors are required to consider the non-shareholder interests which are 
relevant to promoting the success of the company for the benefit of the members. Due to the clear 
prioritisation of the members, directors will only breach the duty to act in good faith when they fail to 
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promote the success of the company for the benefit of the members. However it is submitted that 
directors can breach the duty to act in good faith if they fail to consider a listed interest which was 
relevant to promoting the success of the company and that failure harms the company’s ability to 
promote success for the members. 
Davies is of the opinion that the duty of good faith does offer the potential for directors to be found in 
breach when they fail to consider the non-shareholder listed factors under section 172(1).190 The 
reform of the derivative claim by the Companies Act 2006 allows an action to be taken against a 
director for any breach of duty.191 The requirement to prove an exception to the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle and wrongdoer control have been removed which, in theory at least, makes it is easier for 
shareholders to commence actions against directors.192 By clarifying the standards that directors must 
meet and the threat of a derivative claim, the good faith duty and derivative claim could act as an 
incentive to consider directors to actually consider the listed interests. The expansion of the grounds 
available under the statutory derivative claim could make directors feel more exposed for any breach 
of duty193 and so more likely to consider the listed interests to decrease the likelihood of a derivative 
claim. It has been suggested that section 172(1), coupled with the statutory derivative claim, increases 
the chances of non-shareholder consideration by directors. 
it is at least possible though, that directors seeking to minimise ex ante the risks of derivative 
action, may take the view that section 172 requires them to consider the long term 
consequences of their decisions and the other statutory factors when reaching decisions, where 
they had not done so previously.194 
Due to the objective test, directors can be found in breach of their good faith duty by failing to have 
regard to the listed interests. The way for the derivative claim to work as an enforcement mechanism 
for ESV would be for a derivative claim to be successful where a director failed to give good faith 
consideration to a listed interest in section 172(1). For this to occur three main elements would be 
necessary.  
Firstly, the shareholder taking the derivative claim would need to have a particular interest in the 
infringed stakeholder group. For example a shareholder who is also an employee or a shareholder who 
is particularly concerned with the local community or the environment. In addition, shareholders who 
have a long term perspective could take a derivative claim on the basis that the directors have taken a 
                                                          
190
 Paul Davies, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law (8Th Edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2008), 
514.  
191
 UK Companies Act 2006 s 260(3). 
192
 Demetra Arsalidou, ‘Litigation Culture and the New Statutory Derivative Claim’ (2009) 30(7) Company 
Lawyer 205, 209. 
193
 Ibid, 207. 
194
 Luca Cerioni, Joan Loughrey and Andrew Keay ‘Legal Practitioners, Enlightened Shareholder Value and the 
Shaping of Corporate Governance’ (2008) 8 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 79, 100. 
131 
 
short term approach contrary to section 172(1)(a) and could be successful despite rhetoric from 
directors to the contrary.195 This type of shareholder behaviour is known as shareholder activism and 
is becoming more widespread.196 It has been asserted that the legislative derivative claim makes it 
easier for activist shareholders to take proceedings197 and that increased shareholder activism may 
lead to increased number of derivative actions.198 Milner-Moore and Lewis hold the belief that the 
statutory derivative claim coupled with section 172(1) could allow activist shareholders, like 
environmental groups with a small shareholding, to bring tactical litigation against the directors.199 
Keay, is of the belief that it could be worthwhile for stakeholders to become minor shareholders so 
that they have the last resort of a derivative claim should they feel the directors had disregarded their 
interests, although states that there is a low chance of many such actions being brought.200 There 
seems to be nothing to prevent a stakeholder taking up a small shareholding to initiate a derivative 
claim, for example in Stainer v Lee201 the claimant had only a 0.08% shareholding.  
Secondly, any derivative claim taken on stakeholder grounds would have to be based on a breach of 
good faith under section 172(1). Section 172(1) defines company success in terms of benefit to the 
members, so, for there to be a breach of duty it must be possible to demonstrate that the directors’ 
failure to consider stakeholder interests had damaged the company’s ability to promote the members’ 
interests. For a breach of good faith to exist and for permission to be granted to continue a derivative 
claim there must have been damage caused to the company by a director and so any action based 
solely on damage to a stakeholder would fail. The requirement that the directors’ decision causes 
harm to the company should not be seen as a negative from an enforcement point of view. An ability 
to take a derivative claim based purely on damage to stakeholder interests presents too broad a scope 
for director liability. Directors being sued for every decision which negatively impacts a stakeholder 
group would clearly not be in the interests of the company from either a shareholder or stakeholder 
point of view. However when the failure to consider stakeholder interests actually damages the 
company as an entity, or damages the company’s ability to promote the members’ interests, directors 
should be held liable for a breach of duty. There is also a requirement that the claim itself must be 
capable of providing some tangible benefit to the company. An action based on directors damaging 
the company by failing to have regard to stakeholders will not be sufficient, it must also be possible to 
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regain some wealth for the company through the derivative claim. While this makes it difficult for an 
action on stakeholder grounds to be granted permission it is not impossible for such scenarios to exist. 
A directors’ action which has an adverse impact on stakeholder groups could also easily be 
detrimental to the company202 and in severe cases directors’ breach of section 172(1) on stakeholder 
grounds might well cause damage to the company.203 Damage to the company as an entity could 
easily be seen as damaging its ability to promote the members’ interests.  
Finally, as has been argued for above, the courts would need to view the duty of good faith by an 
objective standard otherwise a court finding a director in breach of their good faith duty would be 
unlikely. Whenever it is alleged that there has been a failure to consider one of the listed interests, the 
directors are likely to justify their actions by reference to their good faith judgment204 and claim they 
have acted to promote the success of the company for the benefit of the members. In order to prove 
that a director had indeed breached their duty under section 172(1), the shareholder would have to 
challenge the directors’ good faith.205 This is not as difficult as is perceived due the objective test 
which is often being applied. 
While it is submitted there is a legal basis for a derivative claim based on damage to stakeholders to 
be successful, it is unlikely that many such claims will be successful. This is because of the continuing 
restrictive approach taken by the courts and the costly nature of derivative claims. For such an action 
to be successful it would require a wealthy shareholder, with a stakeholder interest, coupled with the 
courts taking a less restrictive view of the derivative claim. The courts under the derivative claim 
statute have continued the trend of the common law by treating derivative actions in a restrictive way 
with several cases not making it past the initial stage.206 Despite the derivative claim legislation 
appearing to have widened the scope for potential actions, in reality, many of the same difficulties in 
taking a derivative action remain from the common law.207 In many cases the courts have stated that 
shareholder grievances are best resolved through unfair prejudice proceedings under section 994208 
which is only open to shareholders. Reisberg argues that the courts will continue to be suspicious of 
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derivative actions and will potentially become even more reluctant to allow actions succeed.209 
Another issue with derivative actions is costs and even if successful, any financial gain from the claim 
will be owed to the company as the derivative claim is taken on behalf of the company which acts as a 
disincentive for potential claimants. The two step procedure involved in the statutory derivative claim 
is an issue as the costs associated with even the preliminary process can be significant.210 In England 
and Wales the general rule is that the loser pays the costs which opens the shareholder to a significant 
bill if unsuccessful. Since Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2)211 the English Courts have been able to 
indemnify costs of a shareholder and such orders have been given in Kiani v Cooper212 and Stainer v 
Lee.213 However the order to indemnify costs will be only be awarded if the shareholder is granted 
permission to continue and even then there is no guarantee, in Parry v Bartlett214 no such order was 
given despite the shareholder gaining permission. Perhaps one of the few ways action could be taken 
on stakeholder grounds and still be practically feasible, would be where a director opts for short term 
shareholder gain by acting to the detriment of a stakeholder group. If the decision cost the company 
financially in the long term, Gibbs argues that the damage caused to the company could outweigh the 
substantial financial costs of a claim, given the right set of circumstances. He uses the example of 
where disregarding employee interests would have a negative effect on the company in the long 
term.215 Given that no stakeholder based derivative claim has been taken in any of the reported 
judgments the right set of circumstances seem to be difficult to find. 
Given the practical difficulties in taking derivative claims other methods of enforcement under ESV 
should be examined. Through the UK Insolvency Act 1986 a liquidator can take an action on the 
company’s behalf against a director who has breached their duties to the company.216 This procedure 
led to many of the common law cases against directors for alleged breaches of the duty to act bona 
fide in the interests of the company. An action purely for the benefit of a stakeholder group would 
require somewhat of an altruistic liquidator217 and such an action taken through good faith under 
section 172(1) would be likely fail without some damage to the company or to the members. However 
where the directors’ failure to consider a stakeholder interests damaged the company or the 
company’s ability to promote wealth for the members, the likelihood of success of such an action 
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would increase and the requirement of an altruistic liquidator would no longer be necessary as the 
company’s interests would have been infringed as well as the stakeholders.  
Further, the UK Insolvency Act 1986 allows liquidators and creditors to request the court to review 
the conduct of a person involved in the management of a company, if that person appears to be in 
breach of their duties.218 Where it is found that a director has been in breach, the court can order the 
director to contribute compensation to the company as the court thinks just.219 Again there is the 
potential for liquidators and creditors to take action against directors for a breach of section 172(1) for 
failing to consider stakeholder interests if that failure damages the company. If that failure mounted to 
a financial loss for the company it is easily conceivable for a creditor or liquidator to take such steps. 
From a practical point of view a liquidator’s ability to reclaim the costs of litigation conducted on the 
company’s behalf may also make it more likely for them to take an action against a director in 
comparison to an activist shareholder through a derivative action. Williams, while acknowledging the 
potential for section 212 to enforce the ESV principles, believes that the vague nature of the duties 
owed through section 172(1) makes the likelihood of such actions low.220 He goes on to state that any 
litigation under section 172 will be clouded in uncertainty because of this vagueness inherent in the 
standard of liability.221 Williams’ argument is precisely why the change of perception of good faith is 
necessary to enforce ESV. An objective assessment of honesty in good faith establishes a clear 
standard of liability and allows directors to be held in breach of their duty based on stakeholder 
grounds if the breach also harms the company. Should the good faith duty become a clear standard of 
director behaviour as is argued for in this thesis, then the possibility of actions being taken under 
section 212 would increase.  
In addition to a liquidator taking action against directors for breach of duty, disqualification also can 
be a valuable tool to influence director behaviour and protect the company as an entity from abuse.222 
The courts have made frequent use of the disqualification legislation with 1054 disqualifications in 
2013-14223 and the numbers have been at a similar level over the past 4 years.224 The rules on 
disqualification in the UK have arisen in response to the limitations of traditional mechanisms in 
effectively disciplining directors.225 Pursuant to the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1985, 
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directors can be disqualified if a director of an insolvent company is deemed ‘unfit to be concerned in 
the management of a company’.226 Disqualification can last 2-15227 years and is a complete bar on 
being a director of a registered company in the UK.228 A disqualification order can be made by a court 
who is winding up the company or in the case of a voluntary winding up, the court with jurisdiction to 
wind up the company.229 Generally there is a broad scope as to what qualifies as being unfit to be a 
director a company.230 The factors to be considered when making such orders come from schedule 1 
and include a breach of ‘any fiduciary duty by the director in relation to the company’.231 As one of 
the grounds mentioned in schedule 1 is a breach of duty, it is possible for directors to be disqualified 
for a breach of good faith under section 172(1) and disqualification orders have been given for acting 
in the detriment of employee interests.232 Interestingly another element to be considered is ‘the extent 
of the director’s responsibility for any failure by the company to supply any goods or services which 
have been paid for’233 which is presumably designed to allow for disqualifications against directors 
who have acted contrary to creditor or customer interests.  
6.08 Public Enforcement of Directors’ Duties 
The potential remedies discussed above are private actions based on a breach of good faith under 
section 172(1). Because the members’ interests are prioritised by section 172(1), in order for there to 
be a breach of good faith the company’s ability to promote the success of the members must be 
damaged. Therefore any damage to stakeholder interests, no matter how extensive, will not breach 
good faith under ESV if there is no damage to the members’ interests. This makes the good faith duty 
an unsatisfactory remedy for enforcing purely stakeholder interests. Instead, a superior method to 
ensure directors take into account stakeholder interests would be enforcement through a provision free 
of the requirement to prioritise members’ interests. One such provision is contained in the Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986 as sections 7 and 8 allow for the Secretary of State to take an 
action against a director if it is in the public interest to do so.234 Hence the Act, establishes grounds for 
disqualification free of the requirement of a breach of good faith under section 172(1) and the 
prioritisation of members’ interests. This public interest criterion potentially grants a wide discretion 
to the Secretary of State235 and disqualification orders could be taken under a broad range of 
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stakeholder interests.236 The Secretary of State could deem that if directors acted to the detriment of 
stakeholders such as the community, the environment, or employees, it would be contrary to the 
public interest and seek for the director to be disqualified.  
Perhaps the best way to establish a less shareholder orientated model of the corporate objective in the 
UK is for the Secretary of State to increase the frequency of disqualification orders under the public 
interest provisions. If the Secretary of State became willing to use the broad powers granted by the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act, directors may well start embracing the principles of ESV to 
ensure they remained free of disqualification. This would require the Secretary of State to start acting 
as a public enforcer of director’ duties. Private enforcement generally is seen as unlikely to provide 
regular and effective enforcement of directors’ duties.237 As discussed in Chapter four the Company 
Law Review Steering Group (CLRSG) viewed methods other than private enforcement as the best 
way to ensure consideration of the listed interests instead recommending increased reporting and 
transparency standards.238 Given that ESV is more shareholder focused than the common law, the 
protection of stakeholder interests through public enforcement would provide some balance to the 
existing corporate governance model in the UK and would be welcomed by the pluralists who were 
angered by the removal of the OFR.239 However it seems unlikely that the Secretary of State will start 
acting as a public enforcer of directors’ duties. The Secretary of State has been, to date, unwilling to 
take many actions for disqualification with very few orders being given under the public interest 
provision. No such disqualifications took place in 2013-14 with only one in 2012-13.240 There is also 
the problem of any intervention by the Secretary of State being arbitrary or politically motivated 
rather than acting in the interests of justice or fairness.241 
The conclusion from the above discussion is that the requirement under ESV to consider stakeholder 
interests is likely to continue to go unenforced. Currently the UK relies heavily on private methods of 
enforcement for breaches of directors’ duties,242 however these methods are ineffective in enforcing 
the stakeholder element of ESV. This is due to practical difficulties with the statutory derivative claim 
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and problems with proving a breach of section 172(1) due to the prioritisation of shareholders’ 
interests. In addition there seems to be a reluctance to adopt a public style enforcement approach to 
directors’ duties as the Secretary of State seems reluctant to utilise the powers granted to take 
disqualification orders in the public interest.  
In Ireland however, the public enforcement of directors’ duties has become a key driver in relation to 
standard setting for directors.243 Undoubtedly, public enforcement of directors’ duties has the potential 
to enhance corporate governance244 and has advantages over private enforcement.  As Parkinson notes 
‘deterrence, and the creation and refinement of standards of conduct and performance, have the 
quality of ‘public goods’ which private enforcers, perusing only private gain are liable to under 
produce’.245 Public enforcement allows for a wider representation of interests246 as private 
enforcement mechanisms, such as derivative actions and minority oppression remedies, are available 
only to shareholders. Actions taken by public bodies have the potential to represent stakeholders’ 
interests or the public interest. In addition, public enforcement is likely to have a greater deterrent 
effect than private enforcement247 as there is likely to be much more reputational damage to a director 
from a public enforcement regime as compared to private litigation.248 The potential for reputational 
damage was noted by Hardiman J in the restriction case of Re Tralee Beef and Lamb Ltd249 where he 
stated a restriction order is ‘gravely damaging to the reputation of a person thus afflicted’.250  
The trend of Irish law moving towards public enforcement of directors’ duties can be traced back to 
the McDowell Report251 which highlighted a culture of non-compliance with company law.252 The 
report found that existing law had no deterrent effect upon directors concluding, ‘those who are 
tempted to make serious breaches of company law have little reason to fear detection or 
prosecution’.253 The report led to the establishment of the Office of the Director for Corporate 
Enforcement (ODCE).254 The role of the director is to enforce the Companies Acts, to encourage 
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compliance with the Companies Acts and to investigate offences under the Companies Acts.255 Since 
the establishment of the ODCE corporate law enforcement in Ireland has improved significantly as 
the ODCE has taken an aggressive approach to ensuring compliance with the Companies Acts256 and a 
new practice of active enforcement has evolved in Ireland.257 As well as pursuing disqualification and 
restriction orders, the ODCE has sought to ensure a greater awareness among directors of the 
provisions of the Companies Acts with a view to increasing compliance.258 Prior to the enactment of 
the Companies Act 2014 directors’ fiduciary duties fell outside the scope of the ODCE as they were 
derived from common law rules and equitable doctrines and were not enshrined in statute.259 However 
after the introduction of the Companies Act 2014, directors’ fiduciary duties are now enacted in 
statute260 and will be under the remit of the ODCE. As a result the ODCE can now use its powers to 
investigate suspected breaches261 of directors’ fiduciary duties and seek to ensure compliance with the 
duty to act in the interests of the company.  
Given that the statutory directors’ duties now fall within the remit of the ODCE the most effective 
method of public enforcement would be for the ODCE to initiate proceedings against directors for a 
breach of duty. This would have a significant deterrent effect on directors and, as Keay notes, the 
existence of a potential action being brought by a public authority could well lead to improved 
director behaviour.262 The Companies Act 2014 states that it is a function of the ODCE ‘to enforce 
this Act, including by the prosecution of offences by way of summary proceedings’.263 However this 
power is likely to be reserved for the most serious of corporate offences such as fraudulent or reckless 
trading264 rather than for breaches of fiduciary duties. The primary difficulty with the ODCE taking 
actions against directors for breaches of fiduciary duty would be the strain placed on its resources. 
Enforcing the Companies Acts is already an extremely broad remit and a rigorous enforcement of the 
fiduciary duties listed in section 228 of the Companies Act 2014 would require the ODCE to be given 
significantly increased funding.  
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Despite the fact that enforcement of directors’ fiduciary duties now falls within the enforcement remit 
of the ODCE it is submitted that restriction of directors265 will continue to be the means through 
which directors’ duties are most frequently enforced by public means. As discussed in chapter five, 
the effect of restriction is that a restricted person cannot be appointed as a director for a five year 
period unless the company meets certain capitalisation requirements. Crucially, from an enforcement 
perspective, liquidators of insolvent companies are required to make restriction applications to the 
High Court against all directors involved in the insolvent company266 and the burden of proof is 
placed on directors to show that they have acted honestly and responsibly.267 This amounts to a cost 
effective outsourcing of enforcement and turns liquidators into quasi-public enforcers of directorial 
standards.268 Placing the general requirement on liquidators of insolvent companies to make restriction 
orders has been the prime moving force in relation to directorial incompetence and misconduct in 
Ireland.269 The ODCE also has standing to make application for restrictions.270 The only defence 
available to a director to avoid restriction is to prove that they have acted honestly and responsibly. In 
La Moselle Clothing Ltd271 Shanley J stated that in deciding whether a director should be restricted 
one of the main factors to be considered was ‘the extent to which the director has or has not complied 
with any obligation imposed on him by the Companies Acts’.272 The importance of compliance with 
the Companies Acts in assessing restriction orders was again emphasised by the Supreme Court in Re 
Squash (Ireland) Ltd.273 Therefore a breach of good faith under section 228(1)(a) of the Companies 
Act 2014 will mean that directors will be unlikely to avail of this defence and will be restricted. The 
objective standard of good faith means that it is possible to prove that the director has in fact not acted 
in good faith in the interests of the company and so it is possible for a director to be restricted through 
an action by the ODCE or by a liquidator in the event of the company entering liquidation. A 
combination of the objective test for good faith and the public enforcement mechanisms of the ODCE 
and the restriction regime make it possible to implement an effective enforcement regime when 
directors do not act in the interests of the company. There certainly seems to be a willingness from the 
judiciary to embrace the public enforcement doctrine of restriction as well as a desire to hold directors 
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accountable. In Mitek Holdings Ltd: Grace v Kachkar274 Fennelly J, stated that the restriction regime 
‘evinces public concern that directorships involve real responsibility and that persons who do not 
conform at least to some generally acceptable minimum standards either should not, in the public 
interest, be permitted or should be restricted in regard to future holding of directorships’.275  
6.09 Conclusion 
Legal strategies are only relevant to the extent that they induce compliance.276 While entity 
maximisation offers the greatest possibility to increase benefits for all participants, enforcement of the 
model is also possible. Enforcement of directors’ duties under any model of the corporate objective is 
a difficult issue and as described in chapters two, three and four shareholder value, stakeholder theory 
and Enlightened Shareholder Value all have difficulties with enforcement. However, it is submitted 
that through the duty of good faith it is possible to hold directors to account when they fail to act in 
the interests of the company. Because of the objective nature of the test it is possible for a court to 
find a director was not acting in good faith when deciding if the director honestly believed he was 
acting in the best interests of the company. However despite the good faith duty and its common law 
equivalent the bona fide duty, being subject to numerous examinations by the court, the area is still 
severely lacking clarity as to what standard a director must adhere to in order to satisfy the duty. The 
courts refer to the duty as subjective in nature yet when it comes to actual application of the test, any 
act that is deemed unreasonable by the courts, is seen to be a view which could not be honestly held. 
To increase the chances of the duty having a deterrent effect on directors it honesty should be seen as 
an objective scale in line with the judgment set out in Royal Brunei.  
There are a number of potential actions which can be taken to hold directors to account for a breach of 
good faith. However private enforcement by means of a derivative action seems unlikely to provide 
the desired enforcement mechanism. Issues with costs and the restrictive approach taken by the courts 
in relation to derivative actions appear to be a block on derivative actions acting as an enforcement 
mechanism. This is true of both the common law derivative action in Ireland and the statutory 
derivative claim in the UK.  Liquidators of insolvent company can take action against directors for a 
breach of duty in the UK.277 In Ireland public enforcement offers the best possible solution for 
effective enforcement of directors’ duties. It is submitted that public enforcement, through restrictions 
taken by liquidators or the ODCE, when directors fail to act in the best interests of the company offers 
the most effective means of enforcing the entity focused approach.    
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
7.01 – Research Question and Answer  
The research question of this thesis was to determine which model of the corporate objective would 
be most likely to confer the greatest benefit to all constituents in a company. There is good reason for 
attempting to find a satisfactory normative model which can be practically implemented given the 
growing influence companies exercise over the economy, company stakeholders and society in 
general. The law should require more from companies than simply increasing profits for their 
shareholders and companies should maximise wealth for all participants in the company. Numerous 
attempts have been made at answering the question: in whose interests should a company be run? 
Shareholder value, stakeholder theory, codetermination, Enlightened Shareholder Value (ESV) and 
entity maximisation and sustainability have all been discussed as possible solutions for Ireland. The 
answer proposed is that directors should operate the company with the aim of maximising the entity’s 
wealth and ensuring its sustainability. Instead of focusing on providing benefit to specific sets of 
interests such as shareholders or stakeholders, directors should seek to promote the success of the 
company as a separate legal entity. It is submitted that it is possible, with a reinterpretation from the 
Irish courts of what it means to act in the interests of the company, to implement an entity focused 
approach to the corporate objective in Ireland. It is also submitted there is a sufficient legal basis for 
Ireland the courts to make such a reinterpretation based on the doctrine of separate legal personality 
and cases from the UK prior to the enactment of the UK Companies Act 2006. 
7.02 Reasons for Advocating the Entity Focused Approach 
The first reason for advocating the entity focused approach to the corporate objective is that it reflects 
the legal reality that the company is a distinct entity separate from all its various constituents and 
interest groups. A company is, as Farar describes it, ‘A legal concept which, through the conferment 
of separate legal personality, provides legal recognition of bodies of persons as distinctive holders of 
rights under a collective name, having distinct legal consequences. This is not simply a matter of form 
and fiction’.1 The company entity is an organisation that is separate from all those who are associated 
with it including the shareholders.2 Therefore equating the company’s interests with the shareholders 
and applying shareholder value does not represent the legal reality of what a company is. The 
corporate form developed because of its unique ability to promote and protect all kinds of investors, 
not just shareholders, and this was only possible because the entity was legally separate from its 
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investors.3 Because of this unique ability to promote many different types of interests, treating the 
company as a separate entity offers the best method to maximise benefits for all constituents.  
The second reason is that other models are ill-equipped to meet the normative goal of providing 
maximum wealth to all participants in the company. Stakeholder theory was rejected on grounds that 
it is impractical and unenforceable from a legal perspective. Actually operating the company for the 
benefit of all participants removes any clear objective and leaves directors completely unaccountable, 
the consequences of which is likely to damage the company in its attempts to be economically 
successful.4 If the company is not successful it is much less likely to provide benefits to its 
constituents. Codetermination was rejected as implementing a two-tiered board model in a common 
law jurisdiction is extremely unlikely to happen in the near future and it is also unlikely to achieve the 
goals of increased benefits for all participants as the model’s primary focus is on the interests of 
employees and shareholders. ESV was rejected on the basis that the very system of requiring directors 
to ‘have regard to’ stakeholder interests is unsatisfactory because of its unenforceable nature.5 
Significant issues with enforcement have been experienced with a duty to have regard to the interests 
of employees both in the UK6 and Ireland7 and the experience with ESV has been no different.8  
Efforts at enforcing the stakeholder element of ESV through corporate disclosure have proven futile 
and, as outlined in chapter six, there seems to be no legal method available to effectively enforce the 
listed interests contained in section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006. Because the duty to have 
regard to the listed interests under ESV is completely unenforceable what remains is a clear legislative 
duty to promote the success of the company for the benefit of the shareholders. A legislative scheme 
which priorities shareholder interests but which requires directors to take into account stakeholders is 
simply a model of shareholder value and unlikely to benefit any other interest group other than 
shareholders. 
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The final alternative is shareholder value. Chapter two demonstrated the divergence between 
shareholder value theory and the common law judgments from England, Wales and Scotland. The 
chapter argued that the common law did not advocate a shareholder value approach but instead 
required directors to take decisions on the basis of what was in the best interests of the company as an 
entity9 and that directors should consider the interests of stakeholders, as well as shareholders, in 
deciding what was in the interests of the company.10 However this approach was not taken by the Irish 
courts who interpreted the duty to act in the interests of the company as a duty to act for the benefit of 
the shareholders,11 thus advocating a shareholder value approach. Many arguments were discussed in 
favour of shareholder value such as agency theory and property rights, however no argument reflected 
the reality that the company is a distinct legal entity12 which is incapable of being owned13 and that 
directors’ fiduciary duties are owed to this separate entity.14 The only persuasive argument in favour 
of the shareholder value approach is that the model best allows companies to provide benefits to all 
participants due to its ability to be practically implemented. While this may be true when stakeholder 
theory is the only alternative, shareholder value is not the best way to benefit all constituents. Instead, 
viewing the company as an entity distinct from its shareholders and stakeholders is the best way to 
confer such benefits.  
The entity approach provides the company itself with the best chance of being successful as the 
company’s interests take priority over all interest groups. The focus of directors under the model is to 
maximise the company’s wealth and ensure its sustainability. This aim allows for stakeholder interests 
to be taken into account and even prioritised over shareholder interests, if it is of benefit to the 
company to do so, an outcome which is not possible under shareholder value. With the priority of 
directors being on maximising the company’s wealth, the company is more likely to be economically 
successful and all participants can benefit from knock-on effects of profitable companies.15 By 
generating wealth, companies not only benefit shareholders but also meet a number of other social 
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objectives16 such as providing employment, paying corporation tax and providing products and 
services for the public. The entity focused approach is in contrast to shareholder value which requires 
directors to maximise wealth for the shareholders which can be damaging to the company in the long 
term. This is because interests of the company as an entity may not always coincide with those of the 
current shareholders.17 For example, severe cost cutting may increase profit in the short term but is 
likely to be harmful to the company’s business in the long term.18 As a result, by damaging the 
company as an entity, shareholder value can be harmful to both shareholders and stakeholders in the 
long term.19 Therefore, it is submitted that entity maximisation is more likely to achieve the goal of 
maximum possible benefits for all constituents than any other model of the corporate objective.  
The final reason in favour of the entity maximisation and sustainability model is that it is reasonably 
enforceable. While the entity focused approach outlined in this thesis has the ultimate goal of 
providing benefit for all company constituents, the model does not have the difficulties with practical 
application which prevents the implementation of stakeholder theory. Entity maximisation provides 
directors with one clear goal, maximising the value of the company as an entity while ensuring its 
sustainability. It also provides a clear criterion how to decide between competing interests, directors 
should act in favour of the interests which is most likely to provide most benefit to the company as an 
entity. In addition, legal enforcement of the entity focused approach can be ensured through the duty 
to act in good faith. The Companies Act 2014 requires directors to ‘act in good faith in what the 
director considers to be the interests of the company’.20 As outlined in chapter six, this standard of 
good faith is assessed primarily on objective grounds. This objective test means that it is possible to 
hold director to account when they fail to act in the interests of the company. This can be done either 
through a derivative action, an action taken by a liquidator or by restriction orders. These enforcement 
methods may have a deterrent effect on director behaviour and ensure directors do comply with their 
duty to act in the interests of the company and so act as the enforcement mechanism for an entity 
focused approach. However this deterrent effect could be magnified further if the true objective 
standard of good faith became clear. In this regard, this thesis has argued that honesty should be 
judged by an objective standard in line with the judgment in Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan.21  This 
would make the objective standard of good faith clear while still not interfering with the application 
of the business judgment rule.  
7.03 The Future 
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How the courts will choose to interpret the Companies Act 2014 will decide the Irish approach to the 
corporate objective. This thesis has argued for a reinterpretation of what it means to act in the interests 
of the company in Irish law and that there is a sufficient legal basis for such a reinterpretation based 
on the doctrine of separate legal personality and cases from the UK prior to the enactment of the UK 
Companies Act 2006. While implementing an entity focused approach in the UK would require 
significant legislative reform, the entity approach can be applied in Ireland if the courts interpreted the 
duty to act in the interests of the company as a duty to act in the interests of the company as an entity 
rather than a duty to promote the shareholders’ interests. Such a determination can only be made by 
the development of new case law and there is reason to believe that the courts may take a different 
view of the duty should a case was brought under the Companies Act 2014. The cases which equate a 
duty to act in the interests of company with a duty to act in the interests of the shareholders are more 
than twenty years old.22 Ireland, in more recent years, has seen a greater focus on directors’ duties 
serving a public interest function.23 This is evidenced by the establishment of the Office for the 
Director of Corporate Enforcement and introduction of the restriction regime, the main aim of which 
is to protect the public.24 The Company Law Review Group (CLRG) made it clear that they were 
unwilling to recommend following ESV which prioritises shareholder interests instead preferring a 
more general statement of directors’ duties which would give the judiciary ‘interpretational latitude’.25 
The Companies Act 2014 has also introduced the new fiduciary duty to act honestly and responsibly26 
which suggests that directors’ duties encompass more than simply a duty to maximise wealth for 
shareholders. However despite these developments which indicate that the interpretation of the duty to 
act in the interests of the company may be altered in the future, currently Ireland would still seem to 
advocate a shareholder value approach and it is only by the development of new case law under the 
Companies Act 2014 that this can change.  
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